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  i 
Abstract 
This dissertation addresses several highly-critical issues in affective computing and 
agent architecture design including knowledge representation, motivation, emotion 
appraisal and affective decision making. The approach presented integrates motivational 
drives, goals and associated behaviours via a multi-dimensional Affective Space.  
The research focuses on an emotionally motivated artificial intelligence (EMAI) 
architecture. This architecture dispenses with the ideas implemented in contemporary 
affective agent architectures where individual emotional states are modelled as individual 
variables, integrated and processed using complex algorithms. Contemporary approaches 
required significant programming effort to modify them for domains outside their realm, 
integration of new emotional states and high-level complex affective decision making. 
Unlike contemporary affective agent architectures, the EMAI architecture reasons using a 
multi-dimensional decision making process where emotional states are modelled as 
coexisting locations in a six-dimensional affective continuum called the Affective Space.  
Through use of the Affective Space, an EMAI agent can predict the effect that certain 
behaviours will have on its emotional state and in turn decide how to behave. Furthermore, 
the agent can use the emotions produced from its behaviour to update its beliefs about 
particular events and entities.  The nature of the Affective Space also allows an EMAI 
agent to deal with processes related to emotion synthesis in a more effective manner than 
contemporary architectures. These processes include the natural diminishing of an 
emotional states strength over time, the way in which emotions can influence an agents 
perspective of a situation and the way in which an agent can migrate from one emotional 
state to another.  
This dissertation contributes crucial and unique concepts and formalisations of emotion 
based intelligence for agent construction to the domain of Artificial Intelligence (in 
particular Affective Computing). It introduces a unique process for emotionally motivated 
decision making based on holistic and atomic appraisals made with respect to events. The 
thesis contained within has been supported through experimentation that has confirmed the 
effectiveness of the emotion synthesis technique in the EMAI architecture and how this is 
used to produce intelligent agents capable of emotional reasoning and decision making.   
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1. Introduction 
We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars. 
OSCAR WILDE. 
 
 
1.1 The Ultimate Puzzle 
How is it possible for a slow, tiny brain, whether biological or electronic, to 
perceive, understand, predict, and manipulate a world far larger and more 
complicated than itself?  (Russell and Norvig 1995) 
Understanding the functions of the brain, according to Russell and Norvig (1995), is the 
ultimate puzzle the domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is attempting to solve.   In an 
endeavour to develop intelligent systems that mimic the thinking and behaviour of rational 
humans, AI researchers have called on a number of disciplines including psychology, 
physiology, neurology and philosophy.  However, since 1956 when the AI disciplines 
name was first coined,  researchers have not made a considerable advancement toward a 
theory of general intelligence (Stork 1997).  In Storks interview with Marvin Minsky, 
Minsky conveyed his belief that too much time and effort is put into small projects that do 
not contribute to the progression of a model for general intelligence.   Minsky concludes 
that AI researchers have but scratched at the surface of the fundamentals of true AI and he 
believes one of these fundamentals is emotion (Stork 1997). 
When computers are viewed as logically intelligent machines, what would be the point 
in clouding their rational abilities with unpredictable and confusing qualities such as 
emotions?  This may be a common view amongst AI purists and much of this opinion 
could be due to the way in which the term is perceived and defined (Baillie et al. 2000a).  
Traditionally, philosophers have defined emotions to be interruptions to otherwise logical 
states of being (Smith and Kirby 2000).  The recent resurgence of research in the 
emotional realm in both psychology and cognitive science agrees with the view developed 
by the late Charles Darwin who, in the late 1800s, conceived that emotions play an 
important part in our cognition and serve to provide us with the mechanisms for adaptive 
behaviour in a dynamically complex world (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
From a neurological standpoint, emotions act as a kind of filtering system for 
information processing within the brain (Pert 1997).  The neuropeptide receptors, 
responsible for emotional states and original thought, were initially believed only to exist 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  2 
in the amygdala, hippocampus and hypothalymus (the traditional seats of emotion).  
Recent research has revealed that these receptors exist in high concentrations throughout 
the body including the spinal cord, where all bodily sensations and feelings are initially 
processed.  Therefore, all sensory information passing between synapses undergoes an 
emotional filtering process.  This operation assists the brains ability to deal with the 
deluge of sensory input that it receives.  Neurology indicates that emotion plays a role in 
the way humans process information and therefore suggests that emotion affects human 
intelligence.  Furthermore, it can be argued that intelligence goes beyond logic and 
synthesising emotional responses in machines could greatly enhance the field of AI. 
Although emotion is an integral part of the human psyche, traditional AI researchers 
have all but ignored the role that emotions play in intelligence. Understanding emotion 
generation and developing a reasonable computational model may hold the key to 
unlocking the potential of affective (emotion based) reasoning and decision making in 
machines.   
One such line of research is the realm of Affective Computing. This relatively new 
domain examines the effect that emotions have on human intelligence and endeavours to 
use this to further enhance the field of AI.  How the concept of emotions might heighten 
the intelligent functioning of artificial beings is still unclear, but through the variety of 
research programs that currently exist, areas that might benefit are being identified.  In this 
domain much work is being done to develop artificial intelligences capable of identifying, 
processing and synthesizing emotions.  Picard (1997) suggests that emotions are an 
integral part and a natural progression for artificial intelligence.  She further states that: ... 
the inability of todays computers to recognize, express, and have emotions, severely limits 
their ability to act intelligently and interact naturally with us.  
A domain where this is becoming evident is the realm of interactive fiction where 
autonomous characters, generated by a computer are expected to act and interact in a 
believable and emotional way (Stern 1999).  The fictional characters that inspire these 
computerised counterparts began with the intelligent machines of Isaac Asimov. These 
initially became the primary element in futuristic fictional environments.  Before many 
others, writers realised that to create convincing storylines and allow human and machine 
interaction, emotions had to be an integral part of these electronic and mechanical 
intelligences. Examples of such automatons are Arthur C Clarks HAL (Clarke and 
Kubrick, 1993), R2-D2 and C3-PO (Sansweet and Zahn 1998), Terry Nations O.R.A.C. 
(Wells and Nazarro, 1997), Star Treks Commander Data (Okuda and Okuda 1997), and 
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Asimovs robot, R. Daneel Ovilaw (Asimov 1950).  Developing this type of believability 
in fictional characters impacts on the domain of Affective Computing in areas such as 
interactive fiction and computer games.  Researchers are aware of the need to produce 
computerised characters that are believable (Reilly 1996) in order to suspend the users 
disbelief in the same way attempted in fictional books and motion pictures.  However, 
developers of computerised characters, in particular autonomous ones, need to understand 
how these characters can be programmed with the ability to construct and process synthetic 
emotions as well as convey them.  
For years, scientists have debated over a general definition of emotion. However, one 
thing is agreed, emotions affect human behaviour.  The common stigma associated with 
emotions is that they essentially cause irrational behaviour.  To act in an emotional way 
implies a fallacious, senseless and illogical demeanor.  In fact, throughout this dissertation, 
there are terms such as emotional decision-making and emotional behaviour.  Out of 
context these premises might lead the reader to assume them to mean irrational decision-
making and irrational behaviour.  However, this is not the case. 
In a recent issue of The Courier Mail1 dated the 11th of August 2001, an eye-catching 
advertisement was placed in the business section.  This advertisement had the large banner 
heading of EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE.    On further investigation it was discovered 
that it was an advertisement for a seminar on how to be emotionally intelligent.  In the 
context of a newspaper section read by people interested in big business it could hardly be 
concluded that the term emotional in this advertisement could mean irrational.  It was 
however, referring to the latest buzzwords in the business world.  In 1995, Daniel Goleman 
coined the term emotional intelligence (Goleman 1995).  He suggests that to get ahead in 
business it not only takes intelligence but also a considerable amount of knowing how to 
control and use the natural biological trait of emotion to ones advantage. Goleman (1995) 
defines emotional intelligence as: the capacity to form an accurate, veridical model of 
oneself and to be able to use that model to operate effectively in life. 
                                                   
1
 A leading Australian current affairs newspaper produced daily in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. 
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1.2 A Need for Emotional Computers 
There has been much literature and research in recent years on the theories and 
generation of emotions in artificial intelligences.  Many psychological theorists believe 
that emotions represent adaptive responses in different situations (Plutchik 1980, Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985). Many AI researchers (Picard 1997, Sloman 2001 and Minsky 2000) 
hope these mechanisms can be integrated into intelligent artificial devices for this same 
reason. 
Hanley (1997) explains the need for emotions to act as motivational mechanisms to aid 
in decision making.  In order to perform even the simplest task, a cognitive being (human 
or artificial) must decide between a number of options.  Logical selection of a choice, at a 
minimum, requires weighing up the probable outcomes of the range of choices.  The 
number of choices could be anywhere from one to infinity. Interpolating the choices that 
arise as outcomes of particular events and the further consequences of selecting from 
among these choices creates an explosion of options.  In addition to tracking all 
possibilities, the being must also draw on its knowledge on how to complete a task that 
will satisfy these options while eliminating the irrelevancies.  Hanley concludes that, a 
purely logical being (devoid of emotion) when faced with such a plethora of decisions 
would become overwhelmed with the immense amount of possibilities from which to 
select. 
Emotional decision making provides a good solution for computer systems that face the 
problem of enumerating and evaluating multitudinous choices within an acceptable time 
frame.  One application of AI that is benefiting by integrating emotional decision making 
mechanisms is that of intelligent agents.  The word agent is used within the AI domain to 
refer to a number of different applications.  The most popular use of the term pertains to an 
autonomous artificial being that has the ability to interact intelligently within a temporally 
dynamic environment.  
Much of the current research for achieving these types of results with artificial agents is 
based in appraisal theories.  Models such as the Affective Reasoner (Elliot 1992), the Oz 
project (Bates et al. 1992), PETEII (El-Nasr 1998), Silas (Blumberg et al. 1996) and 
Yuppy (Velasquez 1999) are just a few examples of how appraisals (cognitive and non-
cognitive) are used to generate emotional states and behaviours within an artificial 
intelligence. 
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The variety of emotional concepts implemented in these models using these appraisal 
theories is quite expansive. No truly correct model has been identified (Velasquez 1999) 
and much debate continues on which models or theories are best for integration into AI 
architectures. 
1.3 Perceived Shortfalls of Contemporary Research in Affective 
Computing  
Synthesising and modelling emotions is a complex task.  Most affective computing 
research efforts concentrate on particular aspects of generating emotions.  There is no 
holistic view and with the limited understanding of how emotions are produced and the 
affect they have on humans, it would be arrogant to assume that one could be actualised so 
early in the study of this field.  Much work has been done on small research projects that 
study particular aspects of the relationship between emotions and intelligence.  
1. Current affective computing architectures model emotions as individual variables.  
The problem inherent with this method is that complex algorithms need to be 
programmed into the models to manage the relationships that exist between 
differing emotional states.  
2. In humans, the experiencing of emotional states provides feedback that influences 
future behaviour.  This mechanism is not used in current models to the extent that it 
allows the artificial being to adapt to its environment.   
3. Contemporary Affective Computing models are limited due to their lack of deep 
knowledge representation and knowledge manipulation capabilities.  Contemporary 
models can associate emotion with specific beliefs in the knowledge base, however, 
this restricts the way in which the agents can understand and interact with its 
environment.  Emotional responses need to be associated with beliefs throughout 
the knowledge base. 
4. In contemporary research, the emotion associated with an event is evaluated 
holistically. Contemporary affective agent architectures provide no means of 
attributing partial blame or credit of resulting emotions to individual elements that 
were part of the event.   
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5. The natural decrease in emotion strength or emotional decay in previous models 
has been dealt with by using constant decay rate functions that act over time and 
require considerable programming and coordination effort.  This is a shortfall 
associated with the representation of emotional states as individual variables.  
6. Current models do not address the issue of dynamic goal interpretation (via 
dynamic planning) allowing the agents to change plans based on emotional 
experience.  Emotional responses should allow an affective agent to reevaluate its 
goals and plans through belief revision.   
7. Current models lack the ability to maintain a temporally dynamic emotional 
experience with an environmental element be it an object or another agent.  This 
means that contemporary agents are unable to associate positive emotions with an 
element in one instance and in another, through experience, change its emotional 
perspective about the element to associate a negative emotion with it.   
8. Contemporary agent models do not apply emotional bias in decision making. While 
they do provide the means to generate agents with personalities and 
preprogrammed behaviours associated with differing dispositions, they do not allow 
for temporal changes in decision making using an emotional bias. 
9. As yet, no computational models of emotional intelligence have been described to 
formalise the emergence of emotion in an agent model.   
10. While emotional states combine in current affective computing models to produce a 
single emotional state they require cumbersome programming and coordination of 
the individual emotional state to be achieved.   
The research presented in this dissertation examines how these limitations influence the 
affective decision making process and how the solutions presented within contribute 
significantly to the domains of affective computing and AI.  These contributions will be 
explained and demonstrated by examining the new concepts and mechanisms 
introduced.  Furthermore, this dissertation presents the current work taking place in the 
domain of affective computing and an improved affective agent architecture that 
integrates a new approach to emotion synthesis and affective decision making. 
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1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
By considering all the contemporary ideas and models of emotion, this dissertation 
presents an examination of the elements that make up an emotional event. It explores how 
the assessment of these elements, when combined, can be used to generate emotional states 
and responses in temporal situations. To this end, considerable time has been dedicated to 
the exploration of the psychological theories of emotion to develop a computational model 
for emotion generation of which emotional experiences are to be a key element. 
The research in this dissertation proposes the use of physiological and psychological 
theories in the development of a new model for emotion synthesis. This model not only 
offers an artificial intelligence capable of generating behaviours from emotional states, but 
an artificial intelligence with the ability to use its emotional states to revise its beliefs and 
adapt to its environment.  This model, known as the Emotionally Motivated Artificial 
Intelligence (EMAI) architecture, model presents the archetype of an artificial agent 
capable of reasoning about a selection of behaviours by emotionally assessing its 
alternative options. 
As the research presented in this dissertation is unique to AI, Chapter 2 explores the 
concept of emotion, how emotions are defined, generated and the effect they have on 
human decision making and perception.  This chapter also examines the neurological 
foundation for the generation of emotions and their effect on human intelligence. Varying 
theories of emotion and an empirical method for measuring and predicting emotional states 
will be presented.  This is followed by an overview of the most recent research in the 
domain of affective computing, which examines the current state of affective computing 
with respect to intelligent decision making and reasoning.  Due to the fledgling status of 
the domain, this is essential background information. 
Chapter 3 outlines the EMAI architecture. It describes the Knowledge Area, the 
Constructive Area and the Deliberate Area and each of their sub-components. The 
mechanisms introduced in the EMAI architecture makes it possible for an EMAI agent to 
produce internal emotional states.  These states are used to activate goals, develop plans to 
satisfy goals, make affective decisions about behaviour, develop attitudes and adapt to the 
environment. 
Chapter 4 discusses and illustrates the EMAI architectures Ontology.   The Ontology 
defines the knowledge structure within the architecture.  The EMAI Ontology comprises a 
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goal structure called the Goal Hierarchy, structures of concepts called the Type and 
Relation Hierarchies and a set of fundamental conceptual structures that provide the agent 
with a deep knowledge representation essential for its functioning. Most contemporary 
affective agent systems use a set of production rules that are programmed into the agent.  
They associate fixed emotional states and reactions with elements contained in the agents 
environment.  This does not allow the agent to change the emotions it associates with items 
in the environment or its actions. This chapter shows the way in which knowledge is 
represented in the EMAI architecture. It illustrates how the EMAI architectures deep 
knowledge representation provides an EMAI agent with the ability to construct complex 
representations of events, elements within its environment and associated emotions. 
Chapter 5 discusses and illustrates the goal setting and motivational mechanisms 
integrated into the EMAI architecture. It examines in depth the Goal Hierarchy (introduced 
in Chapter 4) and explains how the agent can generate low level emotions that can lead to 
the activation of goals.   This chapter explains how an EMAI agent can dynamically plan 
and re-plan through the interpretation of its goals and behaviours derived from 
motivational emotional states.   
Chapter 6 investigates the way in which an EMAI agent can generate a set of competing 
plans of behaviour from a single activated goal.  These plans are used to produce outward 
behaviour in an EMAI agent that will lead to the satisfaction of a goal. It will also be 
shown why it is important for an EMAI agent to plan and re-plan through its process of 
dynamic goal interpretation. 
Chapter 7 examines EMAI's ability to form valenced reactions2 toward elements that 
make up the agent's environment and use this information to make decisions. It discusses 
the psychological concept of attitude and presents the mechanisms integrated into the 
EMAI architecture that allow for development and use of these valenced reactions to 
perform single-dimension affective decision making.   It will also be shown how an agent 
built with the EMAI architecture can use the valenced reactions that it forms to revise the 
beliefs about its behaviour and interactions with its environment. It can then use this 
information in future decision making tasks. 
                                                   
2
 
2
 A positive or negative response. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the agent's mechanism for generating emotional states and how it 
uses these to prioritise its behaviours.  It explains in detail the Affective Space and 
formalises how it can be used to determine an EMAI agents current emotional state and 
predict future emotional states.  The Affective Space is a key component of the EMAI 
architecture and allows the agent to apply emotional biasing in decision making, 
theoretically represent an infinite number of emotional states without restructuring or 
reprogramming and combine multiple emotional states to produce a single emotional state.   
It allows emotions to be represented in such a way that enables opposing emotions to 
naturally counter-react with each other and produce an automatic decay in emotion 
strengths as an EMAI agents emotional state changes from one emotion to another.  This 
chapter also provides a formalisation of the emergence of emotions in an emotionally 
intelligent decision-making agent. 
Chapter 9 builds on the single-dimension affective decision making model in Chapter 7 
by integrating it with the Affective Space from Chapter 8.    The result is a model for 
multi-dimensional affective decision making.  The chapter also explains how this can be 
used to give an EMAI agent the ability to assign emotions toward individual elements 
present during an event and re-evaluate its emotional reaction toward these elements. This 
assignment and reassignment of emotional states toward individual event entities gives the 
agent the ability to extrapolate future emotional states given the knowledge of the entities 
that will be present.   Furthermore, the chapter explains how emotions are updated, blended 
and decayed within an EMAI agent. 
To conclude, Chapter 10 presents an experiment conducted to evaluate an EMAI 
agent's emotional state generation and associated behaviours. In this chapter, an EMAI 
agent is used to produce a computer-generated character.  An evaluation of the EMAI 
architecture will be presented.  Assessment of human interaction with the computerised 
character will be used to evaluate the emotional behaviour of the agent and confirm the 
architectures contributions of new concepts and theories to the realm of affective 
computing.  
Finally, Chapter 11 summarises the content of the dissertation, reviews the 
contributions of the research and discusses further directions for this work. 
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1.5 Case Studies and Implementation of Prototypes 
Throughout this dissertation are case studies, beginning at Chapter 5, demonstrating 
how the concepts within the EMAI architecture can be implemented and analysed.  The 
prototypes developed and used for the experiments, presented in the case studies, were 
programmed by the author. 
The case studies, presented in Sections 5.3, 7.6 and 7.8, were implemented using Java 
on a personal computer running Windows 95.  Each experiment used the same base source 
code. The knowledge base was stored in a text file and uploaded each time the program 
was run.  This allowed the knowledge base to be changed in order to run different 
experiments without recompiling the source code.  In the case study of Section 7.7, 
Borland C++ Builder was used to create a simple graphical user interface to display a cell 
automata grid. 
The Fido simulation system prototype, presented in Chapter 9 and evaluated in Chapter 
10, was programmed in Borland C++ Builder on a personal computer running Window 98.  
The conceptual graph processor, integrated to manage the agents knowledge base, is 
based on a version of CGKEE (Munday et al, 1996) ported by the author from UNIX to 
Windows 98. 
All software is available from the author upon request. 
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2. Artificial Intelligence and Emotions 
I have no inclination to keep the domain of the psychological floating as it were in the air, without any 
organic foundation... Let the biologists go as far as they can and let us go as far as we can. Some day the two 
will meet. 
FREUD 
2.1 A Missing Piece of the Puzzle 
When emotions are such an integral part of the human psyche, how is it possible that 
traditionally they have been ignored in AI?  It is beyond the scope of this work to 
philosophise about the historical division of emotion and otherwise indiscriminate faculties 
of the mind.  However, it seems pertinent to mention how emotions and reason (logic) may 
have ever become separated. As a point of interest, Koestler (1967) traces the separation 
back to the ubiquitous rituals of human sacrifice where reason and emotions were split into 
the continuous delusional streak that runs throughout history.    It seems logical that the 
killing of another person would conjure up a number of seriously debilitating emotions that 
would impede any reasonable excuses to sacrifice a life.  Therefore, emotions became the 
illogical states that interrupt rational thought.  At least this has been the viewpoint of 
philosophers and the majority of purist AI researchers (Smith 1997).  Although emotions 
have long been acknowledged as an important part of the human mind, it was unclear how 
these conditions affected rational thought.  The conclusion was that they did affect rational 
thought; they made it irrational. 
The first question that should be asked is, why do machine minds, that are disembodied 
from a natural biological system, need to exhibit states that are primarily produced in 
biological beings through a series of physiological reactions? The answer resides in the 
present day research of affective computing.  Whether an emotional system is being 
applied to an artificial being for use in interactional fiction (Jenkins 1998), computer 
games (Maes 1995), facial expression recognition (Rosenfeld 1997) or affective decision 
making  (Baillie et al. 2000b) the consensus that allures researchers to the field of affective 
computing is that emotional mechanisms are essential in the intelligence of a human being 
and therefore, are a relevant issue in artificial intelligence.  This chapter examines the 
psychological and physiological theories of emotion that have been used in describing the 
human emotional experience, and how theories on emotion have inspired AI researchers to 
implement models of emotion derived from these theories into artificial beings to enhance 
their intelligence. 
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It is difficult to deny the intertwining link between emotions and logic given the recent 
emergence of research into emotion in the AI domain.  The inclusion of models of 
emotional synthesis into artificial intelligences may be necessary. Although it is the 
physical attributes of humans that generate emotions, undeniably and unavoidably these 
cognitive responses influence behaviour, perception, motivation and personality.  Given 
that it is recognised that emotions are an important aspect of rational thought, reasoning 
and decision making, it needs to be determined how emotions can be synthetically 
generated.  Obviously, contemporary machines lack the necessary neurotransmitters to 
produce emotions naturally and other discrete and computational methods need to be 
examined for this purpose. 
This chapter begins by defining the concept of emotions and continues by examining 
the physiological basis of emotion in the human body, how these emotions are interpreted, 
and how they affect behaviour. The diversified theories and models of emotions are also 
discussed.  
2.2 A Definition of Emotions 
Freuds epigraph is a well-put observation of the fields of psychology and biology, not 
only at the time that he said it but also now.  No position could be truer when it comes to 
defining emotion.  
Emotion presents itself as a non-concise term in many of the domains that boast an 
understanding of the topic.  These range from neurology (Fellous 1999, Pert 1997) and 
psychology (Smith and Kirby 2000) to artificial intelligence (Picard 1997).  The reason 
may be that the term is used to describe a large range of cognitive and physiological states 
in sentient beings.  
Emotions are often referred to in the broad sense, to describe not only familiar feelings 
such as happiness and sadness, but also biological motivational urges such as hunger and 
thirst  (Pert 1997). Koestler (1967) summed up this general view defining emotions as: 
...mental states accompanied by intense feelings and involving bodily changes of a 
widespread character.  The degree of difficulty plaguing this subject matter is that a 
person rarely experiences a pure emotion (Koestler 1967).  For example, feelings of 
hunger may be accompanied by feelings of frustration.  However, there is a logical 
intuitive difference in defining hunger as an emotion and frustration as an emotion.  
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Another general definition of emotion given by Lefton (1994) defines emotion as: ... a 
subjective response (feeling), usually accompanied by a physiological change, that is 
interpreted by the individual, then readies the individual for some action that is associated 
with a change in behaviour.  This proposition certainly recognises the meeting of the 
minds that Freud predicts and although this does not attempt to explicitly define an 
emotion, it meshes the logical theory that emotions are indeed physiologically produced in 
an individual and affect that individual psychologically. 
Of course, this later stance is clear in the field of neuropsychology, where emotional 
behaviour is explained as physiological and treated at this level with chemicals (Kolb and 
Whishaw 1990).  For example, patients with severe depression can be successfully treated 
with medications containing serotonin (an essential neurotransmitter found in the brain and 
spinal cord) that replaces essential neuropeptides lacking in the brain.  However, much 
research in generating psychological theories and models ignores the biological 
counterpart.  For example, many reasoning, decision-making, belief, personality and social 
behaviour models have been developed in complete isolation of the physiological domain.   
There exists a plethora of theories and models on emotions.  Many of these have been 
conceived to explore different emotional concepts from different perspectives.  Some 
theories were designed to explain the physiological generation and effects of emotion, 
some place an emphasis on the lower primal emotions that influence and generate 
motivational states, while others examine the discrete categorisation of emotional reactions 
and their antecedents.  The following sections provide a synopsis of the work 
accomplished in this domain and the theories and models developed. 
2.2.1 The Physiology of Emotion 
While it is ludicrous to contemplate emotions having the same physiological affect on 
artificial intelligences as they do on the human nervous system, it is crucial to examine the 
biological generation of emotions and physiological effects before a theory of the influence 
of emotions on cognition can be formulated.  
The search for a physiological theory of emotion has lead many researchers to 
experiment with crucial areas of the brain thought to produce emotional responses in 
animals.  These include the hypothalamus, the amygdala, and other cortical and subcortical 
areas (Lefton 1994).  From the 1920s onwards, researchers have removed and electrically 
simulated these portions of the brain in order to examine the behavioural and emotional 
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responses in their subjects.  These particular areas of the brain are collectively known as 
the limbic system and traditionally emotions where thought to emanate from a series of 
neurons located within. 
MacLean (1958), one of the pioneers of physiological-emotion theory, explains human 
emotions as the result of the interaction of three very differently structured brain types; the 
reptilian brain, the paleo-mammalian brain and the neo-mammalian brain.  His theory is 
known as the Three Brain Theory.  In brief, the human brain has inherited the structures of 
these three brains as the result of the evolutionary process.  The reptilian brain corresponds 
to the basic structure in the phylo-genetically oldest parts of the human brain such as the 
medulla, hypothalamus, the reticular system and the basal ganglia (see Figure 2.1).  This 
area is said to be responsible for visceral and glandular regulations, primitive activities, 
reflexes, arousal and sleep. 
Higher level behaviours such as intelligent problem solving, learning and emotion are 
made possible by the cortex: the 2.5 millimetre thick surface layer of the cerebral 
hemispheres that grows out of the brain stem and consists of more than a hundred different 
functional areas made up of different types of nerve cells.  The cortex has three main 
cortical divisions.  MacLean calls them the archicortex, mesocortex and neocortex, each 
respectively coordinated by the reptilian, paleo-mammalian and neo-mammalian sections. 
The archicortex and mesocortex combine to form the limbic system. Psychologists believe 
the limbic system to be the seat of all emotions, attention and memory.  However, there are 
no clear dividing lines between the limbic system and the neocortex, which contains the 
visual and auditory cortex and is responsible for a majority of perceptual processing.  
Figure 2.1 Rough Sketch of the Human Brain Displaying the External 
Cortex and Internal Older Parts of the Brain 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  15 
MacLeans opinion is that each brain has its own special subjective, cognitive memory and 
the evolution of the first and simplest form of the cerebral cortex coincides with the 
development of emotional behaviour. 
Reactions and behaviours generated by the archicortex and mesocortex are otherwise 
known as fast primary emotions and can be likened to the stimulus response experiments 
of the behavioural psychologists (Koestler 1967). These are the primal responses made 
before the stimulus gets to the cortex in order to be interpreted at a higher level. These 
emotions refer to the quick acting emotions that serve as the humans initial response to a 
stimulus and act as a survival mechanism.  They include effects such as fear and 
startledness.  They are the types of emotions that cause a human to jump out of the way of 
a large incoming object only to find later that it was just a beach ball.  Of course, it could 
have been a large rock, so these instinctive emotions are justified.   
MacLeans theory of emotions is an attempt to explain the human ability to produce 
and interpret high-level emotional responses.  How emotional and physiological states 
interact has been theorised by several other psychologists.  Two opposing points of view 
are presented in the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theories (Lefton 1994). 
Around the turn of the 20th century, two independent researchers, James and Lange  
proposed similar theories of emotion generation.  So similar were these views that they are 
now jointly referred to as the James-Lange Theory. In short, the theory states that an 
emotive situation will elicit an appropriate set of physiological changes that will be sensed 
by the brain and interpreted it as an emotion.  Essentially, when an event occurs in our 
environment it triggers behavioural, autonomic and endocrine responses.  These responses 
are sensed by the brain and perceived as emotions.  This implies that bodily changes 
produce emotional responses and not the reverse.  In the opinions of James and Lange, 
people do not cry because they feel sad, but rather, people feel sad because they are crying. 
A contemporary approach to this theory suggests the action of creating facial 
expressions produce emotions.  For example, when a person smiles (first the action), the 
blood flow and temperature in the brain changes and induces pleasant feelings (Zajonc et 
al. 1989). 
A theory in opposition to the James-Lange theory was developed by Cannon and Bard.    
They questioned that if several oppositional emotions, such as joy and anger, are produced 
from similar physiological changes, such as increased blood pressure and heart rate, then 
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how does the individual deduce their emotional state?  The Cannon-Bard theory states that 
when an individual becomes emotional, two areas of the brain are stimulated concurrently.  
These areas are the cerebral cortex and thalamus.  Arousal of the cerebral cortex produces 
emotional responses and the stimulation of the thalamus creates physiological changes. 
While the theories reviewed in this section provide much to contemplate, they are just 
that; theories.  There are many arguments for and against each theory, especially with the 
later two holding opposing viewpoints (Lefton 1994).  A newer approach by Pert and 
Snyder (Pert 1997), reviewed next, is supported with stronger research evidence and 
examines the effects of emotions at the chemical level of physiological change and may 
provide an indisputable theory of emotion generation. 
2.2.2 The Molecules of Emotion 
In 1985, Pert and Snyder published a controversial paper entitled Neuropeptides and 
Their Receptors: A Psychosomatic Network.    Due to the radical theory proposed within, 
mainstream idealists ignored the research (Pert 1997).   It was not until several years later 
that the scientific community found merit in the theory.   
Traditionally, the limbic system was thought to be the seat of emotions where the 
neurons and associated neuropeptides in this area were responsible for producing 
emotional states.  Neurons are found throughout the body and form parts of the 
electrochemical communication network that relays all incoming sensory information to 
the brain.  Neurons do not physically touch, but are separated by gaps called synapses. 
When a neuron receives a signal it becomes active and excites surrounding neurons by 
releasing neuropeptides that bridge the synapses and allow the signal to be transferred to 
the next neuron.  There are many types of neuropeptides that affect the transfer of the 
signal in many and varied ways.  They perform a filtering process that determines how the 
final signal is interpreted when it reaches the brain.  Neuropeptides identified as being 
emotion producing were initially thought only to exist in a confined area of the brain.  
However, the work of Pert and Snyder found that emotion-producing neuropeptides 
existed throughout the body. 
The theory was so revolutionary that it threatened conventional thinking about emotions 
and emotion generation.   In short the theory states, neuropeptides and their receptors thus 
join the brain, glands and immune system in a network of communication between brain 
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and body, probably representing the biochemical substrate of emotion (Pert and Synder 
1985). 
This research has revealed that the neuropeptide receptors observed as responsible for 
emotional states and originally thought only to exist in the amygdala, hippocampus (a 
gland residing behind the amygdala) and hypothalamus have now been detected in high 
concentrations throughout the body.  This has included the backside of the spinal cord, the 
nervous systems first synapse where bodily sensations and feelings are processed.  
Therefore, all sensory information passing between synapses via the emotion producing 
neuropeptides undergoes an emotional filtering process  (Pert 1997).  This operation assists 
in the brains ability to deal with the deluge of sensory input that it receives. 
The nervous system also carries signals, not only from the body to the brain, but also 
from the brain to the body.  Emotional states or moods occur when emotion-carrying 
peptides are produced in the bodys neurons.  The presence of different emotional 
neuropeptides can create dissimilar reaction in an individual when exposed to the same 
stimuli.  
Leuba and Lucas (1945) conducted an experiment involving the description of six 
pictures by three people when in each of three different moods. Each mood was induced by 
hypnosis and then the pictures were shown.  Interpretations of the scenes in the pictures 
related to the moods of the viewer.  For example, a picture of several university students 
sitting on the grass listening to the radio was interpreted by the same person as relaxing 
when they were in a happy mood, irresponsible when they were in a critical mood and 
competitive when they were in an anxious mood.  Furthermore, as moods are evoked, the 
production of emotion-carrying peptides activates a particular neuronal circuit.  This 
circuit facilitates in learning and recall.  When a person is in a happy mood and the 
associated neuronal circuit is activated, they are more likely to recall positive emotional 
experiences (Pert 1997).  
Having gathered evidence that suggests emotions are a physiological fact present in the 
human body and they impact on the cognitive processes of the brain, the question remains, 
how do emotions in a physiological sense have an impact on the field of artificial 
intelligence?  Furthermore, how can these theories of emotions be integrated into an 
artificial agent that has no biological physiology?  Should they be integrated into an 
artificial agent? Would it be pertinent to give an artificial being the ability to feel and 
express, for example, sadness or happiness? 
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The very idea of an emotional robotic device or machine seems nonsensical and an 
avenue that many AI researchers wish to avoid.  This is not to say that the concept of 
emotions has been entirely ignored by the AI domain but due to the lack of definition and 
understanding of these states it has been mostly put aside for more logical pursuits.  If 
artificial agents are to be programmed with emotional capabilities, these agents need to be 
provided with the capacity to interpret and respond to emotional cues. Due to their lack of 
biological embodiment, it is not possible to rely on complex systems of neuropeptides and 
hormones to configure such an understanding.   
In contrast to the physiological theories of emotion are the theories and models that 
work on the principles of discrete emotional states. These are the cognitive theories of 
emotion. 
2.2.3 Cognitive Theories of Emotion 
The way in which the brain interprets emotional states from physiological actions is the 
foundation of the natural evolutionary path taken in psychology towards the development 
of cognitive theories of emotion.  The physiological theories examined in the last section 
support this view.  This standpoint on emotion generation, otherwise known as appraisal 
theory and considered by a number of psychologists, explains the generation of emotions 
using distinct evaluations of situations to categorise arising affective states.  These 
appraisal theories involves grouping emotional states as positive or negative and continues 
to decompose these into sub-states according to other discrete characteristics such as 
expected/unexpected, certain/uncertain and high control/low control. 
Incorporating elements from the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard physiological theories, 
Schachter and Singer observed that an individual does not only interpret their emotional 
state from their bodily one but also through their perception of the environment (Lefton 
1994).  Not only does an individual perceive their physiological state to determine their 
emotional state but the context in which it is occurring is also significant.  For example, a 
father crying at his daughter's wedding may be perceived as a happy emotional state, 
whereas the same physiological condition at a funeral may be perceived as sad.  To prove 
their theory, Schachter and Singer injected volunteers with epinephrine (adrenaline, a 
powerful stimulant).  Although this drug increases heart rate, excitement and energy, the 
volunteers were not aware of how it would affect them.  Immediately after the injection the 
volunteers where asked to fill out a questionnaire.  In the room with them were students 
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who had been injected with saltwater unbeknown to the volunteers.  About the time the 
epinephrines effects surfaced in the volunteers, the under-cover students would react with 
either a happy or angry disposition towards the questionnaires.  After the experiment, the 
volunteers in the room with the happy students reported feeling happy and the volunteers 
in the room with the angry students reported that the drug made them angry. The 
researchers concluded from this that an individual has no immediate explanation for their 
physical state. They categorise it in thoughts available to them at the time. 
Shaver et al (1987) believes that this kind of emotional research has moved too far 
ahead of itself.  He believes that although cognition plays an important role in emotional 
interpretation, before a researcher can understand and perceive complex emotional states 
they must first understand the structure and concepts of emotions in their entirety. Shaver 
and his colleagues identify six atomic emotional states: love, joy, anger, sadness, fear and 
surprise. Although they believe that emotional experience is very distinct in different 
cultural situations, these six basic emotions or a subset thereof are universal throughout the 
theories of emotion (Smith and Kirby 2000, Magai and Hunziker 1998,  Plutchik 1980). 
The overlapping of these emotions can produce all other emotional states, but the 
cultural emphasis placed on each of the six basic emotions will determine how a complex 
emotion is perceived.  The example they give is that love is a powerful emotion in the 
United States, but in Sumatra, nostalgia is most important.   
The idea of elementary emotion blending is 
not new.  Plutchik (1980) suggested a colour 
wheel of emotions as shown in Figure 2.2 where 
the basic emotions could be blended to create 
complex emotions in a similar way to fusing 
primary colours to produce secondary colours. 
In his theory, Frijda takes the identification 
of emotions one-step further (Elliot 1992).  
Frijda combines emotional responses with 
appraisals and suggests that an individual not only uses cognitive appraisal to assess their 
emotional state in a situation, but as this cognition is taking place the individual is also 
preparing a set of behavioural actions in response to the situation. His theory combines the 
philosophies of the Behaviourist School of Psychology based on the stimulus-response 
Figure 2.2  Plutchik’s Emotional Range Circle 
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theory (Koestler 1967) with an appraisal theory of emotion 3. Often there is not enough 
time for a complex emotional evaluation of a situation, nor is it necessary. 
Further definition for the process of appraisal, which formulates an emotional response, 
can be found in the cognitive appraisal theory developed by Ortony, Clore and Collins 
(OCC model) (Ortony et al. 1988). An illustration of this model can be found in Appendix 
A. The model incorporates and assesses the positive and negative dispositions that can 
occur in response to situations.  It examines the valenced reactions toward one of three 
elements: the consequences of an event, the actions of an individual, and, the aspects of an 
object.   The model assesses the human reaction to one or more of these elements as being:  
pleasing or displeasing, approving or disproving, liking or disliking.  Given this assessment 
an emotional response category can be derived. Due to its discrete categorization of 
appraisal mechanisms, the OCC model lends itself admirably to implementation in AI 
systems and although not originally intended to act as a means to synthetically generate 
emotions in computers, it has provided a basis for a number of research projects in 
affective computing including Elliots Affective Reasoner (Elliot 1992) and Reillys 
Artificial Actors (Reilly 1996), examined further in this chapter. 
Table 2.1 displays the values used in the OCC model (and subsequent AI applications) 
to appraise an event and determine an appropriate emotion.  The table is a subset of the 
OCC appraisals displaying eight of the possible 22 emotional states mentioned in the 
theory.   
 
 
 
2.2.4 Understanding the Chaos 
In all the chaos of emotional models, theories, experimentation and implementation, 
there is a consensus that emotional states can be divided into two distinct categories; lower 
                                                   
3
 This is what MacLean might have identified as the control of the reptilian brain (see Section 2.1.1) or 
 with the complex emotional responses generated by the neo-mammalian brain. 
Consequential 
Disposition 
Focus Object 
(self or other) 
Consequences 
for Focus Object 
Emotion 
pleased other desirable  Happy For 
pleased other undesirable  Pity 
displeased other desirable  Resentment 
displeased other undesirable  Gloating 
pleased self relevant Hope 
pleased self irrelevant Joy 
displeased self relevant Fear 
displeased self irrelevant Distress 
Table 2.1. A Subset of the OCC Cognitive Structure of Emotion 
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(or survival) emotions and higher emotions. These two divisions are identified in 
MacLeans Three Brain Theory (Koestler 1967) as the difference in function between the 
reptilian brain and the neo-mammalian brain. 
The first category is that of emotional drives. These drives or urges can be classified 
according to their source, pleasure rating and strength.  This category of emotion is present 
in philosophies of the Freudian School of Behaviour (Furth 1987) as a sexual drive 
(Koester 1967) and the Behaviourist School of Psychology (Hull 1943) as a stimulus-
deprivation drive (Koester 1967).   MacLean (1958) refers to the two basic emotional 
drives in animal behaviour; self-preservation and preservation of the species. From these 
two ultimate urges all motivational goals of animal behaviour can be derived and are 
individualistic of a defined being.  The four emergent classifications from these categories 
for emotional drive as identified by Toda (Padgham and Taylor, 1997) are emergency, 
biological, cognitive, and social.  
The emergency drive refers to the mechanism that creates behaviours when an 
individual is unexpectedly and suddenly displaced from its homeostatic state.  An example 
is how an individual reacts to an automobile accident.  Usually unplanned, such an event 
might motivate an individual to perform acts that will rectify the situation or return the 
individual to (or as close as possible to) its original state.  Biological urges are again drives 
to return an individual to homeostasis.  Many of these drives are well known, cyclical and 
not surprising occurrences to the individual. For example, hunger occurs in a human when 
the body has a low blood sugar level. Simplistically, warning signals are sent to the brain, 
which in turn generate hunger pains in the stomach (Lefton 1994).  This stimulus creates a 
motivation to eat. The cognitive drive creates curiosity in an individual.  This in turn 
motivates an individual to crave knowledge, to learn more about their environment and 
how they can manipulate and interact with it. Finally, the emergent social urge refers to an 
individuals need for companionship or interaction with others.  Such drives cause 
individuals to comply with peers or seek acceptance among others.  These have a 
significant effect on behaviour in social situations. 
This set of emotions will be referred to, in this dissertation, as survival or lower 
emotions (drives or urges).  The second type of emotion that is to be addressed is that of 
the higher, neurological emotions. 
If survival emotions are those that generate goals and motivation, then higher emotions 
are the resultant mental (and in turn physical) states generated by attempts to satisfy these 
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goals.  These emotions include feelings such as happiness, anger, sorrow, guilt and 
boredom.  
Attempts to satisfy goals driven by the survival emotions give rise to an appropriate set 
of higher emotions.  However, the emotions generated are difficult to categorise due to 
their complex relationships.  Some emotions are viewed as being opposite such as 
happiness and sadness. These are easily distinguished because one is pleasant and the 
other unpleasant.  On the other hand, fear and anger could also be considered opposite 
(when comparing the respective flight or fight responses), but clearly not in the same way 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  Popular theories for categorizing these emotions in 
psychology are the cognitive appraisal theories as mentioned in Section 2.2.3.  
When considering all the research and published material on emotion generation, 
determining a way in which emotions could be of benefit in an artificial intelligence is a 
complex issue.  There is no doubt in the minds of the researchers who developed the 
theories presented in this section that emotions are an important part of human intelligence.  
The next step in the AI domain is to determine which emotional theories and concepts 
could enhance the intelligent information processing in machines. While some researchers 
talk about machines being able to feel and have a conscience (Picard 1998, Sloman 2001), 
the foundation of this dissertation is not to contemplate such a development, but to 
examine how emotions may enhance human intelligence and to develop a model that 
captures these concepts and applies them to the way in which the artificial beings 
manipulate and process information. 
The following section examines five components of emotion found in the field of 
affective computing.  They are by no means reflective of any structure or model of 
affective computing, but rather lend themselves to categorise and present current research 
in a well-organised manner. 
2.3 Affective Computing 
As this area is a one of the latest research developments in the AI domain, it is also a 
fast growing one. Many designs and architectures for emotionally capable artificial 
intelligences have been proposed in the last five years.  These designs focus their attention 
on specific aspects of emotion synthesis.  Understandably, an emotionally complete 
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architecture is yet to be developed.  While the research in this dissertation does not boast to 
have achieved this, it too is another small part of the puzzle. 
The motivation in this domain has been to allow computers to emulate areas of human 
behaviour in order to increase information-processing efficiencies.  These abilities include 
flexible and rational decision making, reasoning with limited memory, limited information 
and relatively slow processing speed, social interaction and creativity. 
According to Picard (1998), if computers are ever to exhibit or have emotions, they 
must be capable of synthesizing and generating them.  Picard (1998) outlines five 
components present in a human emotional system, where all or subsets of these must be 
present, in an affective computer system.  These are 1) emotional behaviour; 2) fast 
primary emotions; 3) cognitively generated emotions; 4) emotional experience: cognitive 
awareness, physiological awareness, and subjective feelings; and, 5) body-mind 
interactions. An examination of these categories is pertinent at this point and the following 
sections examine the current state of research with respect to each of these areas and 
collectively define the domain of affective computing. 
2.3.1 Emotional Behaviour 
The area of emotional behaviour refers to systems that display outward emotions.  This 
does not necessarily mean the system has the means to internally process emotional 
responses as humans do, but nonetheless is capably of appearing emotional. 
A robotic device that seemingly displays emotional behaviour is that of W. Grey 
Walters tortoise mentioned in Penrose (1989) which was capable of autonomous motion 
and had the ability to plug itself into a power socket to recharge its batteries.  Although a 
simple decision making algorithm was obviously deployed to cause this behaviour, it still 
exhibited emotional behaviour (Picard 1998). 
Another example of the display of emotions is the well-known boot-up sequence smiley 
face on the Apple Macintosh computer.  While it is very simple, the user could infer that 
the computer is in a happy state or not.  Though logically it is not, some human users 
without in-depth thought about the computers emotional state might gain a feeling of well 
being from the machine. 
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A more complex example of a computer-generated display of emotions is that 
developed by Haptek (Kaehms 1999).  The company has developed a series of three-
dimensional animated characters that are capable of accepting scripts of text and 
converting them into speech.  Beside this ability, the characters also possess the ability to 
express emotion using voice inflections and facial expressions when explicitly 
programmed.  These characters are an example of the computer being able to convey a 
more complex emotional state to the user while not having autonomously generated that 
state. 
Another example of a display of emotions can be seen in Pixar Animation Studios 
lamp animation (Luxo Jr. 1986).  This short animation uses bodily movements to breathe 
life into a small desk lamp and metaphorically represent it as a small child playing with a 
ball.  Although the lamp does not possess facial expressions, it conveys the supposed 
emotional state of the lamp and convincingly evokes sorrowful responses from the 
audience when the lamps ball bursts and it divulges its sadness by hanging its head 
represented by the lamp shade. 
The next stage in emotion-machine integration is to program the machine with the 
capacity to generate these emotional behaviours independently.  In fact, in the case of W. 
Grey Walters tortoise, this machine was programmed with the ability to recognise 
depletion in power and to act on it.  This is synonymous with human hunger and fits into 
the next category of fast primary emotions. 
2.3.2 Fast Primary Emotions 
The psychological and physiological background of the fast primary emotions was 
previously examined in Section 2.2.1.  The brain, in response to stimuli that evoke a 
survival mechanism, generates these emotions.  One such application of fast primary 
emotions in computers would be to implement survival mechanisms in a robot where it 
could quickly react to protect itself.  This could include such things as getting out of the 
way of moving objects, ducking, the heightening of perceptual sensors or renewing its 
power supply.  
Another subset of these primary emotions is drives or motivational urges.  Many 
affective systems implement motivational mechanisms in unison with goal-orientated 
belief systems (Reilly 1996, Padgham and Taylor 1997, El-Nasr 1998). These systems 
work by generating internal motivations that activate the goals of the artificial agent.  The 
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ideas behind these systems are essentially the same. A timing mechanism or change in 
state of the agent generates an urge that in turn triggers a goal.  Balkenius (1995) identified 
several categories of motivational drives that he believes play an important role in 
cognitive processes and uses these in the simulation of animal behaviour. 
The homeostatic drive or the drive that is generated by a violation of homeostasis 
includes, for example, hunger and thirst, but also the responses to heat and cold. The 
noxious drive considers the signals from noxious stimuli and includes the sensation of 
pain. Cyclical drives, which vary with the time of day or the year, are generated by an 
oscillator influenced by external stimuli such as the length of the day, odours, or the 
amount of light in the environment. These include tiredness and wakefulness, the sexual 
drives of most animals, and migratory drives. The default drive influences the animal when 
no external cue is present which commands the animal to do something else. The 
exploratory drive, which is similar to the default drive in that it tries to activate behaviour 
when the animal has nothing else to do. Finally, the anticipatory drive is internally 
generated but does not relate to any present need of the animal. This drive can influence 
any other drive and its purpose is to simulate a drive, typically a homeostatic one, which is 
not present.  
One of more of these drives have been implemented in a number of affective agent 
systems such as El-Nasrs PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998), Balkeniuss simulated artificial 
creatures (Balkenius 1995), Padham and Taylors Dog World agents (Padgham and Taylor 
1997) and Canameros Abbotts (Canamero 1997).  In all cases the drives are programmed 
into the agent as a number of gauges and cyclic mechanisms.  The cyclic mechanisms 
update the drive gauges and when a threshold value on a gauge is reached a goal is 
triggered.  For example, an agent may have a hunger gauge that is cyclically updated to 
simulate hunger increasing over time.  At a predetermined threshold value on the hunger 
gauge, a goal to seek food will be activated. 
These types of primary emotions are easily simulated and methods for implementing 
them in artificial beings are quite elementary.  The next stage in implementation of such 
mechanisms in AI is that of generating appropriate internal state changes within a machine 
and have that machine understand, react and learn from them.  This capability is called 
emotional experience. 
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2.3.3 Emotional Experience 
An emotional experience is the ability for a machine to have an awareness of its 
emotional state.  This awareness may be accompanied by changing physiological states (an 
example in humans being an increased heart beat) and may be generated by internal 
subjective feelings. These internal feelings, or gut feelings (Koestler 1967), are very 
difficult to implement in computers due to the fact that in humans they are produced 
biochemically (Pert and Synder 1985).   
As previously mentioned, existing AI systems do not have the capacities for 
consciously recognizing or generating emotional states.  Goal-orientated systems are 
constructed from motivation mechanisms that cause the machine to appear as though it 
wants and cares when in fact it has only been programmed to give the superficial 
appearance of these humanistic traits (Sloman 2001).  
Sloman does not speculate on whether machines may one day have conscious feelings 
but does provide an informative architecture for a human-like agent that can emulate the 
process of emotional experience.  He conjectures that the information processing 
capabilities of humans make use of three different architectural layers: a reactive layer, a 
deliberative layer and a self-monitoring layer.  These layers mirror the three separate brain 
layers of MacLeans theory: the reptilian brain, the paleo-mammalian brain and the neo-
mammalian brain respectively. 
The reactive layer takes care of the fast primary emotions, the deliberative layer deals 
with higher emotional states and the creation and execution of plans and the self-
monitoring layer oversees the improvement of the processes stemming from the other two 
layers.  It is the final self-monitoring layer that gives the agent the ability to become aware 
of its emotional experiences, to identify them and to learn from them.  
2.3.4 Body-Mind Interactions 
This section refers to the influence that emotions have on the body and mental states of 
humans.  The study of emotions from a neural basis is an active field of research (Fellous 
1999).  Emotions can influence the body's state and in turn the body's state can influence 
emotion. The physiological aspect of emotions is examined in-depth in Section 2.2.1.  In 
particular, research by Pert (1997) examines the low-level physiological changes that take 
place within the human body with respect to emotions.  
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Canamero (1997) describes a AI system where emotional state changes cause changes 
to a system of synthetic hormones and in turn, changes to the states of these hormones also 
influences the emotional state of the artificial beings.  The emotionally influenced beings, 
called the Abbotts, inhabit a two-dimensional world with another race of unemotional 
beings called the Enemies.  The Abbots behaviour is determined by motivational and 
emotional mechanisms that correspond to internal state changes within the agent.  These 
internal states (constructed from synthetic hormones) represent the agents physiological 
state.  The agents can choose to attack, withdraw, drink, eat, play and rest.  Each behaviour 
has an effect on the agents internal state, which in turn may trigger a motivation that will 
cause a different behaviour.  
2.3.5 Cognitively Generated Emotions 
These emotions may be explained as the emotions that follow primary emotions.  They 
are the emotions generated on appraisal of a stimulus.  Over the past 15 years this 
categorical approach to the study of emotion has become prominent in psychology (Ortony 
et al. 1988).  Groups of theorists known as cognitive appraisal theorists have attempted to 
explain different emotional reactions by categorising emotions from evaluating the 
situations from which the emotions arose.  The long term interest in the classification of 
emotional experiences has traditionally only been defined in two dimensions; pleasantness 
and arousal (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  However, these appraisal dimensions were found 
to be inadequate in classifying the range of human emotional states and newer models 
arose using more complex appraisal dimensions.   
One such model by Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC) (Ortony et al. 1988) examines the 
valenced reaction to one of three elements: 1) the consequences of an event; 2) the actions 
of the agent; and, 3) the aspects of objects.  The model assesses the human reaction to 
these elements as being either, pleasing, displeasing, approving, disproving, liking or 
disliking. 
The Oz project (Bates et al. 1992) is the effort of researchers at Carnegie Mellon 
University.  The primary focus of their work has been in the development of agents 
capable of generating emotions and moods for the purposes of autonomous animated 
characters.  Their broad architecture called Tok, incorporates a number of sub-systems one 
of which, Em, is primarily for the generation of emotions. In the Em architecture, emotions 
are structured hierarchically and categorised as either positive or negative in nature.  The 
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emotions are generated in the goal-orientated agents when a goal is completed.  The 
intensity of the emotion is calculated from the importance of the goal.  Although based on 
the OCC model, Em differs slightly in that its likelihood of success or failure, rather than 
an appraisal of the event to which it relates, determines the importance of the goal.  The 
inspiration for this research has been to build a set of tools that can be used by creative 
artists to build believable artificial characters and scenarios for dramatic purposes.  Artists 
have the ability to create new characters and situations by manipulating, by hand, the hard-
coded cognitive and behavioural mechanisms of Em. 
Another application of the OCC model has been the development of the Affective 
Reasoner, a research project of Elliot (1992).  The Affective Reason is a collection of AI 
programs personified into a multimedia-computing agent.    Each agent has a two-part 
personality consisting of a disposition that influences how the agents perceive their 
environment and a temperament that controls their affective behaviour. As the agents react 
to the dynamic environment in which they have been placed, emotional responses to 
environmental stimuli are produced in one or more of the twenty-four different affective 
categories with which they have been programmed. The twenty-four categories and their 
associated emotional responses can be found in Appendix B.  The agent's disposition and 
temperament combine to form the personality of the agent.  This research demonstrates 
how modelling personalities and social relationships can generate emotions.  The agents' 
are capable of modelling three types of social relationships and corresponding emotions; 
friendship; animosity and empathy. 
Today, this type of reasoning is the most frequent way of generating emotions in 
artificial intelligences through cognitive reasoning. 
2.4 Affective Agent Architectures 
In recent times, there have been a number of architectures that have been designed to 
produce artificial agents capable of expressing and processing emotions.  These models 
cover a wide range of affective phenomena and differ broadly between implementations.  
As a complete examination of these architectures would constitute a publication in its own 
right, a comprehensive review of these models will not appear in this dissertation.  
Having said this, the current architectural designs, their application and evaluation 
provide essential research information that should be considered in the development of any 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  29 
new affective agent architecture. To this end, before the EMAI architecture (the product of 
this dissertation) is explained in Chapter 3, this section provides a brief yet expansive 
overview of several current models and ideas circulating in the Affective Computing 
research domain that have influenced the work contained in this dissertation. 
2.4.1 Blumbergs Silas T. Dog 
An artificial agent that uses primary emotions (see Section 2.2.1) to motivate behaviour 
is Blumbergs architecture for Silas T Dog (Blumberg et al. 1996).  The architecture 
illustrated in Figure 2.3 is an autonomous, animated virtual dog, consists of three layers: 
the Behaviour System layer, the Motor Controller layer and the Geometry layer.  While the 
motor controller and geometry layers perform the necessary tasks to represent the agent as 
a virtual computer character in a virtual three-dimensional world and control its 
movements, the behaviour system controls the agents intelligent behaviours. 
The Behaviour System is a network consisting of independent goal-orientated entities 
called Behaviours.  Behaviours are grouped into mutually inhibiting groups called 
Behaviour Groups, which are in turn organised into a loose hierarchical structure.  The 
goal of a Behaviour can range from very general (for example, reduce hunger) to very 
specific (for example, chew food). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour System 
Motor Controller 
Geometry 
Behaviour 
Sensory
System 
Releasing
Mechanism 
Level of 
Interest 
Inhibition 
Goals and 
Motivation 
Figure 2.3 An Overview of Blumberg’s Silas T. Dog Architecture 
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Before the agent can exhibit a given behaviour, the Behaviour entity must evaluate its 
relevance given external stimuli and internal motivations. External stimuli are passed from 
the Sensory System (that senses the external world) through the Behaviours Releasing 
Mechanism.  The Releasing Mechanism filters the sensory input for relevance toward the 
Behaviour entity.  Motivations and goals are represented by Internal Variables.  The 
Behaviour entity combines the values from the Releasing Mechanism and Internal 
Variables to determine the Behaviours Level of Interest.  This Level of Interest is used to 
model the strength of a particular Behaviour.   
The process of Behaviour System begins by examining the Behaviour Group at the top 
of the systems Behaviour Group Hierarchy.  Behaviour entities within this group compete 
for control of the agent.  The winning Behaviour entity is decided by examining the 
Releasing Mechanism, Internal Variables and Level of Interest of each Behaviour.  This 
Behaviour entity is then said to become active.  If the active Behaviour is linked to a child 
Behaviour Group in the hierarchy, the process of competing begins again on a more 
specific level.  This process continues until the most specific form of a Behaviour is 
identified (that is the bottom level of the hierarchy is reached).  The chosen Behaviour 
entity then communicates with the Motor Controller layer to create the outward behaviour 
of the agent.  This architecture provides a means of managing goal-orientation and 
motivational mechanisms controlled by lower level emotions such as fear and hunger. 
2.4.2 PETEEI (A PET with Evolving Emotional Intelligence) 
The PETEEI architecture (El-Nasr 1998) has three major components; an emotional 
process model, a cognitive process model and a learning process model.  The architecture 
has been used to build an agent with the behaviours of a pet dog.  A PETEEI agent 
operates by perceiving data in the form of an event occurrence.  On receipt of this external 
stimulus the agents emotional model evaluates the events desirability and expectation and 
proceeds to activate an emotion and produces an appropriate emotional behaviour.   The 
emotion is decayed linearly using a constant decay rate function.   Each emotion is 
triggered according to predefined rules based on the OCC model (see Section 2.2.3). 
Behaviours are then selected using a set of predefined production rules.  For example, if 
anger is high and event is dish-was-taken-way then behaviour is bark-at-user.  Besides 
reacting to external stimuli, a PETEEI agent also generates internal stimuli in the form of 
motivations.  These motivations include states such as hunger, fatigue, thirst and pain.  
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These states are stored as individual variables and updated linearly using measures such as 
time. 
2.4.3 Emotion Based Control (EBC) Framework for Autonomous Agent 
Velasquezs Emotional Based 
Control (EBC) Framework (Velasquez 
1999), as shown in Figure 2.4, 
integrates emotional processing with 
other agent systems that control 
perception, attention, motivation, 
behaviour and motor skills in a robotic 
agent. 
In an EBC agent, the Perceptual 
System accepts external stimuli from 
the outside world.  This data is provided to the Emotion Generation System and the 
Behaviour System.  Both these systems also receive data from the Drive System.  The 
Emotion Generation System determines the emotional significance of incoming stimuli 
and ensures that future behaviour and perception are affected accordingly. 
The EBC framework is based on the neurobiological premise of affect programs.  
Affect programs relate to preprogrammed brain systems that generate and coordinate 
stereotypical behaviour in biological agents (Velasquez 1999).  The EBC framework has 
six different types of affect programs generated by the Emotion Generation System, that 
correspond to different primary emotions; fear, anger, sorrow, happiness, disgust and 
surprise.   Each affect program activates its own series of circuitry in an EBC robot that 
causes it to behaviour in a preprogrammed manner.  For example, the fear affect program 
can cause the robot to exhibit cowering and retreating behaviour. Each affect program is 
programmed with a temporal decay function that controls the time for which the affect 
program is in operation once activated.  
Although not fully explored, the EBC framework could also be used to generate 
behaviours relating to higher order emotions such as guilt. For example, by implementing a 
system of emotion blending based on the theories of Plutchik (see Section 2.2.3) the affect 
programs for fear and joy could be activated simultaneously to produce the emotional 
behaviour for guilt. 
Figure 2.4 EBC Framework for Autonomous Agents 
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2.4.4 Minskys Commonsense Agent 
Minsky (2000) suggests that the reason researchers have not yet developed a machine 
capable of performing many of the mundane tasks that people seem to have no problem 
executing is that AI researchers are not using adequate large-scale models that could be 
used to orchestrate systems capable of commonsense or resourcefulness. 
The large-scale architecture conceptualised by Minsky examines the way in which the 
human brain employs its resources and he builds on a previous 3 layered architecture 
devised by Sloman (2001) to create a 5-layered model of an artificial mind. 
Minskys incomplete architecture consists of a reactive layer, a deliberate layer, a 
reflective layer, a meta-management layer and a self-conscious layer.  The reactive layer is 
the basic instinctual area of the architecture and deals with external sensory input. It is 
responsible for the agents reactive behaviours (reflex actions) that require very little 
processing, for example, moving out of the way of a large incoming object.  The deliberate 
layer produces the agents intentional behaviours or calculated actions that have been 
premeditated.  The reflective layer of the agent contemplates and learns from past 
behaviours. It accesses behaviours produced by the other layers and learns and adapts 
based on the outcomes.  The meta-management layer monitors the agents temporal 
progress of the processing taking place in the other layers.  It manages the processes and 
ensures that timely decisions are made and appropriate behaviours are performed. Finally, 
the self-conscious layer processes information pertaining to beliefs about the agents own 
being or how the agent believes that it is perceived by others. 
Minskys large-scale architecture of the mind is currently incomplete.  How the layers 
interact with one another and other parts of the agent remain undefined. Minsky (2000) 
explains that the architecture will be further developed and discussed in his forthcoming 
book, The Emotion Machine.  While Minsky does not explicitly mention emotions with 
respect to intelligence he does hint that there would be emotional switches that would 
interact with the self-conscious and meta-management layers.  The title of his forthcoming 
book and quotes made by Minsky (Stork 1997) suggest that he believes that concepts on 
emotion should be an integral and fundamental part of AI. 
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2.5 Summary 
Emotions are an ill-defined concept.  There have been many and varied theories 
developed over the years that attempt to explain emotions from a holistic view or 
concentrate on atomic components of emotional experience.  Whatever the definition, there 
is current research to suggest that emotions play a crucial role in human intelligence. 
Attempts to replicate human-like performance in the domain of AI have been successful 
with respect to mimicing elements of intelligent behaviour, but limited in a holistic sense.  
Visual and motor capabilities of current AI systems are far from being as precise and 
elegant as that of a real animal let alone emotional capabilities.  Sloman (2001) suggests 
that researchers need to examine not only their understanding of the possibilities for 
information processing machines but they should also deepen their understanding of the 
concepts of emotions and how the two could be integrated.  The question is not, Which is 
the correct theory of emotion? but rather, Which theory bests suits the needs of a particular 
AI system?   
Theories of emotion have been integrated best into artificial beings that are goal-
orientated.  The domain of affective computing is laden with concepts such as goal, 
motivation, desire, intention and so on. Cognitive appraisals have been a popular concept 
for integration into current goal-orientated artificial agent architectures.  However, like 
emotion definitions, cognitive appraisal theories are also many and varied.  The research 
within the domain of affective computing covers all aspects of the concept of emotions.  
Some applications focus their efforts on one aspect, while others implement several 
components in order to create more believable and emotionally intelligent agents. 
Using the emotional theories and concepts as presented in this chapter, this dissertation 
presents a unifying artificial agent architecture that is influenced by emotions.  In keeping 
with the well documented goal-orientated approach, this new agent integrates a number of 
theories on emotion, builds on several of the agent designs already in use in the affective 
computing domain, improves on the approach of event assessment using appraisals and 
presents a new method for decision-making and reasoning about behavioural choices. 
The next chapter introduces this new emotionally motivated artificial intelligence 
architecture and examines its components in illustrative detail. This architecture is the 
original concept of the author and is the major contribution of the work presented in this 
dissertation. 
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3. Emotionally Motivated Artificial Intelligence 
Only the discipline of logic saved my planet from extinction. 
MR SPOCK – Star Trek the Original Series, “Let That Be Your Last Battlefield”. 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the Emotionally Motivated Artificial Intelligence (EMAI) 
architecture developed by the author as a result of the research herein. The design of this 
architecture was motivated by research into the affective agent domain and the 
identification of the shortage of agent architectures that have the capacity for decision-
making influenced by a mechanism that simulates human emotional intelligence (Goleman 
1995).  Picard (1998) affirms the importance of this type of emotionally influenced 
decision-making in computers.  She suggests that if affective decision-making were 
integrated into computers it would provide a competent solution to emulating the 
intelligence of humans where decisions are often made with insufficient knowledge, 
limited memory, and relatively slow processing speeds.  Emotions are an integral part of 
human decision-making and by giving machines a similar mechanism it could help in 
problem solving where options cannot be fully explored, data is incomplete and processing 
time is short. 
This type of emotional intelligence in computers is implemented in the EMAI 
architecture as three major conceptual areas; the Knowledge Area, the Constructive Area 
and the Deliberate Area.  The Knowledge Area contains the agents beliefs and states, the 
Constructive Area acts as the agents cognitive domain and the Deliberate Area performs 
scheduling and execution of behaviours.  The examination of these three areas is the focus 
of this chapter. 
3.2 Overview of the EMAI Architecture 
The objective of the development of the EMAI architecture has not been to examine all 
aspects of human behaviour, which would require the examination of elements such as 
physical conditions, cognitive capabilities and social status (Schmidt 2000), but to focus on 
emotional states and processes that affect human decision-making behaviour.  As there are 
many aspects to human behaviour that should be modelled to build a complete and 
accurate representation of a humans cognitive abilities, the collection of these components 
makes for a difficult study of the individual components in isolation.  For this reason, the 
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EMAI architecture is by no means complete. Because of the complex nature of emotions 
and the plethora of application areas, this architecture has been designed to focus only on 
the modelling and synthesis of emotional states in relation to decision-making about the 
performance of behaviours. Keeping this in mind, this architecture implements a 
psychological basis for emotion generation that concentrates on motivation and the 
selection of behaviour.  
There are three conceptual areas of the EMAI architectures structure that interact to 
motivate an agent by implementing emotional intelligence.  They are the Knowledge Area, 
the Constructive Area and the Deliberate Area.  Each of these components can be seen in 
Figure 3.1, which shows the conceptual working areas of the EMAI architecture.  The 
EMAI architecture is a complex system consisting of an ontology, motivational drives, an 
Affective Space and decision-making mechanisms.  A common enigma in building agents 
with emotional competence is organising the complex way in which these conceptual 
components interact.  For example, emotions affect behaviour and in turn behaviour affects 
emotions.  
For this reason, the Affective Space, shown in Figure 3.1, becomes the focus of the 
agent architecture.  The Affective Space acts as an emotional filter that influences an 
EMAI agents perception of its beliefs, the environment and as a consequence how it 
behaves.  The basis for such a mechanism has been born from the physiological theories of 
emotion such as those of Pert (1997) explained in Chapter 2 where emotions are described 
as having a filtering effect on human sensory input.  The implementation of the Affective 
Space in the EMAI architecture is unique in emotional agent architectures.  While there 
have been a number of emotional agents that have preceded EMAI (see Chapter 2), none 
have explored emotions in the multi-dimensional sense as is presented in this dissertation.  
An in-depth discussion of the Affective Space will be delayed until Chapter 8.  
The EMAI architecture consists of several major processing and knowledge 
representation areas.  Each of these areas works together in a complex network of 
information gathering, manipulating and updating. As shown in Figure 3.1, any agent 
implemented using the EMAI architecture receives external sensory data from its 
environment. It also processes internal sensory data from the Motivational Drive Generator 
in the Knowledge Area. Internal State Registers in the Motivational Drive Generator 
simulate low level biological mechanisms.  The Sensory Processor and the Affective Space 
integrate both types of sensory data into the agents belief system via an emotional filtering 
process. Sensory input (both internal and external) received by the Sensory Processor may 
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activate goals in the agent.  The goals are processed by the agents Constructive Area 
where plans are chosen that will satisfy these goals.  These plans are generated by the 
Event Space Generator, which generates a series of events that could be performed by the 
agent to satisfy its goals. Before the agent schedules the events for execution in the 
Deliberate Area, each event is ordered by the Intention Generator in collaboration with the 
Affective Space and sorted from most liked to least liked.  Once the agent has the list of 
events sorted by emotional effect, the Behaviour Actuator begins executing them in order.  
The events executed by the Behaviour Actuator at any moment in time become the EMAI 
agents outward behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The in-depth examination of the analytical and information handling processes in each 
of the areas of the architecture is given in the following chapters. The remainder of this 
chapter is dedicated to an exploration of each of the three conceptual areas and their sub-
components. 
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3.3 The Knowledge Area 
The Knowledge Area of the EMAI architecture consists of the agent's belief system 
(represented by the Ontology), the agents emotional state (represented by the Emotional 
State Register), the agents preferred emotional state (represented by the Emotional State 
Bias Register), the agents motivations (created by the Motivational Drive Generator), the 
agents perceptions (processed by the Sensory Processor) and the agents emotions 
(represented by the Affective Space).  These components work in unison to represent the 
agents knowledge and processes it needs in order to function.   
The Affective Space is the focal point of the EMAI architecture as this construct 
provides any agent built using this architecture with the ability to make affective (emotion 
based) decisions. In the following sections, each of these components will be reviewed, 
while detailed discussion of the mechanics of these components will be outlined in 
Chapters  4 through 9.  
3.3.1 Ontology 
The Ontology of the EMAI architecture contains the Type and Relation Hierarchies, a 
set of Canonical Graphs and the Goal Hierarchy.  These components work collectively to 
represent the EMAIs knowledge base.  The knowledge base contains all the data that an 
EMAI agent needs to operate within a specific domain environment.  Not only are the 
agents beliefs about itself and the environment stored in the Ontology, but they are also 
structured into partially-ordered hierarchies that assist the agent in operations of deduction, 
association and belief revision.  The Ontology will be examined in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Motivational Drive Generator 
The Motivational Drive Generator consists of three drive mechanisms (homeostatic, 
cyclic and default) and a set of Internal State Registers.   The Internal State Registers 
record the agents physical state.  Each register is represented by a single gauge that stores 
the value for a particular physical state, for example hunger.  The number of Internal State 
Registers implemented depends on the application for which the EMAI agent is being 
used.  For the simple pet-dog agent that will be examined in Chapter 9, three Internal State 
Registers are implemented; these are hunger, fatigue and arousal.  The method of storing 
the agents internal state, as a series of individual variables is not new, other affective 
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agent architectures such as Silas (Blumberg 1996) and PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998) (see 
Section 2.4.4) do the same. 
The Internal State Registers are synonymous with the Internal Variables in Blumbergs 
architecture, Silas.  The Internal Variables are used to model the agents internal states 
such as hunger, thirst, fear and aggression (Blumberg 1996).  The values of the Internal 
Variables are updated at each time-step of the agents simulated life.  A growth rate 
function, dampening rate function, the agents behaviour and external stimulus affect the 
values of the variables.  The Internal Variables of Silas represent motivations that drive the 
behaviour of the agent as they do in the EMAI architecture. 
The same type of motivational mechanism is included in PETEEI.  The PETEEI 
architecture has a number of Motivational States such as pain, hunger, thirst and tiredness.  
Each Motivational State is updated by its own function that assesses how a PETEEI agent 
is being affected by its environment or its own behaviours.  Once the value of a 
Motivational State reaches a predetermined calibre, it sends a signal to the agents 
cognitive process telling it to attend to the associated motivation.  
Unlike the Motivational States of the PETEEI architecture, the Internal State Variables 
of the EMAI architecture do not perform any processes.  They are updated and monitored 
by three independent drive mechanisms.  The three drive mechanisms that monitor the 
values of the Internal State Registers are inspired by the work of Balkenius (1995) (see 
Section 2.3.2) who categorise the many motivational urges involved in animal behaviour 
into three types; homeostatic, cyclical and default.  These drive mechanisms pass internal 
sensory input to the Sensory Processor (explained in the next section) when certain 
conditions are met. 
The Homeostatic Drive helps to maintain an EMAI agents equilibrium.  It works to 
return an agents internal state to the default state when the agent becomes excited.  It does 
this by continually tracking the values of the Internal State Registers and sending internal 
sensory data to the Sensory Processor when the values on the registers fall outside of a 
normal range.  For example, the agent may have an Internal State Register for storing its 
body temperature.  The Homeostatic Drive would monitor this register.  Should the value 
of the agents body temperature register rise or fall outside of a threshold range, the 
Homeostatic Drive mechanism would send an internal sensory data value representing cold 
or hot to the Sensory Processor. 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  39 
The Cyclical Drive maintains an EMAI agents internal body clock.  The Cyclical Drive 
synthesises a constant rate of change in the agents Internal State Registers that are 
affected by time differentials in its environment. At predetermined temporal intervals the 
Cyclical Drive mechanism will increase or decrease the values on temporally sensitive 
Internal State Registers.  For example, the agent may have an Internal State Register to 
represent the agents hunger. As time passes, the Cyclical Drive mechanism would 
increase the value of this register.  This would represent the agent becoming hungry.  At a 
particular threshold level, the Homeostatic Drive would detect that the agent was hungry 
and send appropriate internal sensory data to the Sensory Processor for computation. 
The Default Drive mechanism produces deliberate actions within the agent.  This drive 
relays internal sensory data to the Sensory Processor that represents a need in the agent to 
explore its environment.  Essentially, it is used to produce behaviours in the agent that are 
neither homeostatic nor cyclical.   This mechanism prevents the agent from doing nothing, 
when the other drives are not sending internal sensory data to the Sensory Processor. 
The internal sensory data passed to the Sensory Processor from the Motivational Drive 
Generator represents instincts or urges (characteristics of survival emotions discussed in 
Chapter 2).  This information is used by the Sensory Processor to trigger goals within the 
agent and in turn formulate outward behaviours. 
3.3.3 Sensory Processor 
The Sensory Processor works by processing internal sensory data passed from the 
Motivational Drive Generator and external sensory data collected from the environment.  
When the Sensory Processor receives information it checks to determine which of the 
agents goals (if any) should be triggered in order to deal with the data.  The triggered 
goals associated plan is passed to the Constructive Area for processing.  
A processor that senses internal and external stimuli is fundamental in all affective 
agent architectures.  In Blumbergs Silas architecture (Blumberg 1996), it is called the 
Sensory System and contains a number of smaller monitors called Releasing Mechanisms 
that determine how input will be handled.  In El-Nasrs PETEEI architecture (El-Nasr 
1998), external stimuli are handled by the Cognitive Process module and internal stimuli 
are handled by the Learning and Emotional Process modules.  In Reillys Emotional 
Agents (Reilly 1996), stimuli are first processed in the Emotion Generation module. In 
Velasquezs EBC Framework (see Section 2.4.3) sensory input is handled by the 
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Perceptual System.  Whatever the processor or mechanism is called, a sensory input 
processor is used by all affective agent architectures to sense the surrounding environment 
and the agents internal state.  Having done this, the processor activates other processes 
within the agent to determine how the input will affect the agent. 
In EMAIs Sensory Processor, a goal such as EAT4 may be triggered by a threshold 
value of the agents Internal State Register that represents hunger.  In a non-active state the 
agent will become increasingly hungry at a constant rate in response to signals from the 
Cyclical Drive mechanism within the Motivation Drive Generator.  At a particular 
threshold value of this register the Homeostatic Drive mechanism will send a sensory 
signal of hunger to the Sensory Processor.  In turn, the Sensory Processor will determine 
which goals to activate in order to return the agent to a less hungry state.  
In other cases, external sensory data from the environment, such as the presence of 
noxious stimuli including a loud noise, pain, heat and so on, can also affect goals of an 
agent.  On receiving external sensory data, the Sensory Processor determines which goals 
should be activated and updates the Internal State Registers appropriately.  For example, an 
external data reading of a drop in atmospheric temperature may also reduce the agents 
body temperature registers value. 
The goals identified and activated by the Sensory Processor are quite abstract and are 
passed to the Event Space Generator in the Constructive Area for further processing. 
3.3.4 Emotional State and Bias Registers 
As well as the Internal State Registers that may define internal states such as the 
hunger, tiredness or temperature of an agent, the Knowledge Area also stores another set 
of attributes that collectively define the agents emotional state or mood.  The inspiration 
for including a mood value in the EMAI architecture comes from the work of Leuba and 
Lucas (Leuba and Lucas 1945) who concluded through experimentation that an 
individuals view of the world varies from moment to moment and is influenced by the 
individuals emotional state (see Section 2.2.2).   Therefore, a mood value is stored in the 
                                                   
4
 Throughout this dissertation, goals will be typeset in uppercase. 
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EMAI architecture and used when assessing the external and internal stimuli processed by 
the agent. 
This dissertation introduces a unique way of representing an affective agents emotional 
state.  Until now architectures for affective agents have determined an agents emotional 
state by assessing the state of individual emotion variables (PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998), Silas 
(Blumberg 1996), Emotional Agents (Reilly 1996)) where each variable represents a pure 
emotion (e.g. happiness, sadness, anger).  In the EMAI architecture the mood of the agent 
is stored separately from the agents emotional module. 
The attributes that define an EMAI agents mood and emotional state are pleasantness, 
anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, responsibility and control and are known 
as appraisal dimensions. Although this will be discussed at length in Chapter 9, the mood 
of an EMAI agent is the result of an analysis made when the agent executes an event.  
All events are assessed by the same six attributes listed above.  The agents mood is the 
summing of all the attitudes the agent has thus far collected by executing events.   Along 
with the agents mood, an Emotional Bias Register is kept.  This register defines the 
agents preferred emotional state and is used later by the Intention Generator in the 
Deliberate Area to schedule and order the agents intentions.  
Not only are events as a whole appraised, but each action, object, time and context in 
the knowledge base is also assigned a set of the six appraisal dimensions that must be 
present and linked to all event elements. Appraisal is an assessment the agent places on 
each concept type in the Type and Relation Hierarchies of the Ontology.  They are a set of 
summative values the agent keeps and updates each time it performs a behaviour described 
by an event.  Each element involved in an event, be it action, object, time or context, is 
evaluated by the agent under the six appraisal dimensions listed above.  How an element is 
involved with the agent during the execution of a behaviour determines how the agent rates 
it in terms of each category.  The collection of these appraisals forms the basis of the 
Affective Space. 
3.3.5 Affective Space 
Chapter 8 provides the background and a complete elucidation of the Affective Space 
component. Suffice it to say that this component is the heart and soul of the agent.  The 
Affective Space is a six-dimensional space defined by the six appraisal dimensions. The 
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Affective Space, based on the psychological model of Smith and Ellsworth (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985), defines 15 emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, boredom, challenge, 
hope, fear, interest, contempt, disgust, frustration, surprise, pride, shame and guilt) with 
respect to the dimensions of pleasantness, responsibility, effort, certainty, attention and 
control.  Each appraisal dimension is used to produce a six coordinate point that defines an 
individual emotional state.   The location of these emotional states can be manipulated to 
produce different personalities for the agent.  This will also be discussed in Chapter 9. 
The Affective Space replaces the individual emotional state variables that are used in 
other affective agent architectures (PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998), Em (Reilly 1996) and Dog 
World agents (Padgham et al 1997)).  The benefits of including a continuous emotional 
state space with respect to discrete emotional state values is that the Affective Space 
eliminates the need for the significant coordination between emotional states, complex 
emotional blending formulae and rules and the emotional decay rate functions 
implemented in the other affective agent architectures.  These benefits are further explored 
in Chapter 8.  As the agents mood is stored as six attributes each representing a value in 
each of the appraisal dimensions of the Affective Space, the agents mood can be 
compared (by a distance measure) to any pure emotion (for example, happiness or 
sadness) in the Affective Space.  The pure emotion that is physically closest to the agents 
emotional state is used to describe the agents mood.  
The Affective Space is not only used in determining the agents emotional state.  As 
will be explained in Chapter 9, the Affective Space is used primarily in the agents 
decision-making mechanism to make decisions about event execution using emotions.  
This process occurs in the Deliberate Area.  However, before the agent can make any 
decisions about which events to execute in order to satisfy its goals, a list of events must be 
created. This process occurs in the Constructive Area. 
3.4 The Constructive Area 
The Constructive Area receives abstract goals and generic events from the Knowledge 
Area.  These events form plans that the agent knows if successfully executed, will satisfy 
the goals that have been triggered by the Motivational Drive Generator via the Sensory 
Processor.  The Constructive Area also receives information about the concept types in the 
Ontology that are used to construct specific events the agent needs to perform in order to 
satisfy its goals.  
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Goals received by the Constructive Area may be general or specific depending on the 
level of goal that has been activated.  Rather than a goal with a plan that states generally 
that some action should be taken toward something in someplace at sometime, the 
Constructive Area specialises this to more exact terms that specifically define an event 
plan such as the cooking of the cake will take place in the kitchen at noon. This task, 
performed by the Constructive Area, takes the generalised event plans and constructs 
specialised plans using concepts in the Type and Relation Hierarchies of the Ontology. 
3.4.1 Event Space Generator 
The Event Space Generator receives abstract goals from the Sensory Processor and 
detailed event and planning information from the Ontology.  With this information, the 
Event Space Generator constructs a series of specific competing events and associated 
plans that can be executed in order to satisfy the agents goals.  This process is examined 
in Chapter 7.  The competing event plans are collectively referred to as the event space.   
In Blumbergs architecture for Silas (Blumberg 1996) plans also compete to become the 
agents behaviour.  Each behaviour in the Silas architecture is contained within an 
autonomous object called a Behaviour.   The strength of a Behaviour is determined by any 
associated Releasing Mechanisms (see Section 3.3.3) that have activated it. Events in the 
PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998) seem to be much less complex.  The actions of the agent are based 
on a simple stimulus-reflex process where events occur as the direct result of an external 
stimulus.  Unlike these and other previous affective architectures (EBC Framework 
(Velasquez 1999), Emotional Agents (Reilly 1996)), the EMAI architecture can produce 
complex event plans and dynamically create new ones.  Rather than generating just one 
behaviour to perform in order to satisfy its goals, the agent can create multiple plans to 
satisfy just one goal.  This creates a series of competing event plans.  The competing event 
plans within the event space create a decision-making situation for the agent.  The agent 
must select an event plan from the event space to execute.  This selection process is 
performed in the Deliberate Area, where the agent makes a decision about which event 
plan to execute based on how it feels about the plan.   The agent will execute the most liked 
plans first. Thus the decision making process is based on emotions.  However, before this 
type of decision-making can take place, the agent must assess each event plan and 
determine how each event will affect the agents emotional state.  This process occurs in 
the Deliberate Area. 
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3.5 The Deliberate Area 
The Deliberate Area accepts input in the form of an event space from the Constructive 
Area.  The purpose of the Intention Generator in the Deliberate Area is to order, prioritise 
and schedule events.  The events in the agents schedule become the outward behaviour of 
the agent via the Behaviour Actuator.  The Deliberate Area creates a list of tasks for the 
agent to perform called the agents schedule. This schedule is dynamic, continually being 
updated and reordered as new event spaces arrive from the Constructive Area.  This 
process is performed by the Intention Generator. 
3.5.1 Intention Generator 
As event spaces arrive in the Deliberate Area, the Intention Generator takes each 
collection of plans and orders it in the agents schedule based on a two-fold ordering 
process. The primary ordering of the plans by the Intention Generator is based on goal 
priority.  When a goal is activated or triggered by the Sensory Processor an appropriate 
event space is created in the Constructive Area.  If a goal that has already been triggered is 
triggered again, the associated event space is given a priority rating.  The more often a goal 
is triggered, the higher the agents priority to achieve that goal. Different event spaces will 
have different levels of priority based on the number of times the associated goal has been 
triggered.  The Intention Generator uses this priority to order the event spaces within the 
agents schedule.   
This type of primary event scheduling also occurs in other affective agent architectures 
including Silas (Blumberg 1996), PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998) and EBC Framework 
(Velasquez 1999) where a priority is placed on a behaviour, based on the agents 
motivational state.  However, this is where the similarity between the EMAIs behaviour 
scheduling and previous affective architectures ends.  As mentioned previously, the EMAI 
is not only capable of deducing one plan to satisfy a goal, but it can also infer multiple and 
mutually exclusive plans that can satisfy just one goal.  This collection of plans constitutes 
a goals event space.   
Because each event space in the agents schedule may consist of one or more event 
plans, these plans need to be ordered within the event space.  The Intention Generator 
orders the events within an event space using an emotional sequence, from most desirable 
to least desirable.  The Emotional State Bias Register determines what constitutes a 
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desirable event. The most desirable of event plans are ones that, when executed, would 
produce emotions closest to the value of the Emotional State Bias Register.  As is the case 
with the agents mood, each event in the event space also has an associated set of values 
for each of the six appraisal dimensions in the Affective Space.  The agent assesses each 
event and assigns values to each of these dimensions.  The agent uses the six appraisal 
values for an event, the agents mood and the Affective Space to interpolate the emotional 
state that an event would evoke in the agent if the agent were to execute the event.  This 
process is examined in detail in Chapter 9.   The Intention Generator orders the event 
plans, within the event spaces, using this interpolated emotional state.  Events that will 
produce the most desirable emotional state within the agent are ordered first and least 
desirable plans are placed last within each priority ordering of the event spaces. 
Once event spaces have been ordered, the agent can attempt to perform plans from 
them.  This processing occurs in the Behaviour Actuator. 
3.5.2 Behaviour Actuator 
Before the agent translates an event into behaviour, checks are performed to ensure the 
agents physical state and the environmental states are adequate for the performance of the 
task.  The Behaviour Actuator performs this task which includes considerations such as 
prerequisite and co-requisite tasks being performed and sufficient simulated resource 
availability.  For example, the agent cannot perform the goal EAT if there is no food 
present in the environment and the agent cannot perform the goal PREPARE FOOD if the 
task for the goal FIND FOOD has not been performed.  The following is an example of the 
Deliberate Area at work. 
Assume the agent has been programmed with the beliefs of a pet dog.  The agent has 
three Internal State Registers; Hunger, Tiredness and Activity, which in turn will activate 
three appropriate goals when their threshold values are reached. These are EAT, SLEEP 
and PLAY.  Assume, for this example, the EAT goal has been triggered three times, the 
SLEEP goal has been triggered twice and the PLAY goal has been triggered once.  Each 
goal evokes an associated event space and subsequent events.  The EAT goal evokes 
events for EAT BONE, EAT DOG FOOD and EAT BISCUIT. The SLEEP goal evokes 
SLEEP ON BED and SLEEP OUTSIDE and the PLAY goal rouses the events CHASE 
BALL and DIG HOLE. Given that the agent is in a happy mood and has an Emotional 
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State Bias Register that programs the agent to prefer happy events, the Intention Generator 
would create a schedule thus: 
EAT BISCUIT: happiness 
EAT DOG FOOD: interest 
EAT BONE: boredom 
SLEEP ON BED: happiness 
SLEEP OUTSIDE: frustration 
DIG HOLE: pride 
CHASE BALL: interest 
where the emotion assigned to each event is shown.  The events are first ordered in their 
respective event space priority order, in this case EAT then SLEEP and finally PLAY 
followed by an ordering within each event space based on the events that will keep the 
agent closest to a happy mood being first.  If the agent is successful in achieving the first 
task, in this case the event EAT BISCUIT, the value on the Internal State Register that 
caused the triggering of the EAT goal will be reduced.  The reduction amount is related to 
the attributes of the concept involved in the event. For example, the EAT BISCUIT event 
would reduce the hunger register by less than the EAT DOG FOOD event as the objects 
involved (biscuit and dog food) have differing hunger reducing capacities.  If the Internal 
State Registers value is reduced below the threshold (signifying the agent is no longer 
hungry) the EAT goal will have been satisfied and any remaining events that were evoked 
by the EAT goal will be removed from the list as they are no longer needed.  The resulting 
schedule would be: 
SLEEP ON BED: happiness 
SLEEP OUTSIDE: frustration 
DIG HOLE: pride 
CHASE BALL: interest 
If the successful event reduced the Internal State Register but not enough to reduce its 
value to below the threshold, the associated goal would still be active and the remaining 
events from the respective event space would remain in the schedule.  Furthermore, if the 
agent could not successfully complete the task for EAT BISCUIT it would discard this task 
from the list.  The EAT goal would still be activated and the agent would try the next task 
in the list, namely EAT DOG FOOD.  
Other affective agent architectures also include a process or mechanism that turns the 
agents scheduled behaviours into actual outward behaviours that can be seen by an 
onlooker.  In Silas (Blumberg 1996) the Motor System performs this task.  As Silas is a 
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three-dimensional animated character that exists in a virtual world, the Motor System 
controls the agents animation sequences that convey a particular behaviour.  In the EBC 
Framework (Velasquez 1999) created for implementation in robotic devices, outward 
behaviours are also controlled by a Motor System, however, in this case the Motor System 
controls the robotic devices physical circuitry to make it move.  In PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998) 
although no specific module has been defined for activating behaviour, an appropriate set 
of animation sequences are played as the result of a production rule assessment of the 
agents physical and emotional state.  A similar mechanism or process for generating 
outward behaviour in an affective agent will be found in all affective agent architectures.  
Without one, the agent would not be able to act out events and plans that could satisfy its 
motivated goals. 
3.6 Summary 
Each area in the EMAI architecture works to create an agent that can choose its 
behavioural options based on assessments using emotional state values.  The agent can be 
programmed to simulate any set of characteristics or behaviours by altering the structure of 
the Goal, Type and Relation Hierarchies and the number of Internal State Registers in the 
Motivational Drive Generator.  The personality of the agent is defined by the structure of 
the Affective Space.  All other components work together in order to generate the outward 
behaviour of the agent and to update its belief system.  While the EMAI architecture 
includes a number of fundamental mechanisms that are present in other affective agent 
architectures, it also introduces a number of new and unique concepts and processes that 
enhance the emotion processing capabilities of an EMAI agent. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a holistic examination of the EMAI 
architecture, how it compares to other affective agent architectures and to describe how the 
components separately process information, and also how they cooperate to create an agent 
with affective decision-making abilities.  Many of the components of the agent architecture 
have intricate internal operations not discussed in this chapter.   The purpose of the 
following chapters is to examine the analytical and psychological background for the 
major components of the architecture.  The structure and functionality of each component 
is discussed in depth. The first of these chapters examines the processes and knowledge 
representation of EMAIs Ontology. 
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4. Structuring Knowledge 
e know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information upon 
it. 
- Samual Johnson (1709 – 1785) 
4.1 Introduction 
Ontology is the study of categorising elements within a specific domain. The result of 
such a study creates an Ontology.  Sowa (2001) defines an Ontology as: 
a catalog of the types of things that are assumed to exist in a domain of 
interest D from the perspective of a person who uses a language L for the 
purpose of talking about D. The types in the Ontology represent the 
predicates, word senses, or concept and relation types of the language L 
when used to discuss topics in the domain D. An uninterpreted logic, such 
as predicate calculus, conceptual graphs, or KIF, is ontologically neutral. It 
imposes no constraints on the subject matter or the way the subject may be 
characterized. By itself, logic says nothing about anything, but the 
combination of logic with an Ontology provides a language that can 
express relationships about the entities in the domain of interest.  
The EMAI Ontology organises elements from the agents realm, using conceptual 
graph theory (Sowa 1984, 2001) and extends the formalism using the new concepts: the 
Goal Hierarchy (Baillie et al. 2000c), Event Graphs and Activity Digraphs. Event Graphs 
and Activity Digraphs are new abstractions defined in this dissertation for the purpose of 
representing events and plans. The Ontology presents the knowledge that an EMAI agent 
possesses about its environment. 
In this chapter, the EMAI Ontology is described. An EMAI agents Ontology consists 
of sub-components that work collectively to represent the agents knowledge base. The 
Ontology consists of a Type Hierarchy, Relation Hierarchy, Goal Hierarchy, Event Graphs, 
Activity Digraphs, and a set of primitive Canonical Graphs from which all other graphs 
needed to represent the full extent of the agent's knowledge can be derived. In the 
following section, the knowledge representation used in the EMAI architecture is 
described. 
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4.2 Knowledge Representation 
The knowledge representation scheme of conceptual graphs (CG) (Sowa 1984, 2001) 
has been chosen as it provides the necessary vehicle for the storage of the type of deep 
knowledge required by the agent using existing structure for conceptual relationships and 
knowledge processing through canonical graph formation rules.  Conceptual graphs also 
form part of a semantic network thus giving flexibility for the agent to later be integrated 
with other perceptual input, procedures and motor mechanisms.  An introduction to 
conceptual graph theory can be found in Appendix C of this dissertation. In addition to the 
knowledge structures of conceptual graphs, this dissertation also introduces a structure 
called the Goal Hierarchy. Furthermore, it introduces two forms of abstraction called the 
Event Graph and Activity Digraph to represent events and plans, respectively.  
Collectively, these structures are used to represent the EMAI Ontology. 
Note the Type Hierarchy and Relation Hierarchy have been defined by Sowa (1984), 
but re-produced here for completion and ease of understanding for the rest of the 
abstractions. 
4.2.1 Type Hierarchy 
The Type Hierarchy in the EMAI Ontology contains all the concept types known to the 
agent in a partially-ordered set arranged as supertypes and subtypes.  Sowa defines a Type 
Hierarchy as follows. 
Definition: A Type Hierarchy is a partially-ordered set T whose elements are called type 
labels. Each type label in T is specified as primitive or defined.  
• For any concept c, the type of c is either a type label in T or a 
monadic lambda expression.  
• The Type Hierarchy T contains two primitive type labels Entity, 
called the universal type, and Absurdity, called the absurd type. The 
symbol 
┬
 is synonymous with Entity, and the symbol ┴ is 
synonymous with Absurdity.  
• For every defined type label, there is a monadic lambda expression, 
called its definition.  
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• A defined type label and its definition are interchangeable: in any 
position where one may occur, the other may replace it.  
• The partial ordering over T is determined by the subtype relation, 
represented by the characters "≤" for subtype, "<" for proper subtype, 
"≥" for supertype, and ">" for proper supertype. If t is any type label, 
┬
 ≥ t and t ≥┴; in particular, 
┬ 
> ┴.  
• The partial ordering of type labels must be consistent with the rules 
of inference. (Sowa 2001). 
 
The most abstract concepts appear in the top of the hierarchy.  As the 
hierarchy decomposes into lower levels the concepts become more specific.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of a simple Type Hierarchy.  A concept type 
such as ENTITY is abstract and can be decomposed into the mores specific 
concept types of APPLE, BANANA, PORK and LAMB.  It can be stated that 
APPLE is a subtype of ENTITY and ENTITY is a supertype of APPLE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Relation Hierarchy 
The Relation Hierarchy in the EMAI Ontology defines the supertype and subtype 
relationships that exist between the conceptual relations that are used by an EMAI agent to 
define the roles amid the concepts in the Type Hierarchy.  Sowa defines a Relation 
Hierarchy as follows. 
Definition: A Relation Hierarchy is a partially-ordered set R whose elements are called 
relation labels. Each relation label is specified as primitive or defined, but not both.  
• For every relation label in R, there is a nonnegative integer n called 
its valence.  
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• For every n-adic conceptual relation r, the type of r is either a 
relation label in R of valence n or an n-adic lambda expression.  
• For every defined relation label of valence n, there is exactly one n-
adic lambda expression, called its definition.  
• A defined relation label and its definition are interchangeable: in any 
position of a CG where one may occur, it may be replaced by the 
other.  
• The partial ordering over R is determined by the subtype relation, 
with the symbols ≤ for subtype, < for proper subtype, ≥ for 
supertype, and > for proper supertype.  
• The partial ordering of relation labels must be consistent with the 
rules of inference (see Sowa 2001).  
• If r is an n-adic relation label, s is an m-adic relation label, and n is 
not equal to m, then none of the following is true: r<s, r>s, r=s. 
(Sowa 2001) 
Figure 4.2 displays an example of a simple Relation Hierarchy.  These relations are used 
to join the concepts of the Type Hierarchy into conceptual graphs. For example, the 
relation AGNT can be used to describe how an ENTITY concept can be the instigator of 
an ACTION concept. A relation such as CON is abstract and can be decomposed into 
more specific relations of INST and LOC.  It can be said that INST is a sub-relation of 
CON and CON is a super-relation of INST. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Goal Hierarchy 
Human behaviour is goal-orientated (Furth 1987, Rao and Georgeff 1995). This 
property allows people to recover from failed plans and to recognise and create new ones. 
Koestler (1967) cites MacLean (1958) and references the two basic motivational drives (or 
goals) in human behaviour; self-preservation and preservation of the species.  These goals, 
according to Koestler, are, by instinct, built into all animals and are programmed into the 
reptilian and paleo-mammalian brain constructs described in MacLeans Theory in Section 
2.2.1.   From these two goals (U1 and U2), all other motivational goals (G1  Gn ) of human 
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behaviour can be derived and are individual to the human for whom they are defined. 
Expression 4.1 attempts to formalise this relationship5. 
}{}...{ 211 UUGG n ∪⊆                    4.1 
Thus, an EMAI agent may posses a set of goals at any one point in time.  Each of these 
goals has a particular level of priority.  The level of priority placed on a goal indicates the 
level of desire the agent has for carrying out activities that fulfill that goal. The greater the 
desire to fulfill a goal the greater the chance the agent will be working towards fulfilling 
that goal.  Besides the desire to fulfill the goal, the ability of an agent to carry out a plan 
that will satisfy the goal is also dependent on its beliefs resulting from the environment and 
its internal states.  
The Goal Hierarchy contains the entire set of goals that are used to generate tasks 
within the agent.  In order to emulate human-like behaviour the agent is driven by this set 
of goals.  In a similar structure to a conceptual graph Type Hierarchy, the goals within the 
hierarchy have supergoals and subgoals.  The subgoals inherit properties from the 
supergoals and the supergoals are more abstract than the subgoals.  The goals that are 
programmed into the Goal Hierarchy reflect the type of agent the architecture is being used 
to simulate.  For example, if the agent were to represent an animal, then it would be 
programmed with a Goal Hierarchy suitable for simulating the behaviour of a goal-
orientated animal.  This Goal Hierarchy may look similar to Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
The goals represented in the Goal Hierarchy of Figure 4.3 are quite abstract and could 
be representative of any living creature.  The idea behind the Goal Hierarchy is that it can 
be representative of the agents goals on any level.  The more this Goal Hierarchy is 
decomposed into primitive goals the closer it comes to representing specific events.  At the 
                                                   
5
 This occurs as the two ultimate goals have subgoals, which in turn have their own subgoals and so forth. The 
set of all these goals (including subgoals) constitutes all of an individual’s motivational goals. 
Figure 4.3 A Simple Goal Hierarchy for an Animal
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most primitive level of the Goal Hierarchy there exists a partially-ordered set of goals that 
are synonymous with the processes or events and plans that can be performed to satisfy a 
goal. By decomposing any goal in the hierarchy into primitives, the agent can identify a 
plan of events that can be performed to satisfy the initial goal. Figure 4.4 illustrates part of 
a Goal Hierarchy.  This figure shows a partial Goal Hierarchy displaying the goal EAT 
decomposed into three partial subgoals; FIND FOOD, PREPARE FOOD and CONSUME 
FOOD.  
 
 
As stated earlier, the goals in the Goal Hierarchy of the EMAI Ontology are either 
abstract or primitive.  An abstract goal can be broken down into subgoals (of which some 
will be abstract, while others may be primitive). Subgoals are either AND-ed or OR-ed. A 
set of AND-ed subgoals indicates that all of the subgoals need to be successfully achieved 
to satisfy the supergoal. A set of OR-ed subgoals indicates that at least one of the sub-goals 
needs to be successfully achieved to satisfy the supergoal. The AND and OR are used to 
indicate process inclusion.  A new construct called an Event Graph is used to indicate 
process ordering (see Section 4.3.1). Each goal corresponds to an associated event that can 
be carried out in order to achieve (or partially achieve) the goal. The definition of Goal 
Hierarchy can be stated as follows: 
Definition: A Goal Hierarchy is a partially-ordered set G whose elements are called goals. 
Each goal in G is specified as abstract or primitive.  Considering the symbol ≤ indicates 
ordering and g and h are goals, G is such that: 
• If g ≤ h, then g is called the subgoal of h; and h is called the supergoal of g, 
written h ≥ g. 
• The Goal Hierarchy G contains one ultimate goal, called the ultimate goal (U), and 
two subultimate goals called self-preservation (U1) and species-preservation (U2).  
• The partial ordering over G is determined by the subgoal relation, represented by 
the characters "≤" for subgoal, "<" for proper subgoal, "≥" for supergoal, and ">" 
for proper supergoal. If g is any goal, U ≥ g and g ≤ U.  
• For any goal g where g ≠ U, g ≠ U1 and g ≠ U2 then g will be a proper subgoal of 
U1 and/or U2.  
• If a goal g has a set of subgoals S such that S = {φ}, g is said to be primitive. 
Figure 4.4 Goal Hierarchy for EAT 
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• The subgoals, {s1..sn}, of the set of subgoals, S, for a goal, g, can be arranged in 
sentences of propositional logic where the logical connective AND is represented 
by the character Λ” and OR is presented by the character V.  A sentence such 
as (s1 Λ s2 Λ s3) ⇒ g indicates that of all the subgoals in S, only s1, s2 and s3 need 
to be satisfied in order to satisfy the g. A sentence such as (s1 V s2 V s3) ⇒ g 
indicates that only one of  the subgoals (s1,s2 or s3) needs to be satisfied in order to 
satisfy the g. 
• The subgoals S={s1sn}, of the goal, g, can be arranged into subsets of S, A1Am, 
such that all goals in Ai are joined in a sentence of propositional logic using Λ as 
the logical connective and A1VA2VVAn. 
4.2.4 Relationship Between Type Hierarchy and Goal Hierarchy 
A typical Type Hierarchy is shown in Figure 4.5. In this structure, there is type EVENT 
as a subtype of type ACTION, and FIND, PREPARE and CONSUME as subtypes of 
EVENT, and so on, as shown at the bottom of this figure as an expansion of the FIND 
FOOD, PREPARE FOOD and CONSUME FOOD subtypes6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is fundamental to the understanding of the definition of this EMAI Ontology to 
comprehend the relationship between the Type Hierarchy and the Goal Hierarchy. In the 
                                                   
6
 Combinatorial explosion is an issue with this representation scheme. However, in this dissertation, the 
emphasis of the study is in exploring emotion in decision making, and as such, combinatorial explosion is 
not the focus of this research. 
Figure 4.5 Type Hierarchy Showing Event Types with the FIND FOOD, PREPARE FOOD and 
CONSUME FOOD Subtypes Shown Expanded in the Oval Section 
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Type Hierarchy, all ENTITYs are objects types7, while all subtypes of EVENTs are action 
types. Actions are performed against the objects. In the Goal Hierarchy, all the action types 
from the Type Hierarchy can form the sub-goals under the subultimate goals called self-
preservation (U1) and species-preservation (U2), as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each goal corresponds to an associated event that can be carried out in order to achieve 
(or partially achieve) the goal. In the Goal Hierarchy in Figure 4.6, there are sub-goals for 
FIND-FOOD, PREPARE-FOOD and CONSUME-FOOD AND-ed, while FIND-FRUIT 
and FIND-MEAT is OR-ed. Similarly, FIND-PORK and FIND-LAMB are OR-ed, and so 
on. This Goal Hierarchy simply states that to satisfy the EAT goal, the subgoals: FIND-
FOOD, PREPARE-FOOD, and EAT-FOOD have to be satisfied. To satisfy FIND-FOOD, 
either FIND-FRUIT or FIND-MEAT has to be satisfied, and so on. 
                                                   
7
 Note, in other knowledge bases not all entities are classified as object types.  However, in this representation 
it is unnecessary to classify them as other types.  Refer to Section 6.4 for further details on entity 
classifications.  
4.6 An Extended Goal Hierarchy 
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An event can be represented by an abstraction in the form of a conceptual graph. These 
events can be ordered in a temporal manner to form plans. Plans are also represented by an 
abstraction in the form of conceptual graph. In the next section, these two forms of 
abstraction are described and defined. 
4.3 Event and Plan Definitions 
4.3.1 Event Graph 
Each goal in the Goal Hierarchy has an associated event (with the same name) that can 
be performed by the agent to satisfy or partially satisfy the goal. An event is represented in 
the agents knowledge base as a conceptual graph in the form dictated by the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Petty and Cacioppo 1996) (see Chapter 5). This theory defines a 
behavioural event as having four elements; action, object, time and context. A generic 
event is represented by the conceptual graph shown in Figure 4.7 where an event is defined 
as some entity performing an action on some entity at some time and in some context. 
Associated with this graph are three sets of conceptual graphs that represent the 
precondition, postcondition and delete graphs that are used during event reasoning 
(otherwise referred to in this dissertation as event execution). 
 
 
 
 
 
This can also be represented in linear form as: 
[ACTION] – 
  (OBJ) -> [ENTITY] 
  (AGNT) -> [ENTITY] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME] 
  (CON) -> [CONTEXT] 
 
Figure 4.7 A Conceptual Graph Representation of an Abstract Event 
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In other words, a goal a in the Goal Hierarchy G, at any level of abstract, n, written as Ga,n 
is represented by a conceptual graphs abstraction called the Event Graph. Each Event 
Graph has associated with it a set of graphs that represent the precondition, postcondition 
and delete list. An Event Graph is defined as follows. 
 
Definition: An Event Graph is an n-adic abstraction,  v1..n, w1..m, x1..o u, where u is the 
conceptual graphs representing the Event Graph, v1..n represents a set of n conceptual 
graphs that represents the pre-condition that must be satisfied before this event can be 
executed, w1..m represents a set of m conceptual graphs that represents the post-conditions 
that will result from executing this event, and x1..o represents a set of o conceptual graphs 
that will be removed from the memory, after execution of this event. 
 
In other words, the preconditions denote the knowledge that must exist before the event 
is executed, the postconditions denote the knowledge that is created as a result of executing 
the event and the delete list represents knowledge that is no longer needed after the event 
has been executed. For example, the Event Graph for the FIND-FOOD could be 
represented as in Figure 4.8. 
In linear form, the Event Graph in Figure 4.8 is written as follows: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
where the corresponding precondition, postcondition and delete sets of conceptual graphs 
are as shown below: 
Figure 4.8 Event Graph Representation of FIND FOOD Event 
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Precondition: {[AGENT: EMAI]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD]} 
Postcondition: {[AGENT: EMAI]<-(POSS)->[FOOD]} 
Delete list: {[AGENT: EMAI]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD]} 
 
 
To facilitate knowledge passing during the graph execution process, it is essential that the 
graph processor utilises coreference links within a graph, and line of identity between 
graphs. Definitions of these concepts are given below. 
 
Definition: Coreference links show which concepts refer to the same entities. In linear 
form representation of conceptual graphs, co-reference links are represented using 
variables. 
For example, consider the following conceptual graph: 
            
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] -> (LOC) -> [SHOP:a*] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [?a] 
 
where the location of the AGENT is identical to the location where the event FIND took 
place. 
 
Definition: A line of identity is a connected, undirected graph g whose nodes are concepts 
and whose arcs are pairs of concepts, called co-reference links. No concept may belong to 
more than one line of identity. A concept a in graph g is said to dominate another concept 
b if there is a path <a1, a2,....,an> in g where a=a1, b=an, and for each i, either ai and ai+1 
both occur in the same context or the context of ai dominates the context of ai+1. 
 
For example, consider the following Event Graph, that is made up of conceptual graphs g1, 
g2, g3, and g4: 
g1: [FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD:*a] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *b] -> (LOC) -> [SHOP:*c] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [?c] 
g2: [AGENT: *b]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD:*a] 
g3: [AGENT: *b]<-(POSS)->[FOOD:*a] 
g4: [AGENT: *b]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD:*a] 
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In the above Event Graph, the concept SHOP in g1 is a co-reference (indicated by the 
variable *c. There exists a line of identity between all four graphs via the concepts FOOD 
and AGENT. So, during graph processing, if the generic concept [AGENT: *b] in g1 is 
specialised to [AGENT: EMAI], the graph processor will automatically follow the 
coreference links and line of identity to specialize g2, g3 and g4 as follows: 
 
g2: [AGENT: EMAI]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD:*a] 
g3: [AGENT: EMAI]<-(POSS)->[FOOD:*a] 
g4: [AGENT: EMAI]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD:*a] 
 
As described above, each goal in the Goal Hierarchy has a corresponding Event Graph.  
The Event Graph describes the process that must take place to satisfy the goal.  This 
process is called an event. The goals define the why of an agent's behaviour and the events 
define the how.  They are so closely related that it is difficult in the English language to 
divide them.  For example, the goal may be to eat an apple and the event will be eating an 
apple.   For each event, there is a corresponding goal, whatever it may be.  We cannot have 
the how without the why. Therefore, each goal in the Goal Hierarchy has a corresponding 
event at the same level of abstraction as the goal and a set of events on sub-levels the agent 
may choose from to achieve the goal. The events on subsequent levels are arranged into 
Activity Digraphs that form plans to satisfy the associated goal. 
4.3.2 Activity Digraphs 
Alone, the Goal Hierarchy does not include any plans that show how the subgoals 
interact to satisfy the parent goal.  To this end, the Goal Hierarchy is accompanied by a set 
of Activity Digraphs that explain how goals combine to form plans. Activity Digraphs can 
be formed at various levels of abstraction. For example, at level 3, the Activity Digraph 
accompanying the Goal Hierarchy of Figure 4.6 might look like that in Figure 4.9.  In an 
Activity Digraph (not to be confused with a conceptual graph) the vertices correspond to 
the events (represented by Event Graphs) that must be performed and an edge is drawn 
from vertex i to vertex j if event i must precede event j.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 Activity Digraph for EAT 
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The plans in the Activity Digraphs need not be as simplistic as simple sequencing (for 
example, process repetition is allowed). Activity Digraphs are synonymous with Problem 
Maps described in (Lukose, 1992, 1996). They can represent any degree of complexity and 
can easily represent all the major control structures (such as FOR, WHILE, REPEAT and 
CASE). Each event in the plan will have a set of pre-conditions, co-conditions and post-
conditions that need to be analysed by the agent before, during and after execution.  Each 
event will alter the state of the agent or the environment during and after execution.  The 
agents processing of an Activity Digraph falls into the domain of plan reasoning and task 
analysis and will not be discussed in this dissertation. Suffice it to say that each event in 
the Activity Digraph is analysed by the agent using plan reasoning techniques (Allen, 
Kautz et al 1991) that as a result affect the state of the agent, the agents environment and 
the agents behaviour. 
To construct a conceptual graph representation of an Activity Digraph, a partial 
temporal ordering of the Event Graphs is specified.   The two temporal relation types that 
are used to specify the temporal ordering of the Event Graphs are 
FINISH_BEFORE_START (FBS) and START_WHEN_START (SWS) (Lukose 1996).  An 
Activity Digraph can be defined as follows: 
Definition: An Activity Digraph labeled t is defined as a n-adic abstraction v1,..,vn 
w1,...,wm u, where u is the conceptual graph representing the activity digraph, v1,..,vn which 
is in turn the set of conceptual graphs representing the initial state, while w1,...,wm is the set 
of graphs representing the final state. 
This definition is analogous to the definition of Problem Map (Lukose 1993, 1996). The 
difference between Problem Map and Activity Digraph is that the Problem Maps are 
Executable Conceptual Structure (dynamic graphs), while the Activity Digraphs are not; 
they can only be reasoned upon (static graphs). The Activity Digraph in Figure 4.8 could 
be represented as: 
 [FIND-FOOD]->(FBS)->[PREPARE-FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME-FOOD] 
The initial state of the above Activity Digraph is the union of the pre-conditions of all the 
Event Graphs associated to the Activity Digraph. In the above example, they are the union 
of the preconditions of FIND-FOOD, PREPARE-FOOD, and CONSUME-FOOD. The 
final states are the union of all the post-condition graphs of the same Event Graphs. 
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4.4 Example of an EMAI Ontology 
This section examines an example of a typical EMAI Ontology. Consider the Type 
Hierarchy, Relation Hierarchy and the Goal Hierarchy shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 
4.12, respectively.  Note that for this example, only the relevant sections of the hierarchies 
are displayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As described earlier, each goal in the Goal Hierarchy is associated with an Event 
Graph. In this example, the Event Graphs for FIND-FOOD, PREPARE-FOOD, and 
COMSUME-FOOD, are as depicted in Figures 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15, respectively8. Note the 
subgoals of EAT are AND-ed. This implies there is an Activity Digraph that links these 
Figure 4.12 Goal Hierarchy for EAT 
Figure 4.10 A Type Hierarchy 
Figure 4.11 A Relation Hierarchy 
Figure 4.13 Event Graph Representation of FIND FOOD Event 
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Figure 4.14 Event Graph Representation of PREPARE FOOD Event 
Event Graphs to form the plan associated with the event EAT.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Activity Digraph that represents the plan for EAT is represented (as described 
earlier) using the temporal relation called FINISH-BEFORE-START (FBS), and can be 
written in linear form as shown below: 
[FIND-FOOD] -> (FBS)->[PREPARE-FOOD] -> (FBS) -> [CONSUME-FOOD] 
By expanding each of the above concepts with its corresponding Event Graphs, the 
Activity Digraph shown in Figure 4.16 is obtained.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
8
 Notice the CON relation has been specialised from Figure 4.7 into the relations INST and LOC (see Figure 
4.11) to illustrate how these relations might be implemented. 
Figure 4.15 Event Graph Representation of CONSUME FOOD Event 
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4.5 Summary 
The EMAI Ontology achieves the depth of knowledge required by an affective agent by 
using conceptual graph theory (Sowa, 1984) and Event Graphs and Activity Digraphs 
based on the Executable Conceptual Structure constructs (Lukose, 1996).  To these 
existing formalisms, a new structure, called the Goal Hierarchy, has been added to 
strengthen the architectures representation of the knowledge in a goal-orientated agent.  
The Goal Hierarchy gives the agent a logical method for organising goals.  Each goal in 
the hierarchy decomposes into a set of subgoals.  Each subgoal has an associated event that 
forms a part of a plan that achieves a parent goal.  An Event Graph in turn represents each 
event, and an Activity Digraph represents the plan.  
The knowledge contained in the EMAI Ontology is necessary to develop the emotional 
behaviour of an agent.  However, before an EMAI agent is compelled to perform a 
behaviour it must first want to do so.  The internal processes that cause the agent to behave 
are contained within the Motivational Drive Generator.  This, in collaboration with the 
Figure 4.16 Activity Digraph Representation of EAT Plan 
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Sensory Processor, activates an EMAI agents goals and begins the process of affective 
behaviour generation. 
5. Motivation and Prioritisation 
Obviously, for intelligence to function, it must be motivated by an affective power.  A person will not ever 
solve a problem if the problem does not interest him.  
- PIAGET 
5.1 Introduction 
Unlike machines, many factors drive human behaviour.  Each human is an autonomous, 
socially interdependent entity.  They are each motivated by many and varied needs and 
often do not act in a logical manner.  This makes their behaviour unpredictable and beyond 
simple statistical extrapolation (Baillie and Lukose 2001a).  In the struggle to define 
human behaviour, Koestler (1967) makes similar observations. He suggests the human 
organism is not merely a mechanical device, but it reacts to an ever-changing world and 
how it reacts to the world is based on its goals at the time. For example, at one instant, a 
person may have the intent to work towards achieving goal A, but at a later time the same 
person may have a completely different intent.  This is one reason why it has recently 
become evident that in order to produce artificial agents with intelligent behaviour it is 
necessary to supply these agents with the ability to react to the dynamic world 
(environment) where they live; be it virtual or real (Rao and Georgeff 1992, Blumberg et 
al. 1996). 
The EMAI architecture relies on the Knowledge Areas system of individual beliefs the 
agent holds about its environment and its physical and emotional states. These beliefs 
continually interact with an EMAI agents desire to achieve a goal activated by the 
Sensory Processor and its ordered event plans and schedule of behaviour.  Thus, the goal-
orientated nature of the agent allows it to demonstrate planning and re-planning. The agent 
exhibits reactive and deliberative behaviours. It has a repository of reactive plans that it 
can use in various situations that occur within its environment, while at the same time, it 
also has a repository of actions that it is capable of performing.  To achieve this, the agent 
must plan the sequence of actions to execute, in response to changes in the environment or 
itself.  Following this, the agent can attempt to achieve its goal. The agents beliefs are 
dynamic and may change with time, the agents physical position within its environment, 
and its justification of beliefs.  To simulate this kind of behaviour using the EMAI 
architecture, the mechanics of goal setting, goal prioritising and motivation are utilised to 
construct the agents Knowledge Area.   
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This chapter examines the internal mechanisms of the EMAIs Motivational Drive 
Generator and takes a further look at the structure of the Goal Hierarchy in the EMAI 
architectures Ontology. An illustration of how the motivational urges (represented by the 
corresponding Internal State Registers) influence the activation and prioritisation of an 
EMAI agents goals is given.  These processes within the Motivational Drive Generator, 
which have been inspired by human behaviour, are where the final behaviours of an EMAI 
agent originate. 
This chapter begins by examining the structure of the EMAI Ontologys Goal 
Hierarchy (as presented in (Baillie and Lukose 1999)). This is followed by an illustration 
of the Motivational Drive Generator and Sensory Processor.  
5.2 Motivating an EMAI Agent 
Inspiration for the motivational and prioritising mechanisms of the EMAI agent have 
been taken from psychological literature. Many renowned psychologists (Freud (Rothgeb 
1973), Piaget (Furth 1987), Toda (Padgham and Taylor 1997), and Koestler 1967) speak of 
this motivation in terms of urges. Toda (Padgham and Taylor 1997) identifies four 
motivational urges (emergency, biological, cognitive, and social). The combination of 
these urges and their intensity levels determine the behaviour of the individual and which 
goals are made high priority.  Section 2.3.2 identifies other drives and the cyclic and 
concepts used in contemporary agent architectures (El-Nasr 1998, Balkenius 1995, 
Padgham and Taylor 1997 and Canamero 1997).  The EMAI architecture uses these 
concepts to emulate urges within the Motivational Drive Generator. 
5.2.1 Revisiting the Goal Hierarchy 
Recall from Chapter 4 two basic motivational goals in human behaviour; self-
preservation (U1) and preservation of the species (U2). From these two goals (U1 and U2), 
all other motivational goals (G1  Gn ) of human behaviour can be derived and are 
individualistic of the human for whom they are defining. Expression 5.1 formalises this 
relationship. 
}{}...{ 211 UUGG n ∪⊆                          5.1 
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When a goal becomes the focus of an agent's belief and the agent wants to satisfy that 
goal, each and every subgoal of that goal becomes active.  A very simple example is 
shown in Figure 5.1. An Activity Digraph represents the inter-relationships between these 
subgoals, where the diagrammatic representation of an Activity Digraph is made up of 
vertices and edges as described in Expression 5.2: 
),( EVD =          5.2
where V is the set of goals that are the vertices of D, and E is the set of edges that connect 
these vertices.  As can be seen in Figure 5.1, this agent has seven subgoals on Level n+1.  
When the agent's goal Ga,n becomes active, so too will all the subgoals on Level n+1.  In 
this case the agent can choose from Activity Digraph D1,n+1, D2,n+1 or D3,n+1.    The common 
subgoals of Ga,n will appear in all Activity Digraphs Dx,n+1, where 1≤ x≤ 3.  These subgoals 
are easily identified in the set produced by expression 5.39:  
I
j
i
njD
1
1,
=
+
       5.3 
where j is the number of goals on Level n+1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9
 These common subgoals are found through the intersection of each set of subgoals that constitute an Activity 
Digraph. 
Figure 5.1 Hierarchy and Associated Activity Digraph for Level n+1
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In the example shown in Figure 5.1, the agent has two common subgoals in the Activity 
Digraphs that satisfy Ga,n: a and e. These common subgoals will define the success factor 
for Ga,n being achieved.  If these subgoals cannot possibly be achieved then the parent goal 
cannot be achieved.  Once it has been proven that these dependencies can be satisfied, total 
satisfaction of Ga,n depends on the successful completion of other subgoals in the chosen 
plan (represented by one of the Activity Digraphs)  
5.2.2 Goals 
Goals are classified hierarchically, branching down into subgoals from one ultimate 
goal. The two sub-ultimate goals in human behaviour are as self-preservation and 
preservation of the species.  The term ultimate goal is used for the goal at the very top of 
the hierarchy for completeness. This Goal Hierarchy is depicted in Figure 5.2.  Incremental 
numbers identify each level of goals with Level 0 being the ultimate goal. 
 
 
 
 
All other agent goals fall into this hierarchy as subgoals of Level 1.  Each subsequent 
level of subgoals is appropriately named Level 2, Level 3  Level n. These sublevels are 
partially-ordered sets of goals that are combined in the form of Activity Digraphs to satisfy 
the goal on the level above and partially satisfy goals on subsequent higher levels.  Each 
level of the hierarchy can be displayed as an Activity Digraph that represents the paths 
through this network of goals that lead to the achievement of the parent goal.  Figure 5.3 
shows a partial view of an example Goal Hierarchy for a pet dog with Figure 5.4 
displaying the associated Activity Digraphs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Goal Hierarchy 
Figure 5.3 Partial View of the Goal Hierarchy for a Pet Dog 
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For the sake of this example, assume there are three ways in which the PLAY goal can 
be achieved. As more subgoals are added to the example, it becomes complex and difficult 
to examine the application of the Goal Hierarchy in the EMAI architecture. Therefore, for 
this example the number of subgoals is three.  
 
 
 
 
 
For a goal a at Level n (Ga,n), there may exist a number of Activity Digraphs (Da1,n+1, 
Da2,n+1, , Dak,n+1) consisting of subgoals of Ga,n from Level n+1. When one of these 
Activity Digraphs is executed successfully, the goal Ga,n will be satisfied as explained by 
Expression 5.4. 
)(....)()()( 1,1,21,1, DDDG naknanana ororCompletedorCompletedSatisfied +++=    5.4 
where k is the number of digraphs in Level n+1.  A goal can be defined in terms of its 
subgoals as shown in Expression 5.5: 
U
k
i
nina DVGS
1
1,, )()(
=
+=                                             5.5 
where S is a function that when applied to a goal, will return a set of all its subgoals, and V 
is a function that when applied to an Activity Digraph will return a set of goals represented 
in the Activity Digraph (represented by the vertices of the Activity Digraph). In other 
words, a goal is defined in terms of its immediate subgoals. However, note that a goal Ga,n 
Figure 5.4 Activity Digraphs for PLAY 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  69 
can be achieved by satisfying any one of the Activity Digraphs, which may only contain a 
sub-set of all the subgoals of Ga,n. The union of all vertices of the Activity Digraphs gives 
the set of all individual subgoals of Ga,n.   
The set of vertices Vt of the Activity Digraph Dt,n+1 will form a sub-set of all the 
subgoals of Ga,n as shown in Expression 5.6: 
ktGSDVV nantt ≤≤⊆= + 1),()( ,1,             5.6 
and the intersections between the Activity Digraphs are not necessarily empty, as shown in 
Expression 5.7: 
yxandkyxDVDV nynx ≠≤≤≠∩ ++ ,,1{},)()( 1,1,                  5.7 
Not every subgoal need be completed to satisfy the supergoal. If a goal consists of more 
than one Activity Digraph, only one of the digraphs need be completed to satisfy the goal.  
This can be seen in Figure 5.4.  To satisfy the PLAY goal there are three choices of 
Activity Digraphs.  No matter which digraph is used to satisfy the goal, subgoal a will 
always be satisfied as it appears in all three digraphs.  However, the subgoals, c, d, e, f and 
g, may or may not be satisfied depending on which digraph is chosen.  
At the lowest extreme level of the hierarchy exist the atomic goals.  These goals have 
only one process. At this point the hierarchy could be reduced to where goals become 
purpose (for example, the purpose of the heart is to keep beating and circulate blood 
throughout the body).  The heart has a fixed process. How far the Goal Hierarchy 
decomposes is dependent on its use.  If the agent was simulating a pet dog, the purpose 
goals become holistic behaviours and it is acceptable to leave them out.  If the agent was 
needed to simulate heart disease and the effects of eating fatty foods, then the Goal 
Hierarchy may be decomposed to this level. 
Using the partial Goal Hierarchy in Figure 5.5, the atomic goal CHEW BONE could be 
represented as an event by the conceptual graph: 
[CHEW] – 
  (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
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  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
where the concept types NOW and BACKYARD are arbitrary values given in this 
example.  The time and context (in this case location) could easily have been given as 
TOMORROW and ON THE BEACH, respectively.  However, for the goal CHEW BONE 
the satisfaction of the goal is the primary focus of the event and the time and context, in 
this case are irrelevant.   
 
 
 
 
 
It is also apparent that as the hierarchy is decomposed further, goals and their subgoals 
are repeated as subgoals of other goals. Logically this creates a complex network of goals, 
but keeping with the hierarchical structure it is important to remember the goal to subgoal 
relationship cannot be shown in a network and that a goal cannot decompose into itself on 
any level.  A partial hierarchy such as the one shown in Figure 5.5 is quite acceptable. In 
this figure, the Goal Hierarchy is shown including the subgoals EAT and PLAY.  When 
the agents EAT goal is triggered, it identifies the options, CHEW BONE, DIG HOLE and 
BURY BONE.  The subgoals of the EAT goal are all part of the Activity Digraph that 
must be completed to satisfy the EAT goal.  In contrast the PLAY goal has two mutually 
exclusive goals, either of which may be completed to satisfy the PLAY goal.  Notice the 
DIG HOLE subgoal is repeated. In the hierarchy, this goal represents the same DIG HOLE 
goal, which in turn decomposes into the same DIG HOLE event.  This illustrates how a 
subgoal of one goal can be a subgoal of another goal.  Often the same behaviours can be 
performed with respect to satisfying different goals.  
Also, illustrated here is a goal that has two different subgoals and associated processes 
for satisfying it.  The PLAY goal can either be satisfied by successfully executing the DIG 
HOLE or CHASE BALL subgoals and the associated actions.  This would give the agent 
Figure 5.5 Hierarchy Showing Repetition of Goals on Different Levels 
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two courses of action.  How the agent chooses between subgoals is based on the priority of 
the goal calculated by assessing its urgency, if the agents physical state and environment 
states are adequate for completing the goal, how the agent feels emotionally about the goal 
and the agents mood.   
5.2.3 Goal Activation 
Each goal in the Goal Hierarchy can be derived from one or a combination of 
motivational urges.  In the case where the agent has a complex Goal Hierarchy the 
mechanisms that cause the agents goals to become activated and subsequently satisfied 
become elaborate. The agent desires to achieve all the goals in its Goal Hierarchy but not 
all at the same time.  The goals that have been activated or triggered and are currently 
driving the behaviour of the agent have been extracted from the Goal Hierarchy, processed 
into events and placed in the agents schedule.  The amount of commitment the agent has 
to complete a goal is the intensity of desire it has toward completing the goal.  For 
example, the agent may have an EAT goal in its Goal Hierarchy, but unless the goal is 
activated, the agent will not be attempting to satisfy that goal.   
The agent will behave in response to activated goals.  Therefore, in order to generate 
behaviour in the agent, a goal has to be triggered.  The Sensory Processor (see Section 
3.3.3) performs this process.   The Sensory Processor receives internal sensory data from 
the Motivational Drive Generator that it then matches to appropriate goals from the Goal 
Hierarchy.  The Motivational Drive Generator produces the internal sensory data by 
monitoring a series of Internal State Registers that represent motivational urges.  Each 
register has a level value that records the strength of the associated urge.  This level is 
influenced by changes in time and environmental conditions. The levels on the registers 
are controlled by drive mechanisms that simulate the motivational drives identified by 
Balkenius (1995) (see Section 2.3.2).  These drive mechanisms are the Homeostatic Drive, 
the Cyclical Drive and the Default Drive.  
The Homeostatic Drive is used to return the agent to an unexcited state.  This drive 
causes the agent to seek a drive-reduction remedy.  Initially the agent assumes an 
unexcited, normal physical and emotional state.  Should the physical or emotional states 
change to extend beyond threshold values, the Homeostatic Drive sends the appropriate 
internal sensory data to the Sensory Processor, which triggers appropriate goals within the 
agents Goal Hierarchy. On satisfaction of these goals the agent will have returned to a less 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  72 
excited state, if not having returned it to its norm.  For example, the agent may be 
programmed with a simulated body temperature of 20oC.  This temperature would be 
represented internally as an Internal State Register with a level value of 20.  If the value on 
this body temperature register changes, the Homeostatic Drive will cause the triggering of 
goals that make the agent seek a treatment to return its body temperature register to its 
normal position. Other examples of simulated changes that would initiate the Homeostatic 
Drive would be the detection of pain, boredom or social situations. 
The EMAI architecture models the Cyclical Drive in a similar manner to the 
representation of emotion in Padgham and Taylor (1997). The urges are modelled using a 
Temporally Cyclic Internal Engine and Internal State Registers.   The Cyclic Engine 
synthesises a constant rate of change in the physical states of the agent that are affected by 
time differentials in its environment.  The Internal State Registers keep a count of the 
updates made by the Cyclic Engine and at a threshold value the Motivational Drive 
Generator will send appropriate internal sensory data to the Sensory Processor that will 
trigger an appropriate goal.  For example, an agent with an EAT goal will have a 
corresponding register called hunger.  At preset temporal intervals the Cyclic Engine will 
increase the value on the hunger register.  This simulates the agent becoming hungry over 
time.  When the hunger register reaches a critical threshold level, the Homeostatic Drive 
will detect it and cause the agents EAT goal to become activated via the Sensory 
Processor. 
The Default Drive acts as a deliberate mechanism to produce behaviour in contrast to 
the other two drives, which are essentially reactive.  Without the Default Drive the agent 
would appear inactive when it was not attending to its physical or emotional needs.  This 
drive is used to generate behaviours that appear exploratory or anticipatory.  Behaviours 
produced are not due to changes in the agents physical, emotional or environmental state 
as is the cause with the Homeostatic and Cyclical Drives.   
As already briefly discussed, the motivational urges are implemented in the 
Motivational Drive Generator as a series of Internal State Registers.  The Motivational 
Drive Generator monitors the levels of the registers via the drive mechanisms and passes 
appropriate data to the Sensory Processor when the preset threshold values for the registers 
are reached.  One or more registers, depending on the depth of the agents Ontology and 
what the agent is simulating, may represent each urge.  A hunger register, a body 
temperature register and a fatigue register could represent the urges produced by the 
Homeostatic Drive.  If the implementation of the EMAI architecture was not concerned 
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with simulating body temperature and fatigue these registers could be omitted.  Whatever 
the number of registers implemented, the levels on these registers are maintained by the 
Homeostatic, Cyclical and Default Drives and used via the Sensory Processor to activate 
goals in the Goal Hierarchy.  The goal EAT could be triggered by a certain level on a 
hunger register that is updated by the Cyclical Drive and read by the Homeostatic Drive.  
The goal SEEK WARMTH could be triggered by a certain level on the body temperature 
register that is updated by the Homeostatic Drive. To model the Internal State Registers, 
the set of registers are represented as R, where a particular register r has a neutral intensity 
I0(r), a positive value r+ and a negative value r-.  A register with a positive intensity level 
will trigger a different set of goals to the negative intensities.  For example, a positive 
value on the body temperature register (that represents an increased temperature) will 
cause the agents SEEK COOLING goal to become active.  In contrast a negative value on 
the body temperature gauge would trigger the SEEK WARMTH goal. Figure 5.6 
illustrates an example Internal State Register.  
 
 
 
 
 
The register that causes the goal to become active is also affected by the outcomes of 
the processes used to satisfy the goal.  The agent may begin to feel hot (a value of r+), at a 
threshold value of r+, the agents SEEK COOLING goal will have a priority proportional 
to the intensity of the value on the register.  The agent may be programmed to withstand 
temperatures that are a threshold value 10oC above its norm.  If the register exceeds this 
threshold value, an appropriate goal will be triggered to attempt to reduce the value on this 
register.  The agent will seek to satisfy its goal with an appropriate process. The atomic 
goal or process may be REMOVE CLOTHING.  On successful completion of the process 
the agent will have satisfied the SEEK COOLING goal and the intensity of the agents 
body temperature register will have been reduced.  Of course the REMOVE CLOTHING 
process may not reduce the register completely (that is setting it back to I0(r)) and the 
agents SEEK COOLING goal will not have been satisfied. In this case the agents SEEK 
Figure 5.6 An Example of an Internal State Register Representing Body Temperature
BODY 
TEMPERATURE
400C
-100C
340C ( I0(r) )
I
r+ 
r- 
thresholds
Activate [SEEK COOLING] goal 
if the value of I falls in this 
region.  
Activate [SEEK WARMTH] goal 
if the value of I falls in this region. 
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COOLING goal will still be active and the agent will continue to seek other ways of 
satisfying this goal. 
In summary, there is an Internal State Register r with intensity, I(r).  At any point in 
time (t + δ) the intensity of r can be calculated using Expression 5.8: 
)_,(),()()( outcomegoalrrrr SAGRII tt −+=+ δδ                      5.8 
where GR10 is a function of the growth in the intensity of the register since time t and SA11 
is the level of satisfaction for a motivational urge (represented by the register r) incurred 
by the goal_outcome. The intensity of a register is equal to the previous value of the 
register plus any growth in the intensity minus any satisfaction of that intensity due to a 
goal outcome. An agent's urge has been satisfied when: 
),()()_,( δrroutcomegoalr GRISA t +≥                                5.9 
For example, assume that an EMAI agent has a neutral intensity level (I0(r)) of 340C 
and a r- threshold value of 200C for the Internal State Register representing body 
temperature. If the agent is placed in an environment such that the rate of growth of its 
intensity is 10C per second, after 5 seconds, the value of G(r, 5) will be -5. The intensity 
value represented by the corresponding Internal State Register, I(r), would be 290C  (34 - 
5). After a further 10 seconds the value of I(r) would be 190C.  The value of I(r) would 
now be below the r- threshold value. The Homeostatic Drive mechanism would detect this 
drop in body temperature below the threshold and send appropriate internal sensory data to 
the Sensory Processor to indicate the agent was cold.  The Sensory Processor would in turn 
trigger the SEEK WARMTH goal.  The agent may decide to execute a process for ADD 
CLOTHING.  This may result in a body temperature increase of 50C, which would 
increase I(r) to a value of 240C.  As the new value for I(r) is above the r- threshold, the 
SEEK WARMTH goal will be deactivated.  If however, the value of I(r) were to fall to a 
                                                   
10
 The growth function is performed in an EMAI agent by the Cyclical Drive Mechanism that applies growth 
values to the intensities of the Internal State Registers with each cycle. 
11
 The satisfaction function occurs after the agent has performed a behaviour.  The Sensory Processor receives 
external sensory data relating to the outcomes of behaviours and the appropriate Internal Sensory Registers 
are updated.  The satisfaction function is used to test if the values on the Internal Sensory Registers have 
returned to normal. 
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value of 100C the execution of the ADD CLOTHING event would only raise the value of 
I(r) to 150C.  As this value is still below the r- threshold, the SEEK WARMTH goal would 
remain active.  In this case the agent would have to continue performing the ADD 
CLOTHING event until the value of I(r) returned to a level above the r- threshold. 
5.2.4 Prioritisation of Goals 
Each time the drive mechanisms within the Motivation Drive Generator detect a 
registers value is outside the threshold values, internal sensory data is sent to the Sensory 
Processor, which activates the associated goal.  If the goal is already active, the priority of 
the goal increases.  At time t, the priority placed on a goal, P(Ga,n)t, is proportional to the 
total intensity of the register/s that triggered the goal as shown in Expression 5.10.   
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As shown by Expression 5.10 the priority of a goal can be determined by more than one 
Internal State Register.  Two or more registers may influence the priority of a single goal.  
For example, if there existed a register for hunger and a register for boredom, the internal 
sensory data sent to the Sensory Processor from both these registers via the Homeostatic 
Drive mechanism could be used to trigger the EAT goal.  This also implies the satisfaction 
of a single goal can affect the values on more than one Internal State Register.  For 
example, satisfaction of the EAT goal may affect the values on not only the hunger and 
boredom registers but it may also affect the body temperature register. 
It is important to note that all goals in the hierarchy are not always active.  It is not until 
the register reaches a critical threshold point that the goal is activated and the agent 
believes its objective is to fulfill the goal and begin a set of processes that will satisfy the 
goal.  In other words, the goal lays dormant in the Goal Hierarchy until it is triggered.  At 
this point the goal becomes active and the agent makes further investigations into the 
processes that will achieve the goal, thus suppressing the register and in turn the drive that 
began the process. 
The Intention Generator uses the prioritising values placed on the goals to order them 
for execution.  Further details of this process are delayed until Chapter 9 where this 
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motivational intensity prioritising is coupled with emotional ordering to produce the 
agents schedule of behaviours. 
5.3 Case Study: Urge Thresholds, Goal Setting and Prioritisation  
5.3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this case study is to illustrate the urge thresholds, goal setting and goal 
prioritisations of the Motivational Drive Generator and the Sensory Processor described 
earlier in this chapter.  To do this, the EMAI agent has been programmed with the Goal 
Hierarchy shown in Figure 5.712.  The inspiration for this hierarchy stems from the basic 
instinctual behaviours present in a pet dog-like animal.  Other agent architectures have 
been examined by simulating pet animals and in particular dogs such as PETEEI (El-Nasr 
1998) and DOGZ (Stern et al. 1998).  The reason for this is that a pet dog has a simple set 
of behaviours (compared to humans) and most humans have an idea on how these animals 
should behave under varying conditions (El-Nasr 1998), making analysis simpler.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The behavioural traits of the pet dog have their basis in the evolutionary process. 
Through natural selection, a canine model has formed giving the species physical 
                                                   
12
 Note: CHUM is a dog-food brand in Australia. 
Figure 5.7 Simple Goal Hierarchy for a Dog-like Agent 
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characteristics and mental abilities to continue their existence. Their behavioural patterns 
guide them through their day to day and year to year existence helping them to make the 
right choices to protect themselves and their offspring (Foster and Smith 2000).  Beside the 
essential survival goals of eating and sleeping, a dogs playing behaviour stems from their 
puppy play. This taught them hunting skills and how to interact with other dogs in the 
wild. Even digging is evolutionary and dogs instinctually dig holes for protection.  For 
these reasons, each of these goals have been integrated into the EMAI architecture for the 
demonstration of this case study. 
The EAT, SLEEP and PLAY goals each have two subgoals.  Each subgoal is mutually 
exclusive.  This means that any of the two subgoals can be satisfied in order to complete 
the associated supergoal. If the PLAY goal is activated, either DIG HOLE or CHASE 
BALL needs to be completed to satisfy PLAY.  To keep this example simple, the agent is 
programmed with three Internal State Registers that each trigger one parent goal when a 
threshold value is reached.  At each time interval in the simulation, each registers value is 
updated by a predetermined amount.  In the simulation the registers for eat, sleep and play 
are set to high values indicating a low depletion in these areas.  For example, a high value 
on the eat register indicates the agents nutritional reserves are high.  As the simulation 
runs the values on the registers decrease.  On reaching a threshold level, an appropriate 
goal is triggered.  The agent schedules the subgoals for execution. (This process is 
examined in depth in Chapter 6 and will not be covered here.)  When a subgoal is 
successfully completed, the goal is satisfied and the respective registers value is increased.  
Figure 5.8 graphically displays the simulation run.  Each register value is displayed with 
respect to time and a narrative produced by the agent during the simulation is shown at the 
appropriate time intervals.  A time interval without narrative illustrates the agents 
inactivity.  Beside the Internal State Register levels, the threshold value at which a goal is 
triggered is also shown. 
5.3.2 Results 
 As the simulation begins, all agent goals are inactive. Therefore, the agent remains 
behaviourally idle.  As time passes, the graph shows the depletion of the agents Internal 
State Registers.  Between time interval 4 and 5, the levels on the play and sleep registers 
reach their threshold values and the PLAY and SLEEP goals are activated.  This event 
places the processes for DIG HOLE, CHASE BALL, DEEP SLEEP and SNOOZE into the 
agents schedule.  As the agent cannot perform PLAY and SLEEP activities at the same 
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time it has to choose just one.  At this point in the simulation the PLAY and SLEEP goals 
have been activated the same number of times (in this case, once) and therefore, have the 
same level of priority placed on them.  For this case study the behaviour selected is the one 
entered into the schedule first (further prioritisation mechanisms will be examined in 
Chapter 9).   
At time interval 5 the agent selects the DIG HOLE activity.  This activity is completed 
successfully and the level on the play register can be seen to increase above the threshold 
value, thus satisfying the PLAY goal.  The activities corresponding to DIG HOLE and 
CHASE BALL are removed from the agents schedule.  At the same time the sleep and eat 
registers continue to decrease at their temporally cyclical rate plus a small variation caused 
by the PLAY activity.  In the next time interval, the agent no longer has an active PLAY 
goal and it therefore moves to its next scheduled activity that will satisfy the still active 
SLEEP goal.  By time interval 7, both the PLAY and SLEEP goals have been satisfied, the 
appropriate registers updated, all scheduled activities removed and the goals become 
inactive. 
By time index 9 the agents eat register has reached its threshold.  The EAT goal is 
activated, the activities for EAT DOG FOOD and CHEW BONE are scheduled, but the 
agent does not immediately begin executing these as the SLEEP goal has also been 
activated again.  At time interval 10 when the agent has finished the event for the SLEEP 
goal, the agent is free to attempt to satisfy the EAT goal by executing one of the two 
associated activities.  The agent begins by attempting the EAT DOG FOOD activity.  
However, this activity requires the presence of food in the agents environment of which 
there is none.  Therefore, this activity fails and the agent tries the next activity of CHEW 
BONE.  Again, there are no simulated bones present in the environment and this activity 
fails too.  Furthermore, the failure of these activities has not caused the eat register to 
increase and the EAT goal is still active. 
The EAT goal remains active and the agent tries to satisfy it when it is not performing an 
activity associated with a goal that can be satisfied.  At time index 14, the user adds some 
simulated food to the agents environment.  At time index 15, the agents attempt to satisfy 
the EAT goal is successful and the eat registers value is increased. 
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Time Index: 5
EMAI wants to play.
EMAI digs a hole.
Time Index: 6
EMAI is tired.
EMAI lies down for a rest.
Time Index: 8
EMAI wants to play.
EMAI digs a hole.
Time Index: 9
EMAI is tired.
EMAI lies down for a rest.
Time Index: 10
EMAI is looking for dog food.
EMAI is looking for a bone.
EMAI is hungry.
Time Index: 11
EMAI wants to play.
EMAI digs a hole.
Time Index: 12
EMAI is looking for dog food.
EMAI is looking for a bone.
EMAI is hungry.
Time Index: 13
EMAI is tired.
EMAI lies down for a rest.
Time Index: 14
EMAI wants to play.
EMAI digs a hole.
You dish up some chum.
Time Index: 15
EMAI is looking for dog food.
EMAI finds some chum and eats 
it.
Legend 
Internal State Registers
Eat 
Play 
Sleep 
Register Thresholds 
Eat 
Play 
Sleep 
Simulation Narrative 
Figure 5.8 Simulation Run with EMAI Agent Displaying Internal State Register Levels, Thresholds and Narrative
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5.3.3 Discussion 
This case study illustrates how an EMAI agent prioritises goals and how the Internal 
State Registers and cyclical drive mechanisms are used to simulate motivation.  These 
drives are used internally by the agent to produce behaviours by activating the goals within 
the Goal Hierarchy of the Ontology. Once a register has reached its threshold value and the 
corresponding goal is activated, that goal remains active until the register has returned and 
surpassed the threshold point.  In the simulation depicted in Figure 5.8, each time the agent 
satisfactorily completes an activity, the appropriate register is returned to a value on the 
other side of the threshold.  This may not always be the case as demonstrated in Figure 5.9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At time interval 15, the eat register begins to fluctuate in value.  This is the result of the 
agents successful attempts to complete an activity that satisfies the EAT goal but does not 
raise the level of the eat register beyond the threshold.  In this simulation the small 
increases in the eat register are caused by the agent completing the CHEW BONE activity.  
While this activity does suppress the agents eat register a little, it does not return the eat 
register to a value above the threshold and therefore, is simulating that the agent is still 
hungry.  Therefore, the agents EAT goal remains active and the agent will continue to 
execute EAT activities.  During the time intervals 15 to 22, the agents environment was 
Legend 
Registers 
Eat 
Play 
Sleep 
Thresholds 
Eat 
Play 
Sleep 
Figure 5.9 Simulation Run with Fluctuating Gauge Values Beyond the Threshold 
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populated with a number of simulated bones but no other food.  Therefore, the agent could 
only satisfy the CHEW BONE activity and not the EAT DOG FOOD activity that would 
have raised the eat register more substantially.  At time interval 23, the user adds other 
simulated food item to the environment.  This item allows the agent to successfully 
complete the EAT DOG FOOD action and this results in a raise in the eat register value to 
beyond the threshold; the EAT goal being deactivated and the EAT events being removed 
from the schedule.  
Note the priority associated with a goal  (as per Expression 5.10) equals the sum of the 
intensity of all the registers (motivational urges) that affect the goal. In this case study, 
there is only one register (motivational urge) associated with a particular goal. Therefore, 
the priority associated with a goal, like PLAY is calculated as: 
∑
=
=
1
1
))((])([
f
ftt rIP PLAY     where r1 represents the play register. 
One final point that should be made about this simulation is that the agent had subgoals 
and corresponding activities that were never executed.  These were the SNOOZE and 
CHASE BALL subgoals.  As this simulation worked purely on prioritising activities based 
on the urge register levels, all subgoals of the same parent goal were assigned the same 
priority.  This meant that when the agent came to selecting an activity in the schedule 
based on priority, activities for the same goal were ranked evenly.  Whenever this occurs, 
the agent selects the item that entered the schedule first by a FIFO method to resolve any 
conflict or indecision.  Therefore, whenever the PLAY goal was activated the DIG HOLE 
process would be executed before the CHASE BALL process.  As the DIG HOLE process 
was always successful in satisfying the PLAY goal, the agent never had to execute the 
CHASE BALL process. Although this is an unlikely simulation of real behaviour in 
solving conflict and selecting behaviour, it is adequate for the purposes of this simulation.  
5.4  Summary 
The EMAI architecture implements a Knowledge Area that includes a Motivational 
Drive Generator, Sensory Processor and an Ontology with a Goal Hierarchy. Before an 
EMAI agent will act, an appropriate goal in the Goal Hierarchy has to become active.  The 
Motivational Drive Generator contains a series of Internal State Registers that maintain the 
motivational urges of the agent.  Three drive mechanisms (homeostatic, cyclical and 
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default) monitor the values of the Internal State Registers. When an Internal State Register 
reaches a threshold value, the appropriate drive mechanism sends data to the Sensory 
Processor. The Sensory Processor processes the data and determines which goal in the 
Goal Hierarchy to activate.  When a goal in the Goal Hierarchy becomes active, the agent 
is able to decompose the goal to locate one or more Activity Digraphs that could be 
performed to satisfy the goal.  This mechanism simulates a human-like goal-orientated 
behaviour in the agent.  This goal-orientated behaviour gives the agent the ability to 
recover from failed plans and to recognise and create new plans.  This capability is 
illustrated in the case study. 
The processes, demonstrated in the case study presented in this chapter, illustrate the 
underlying goal-orientated processes and motivation mechanisms working in the EMAI 
architecture.   It shows how lower level emotions represented by the eat, sleep and play 
registers are used to generate behaviours within the agent.  This produces an agent capable 
of goal-orientated behaviour, but with little variation in action choices.  These mechanisms 
make the agent quite predictable and less complex than real animal or human behaviour.  
The next chapter examines the concept of higher emotional evaluation using attitude 
theory and discusses the ways in which this has been integrated into the agent architecture 
in order to add depth to the personality of the agent. 
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6. Event Space 
It is easy to be wise after the event. 
- 17th century proverb. 
6.1 Introduction 
Humans (and other intelligent biological animals) are generally unaware of their 
cognitive processes (Lefton 1994). Psychologists refer to these processes as thinking.   The 
term thinking in psychology refers to the sorting through of choices and deciding what 
behaviours to perform.  In brief, thinking refers to reasoning, decision making and problem 
solving (Galotti, 1989).  In psychology, reasoning refers to the process of generating and 
evaluating situations and decision making refers to assessing and choosing among 
alternatives.   In the EMAI architecture, these same processes occur within the Event 
Space Generator. 
This chapter introduces the EMAI architectures Event Space Generator.  It begins by 
examining the structure of a single event and how a partially-ordered set of events can be 
used to define a plan. An EMAI agent uses these plans to achieve its goals.  Each event 
represents a specific outward behaviour that can be exhibited by the agent.  As there may 
be more than one plan that could be executed to achieve a single goal, an EMAI agent 
must determine the nature of all events involved by specialising each plan into elementary 
concept types from its Ontology.  This collection of specialised, competing events (that 
form alternative plans) is called the event space. 
This chapter continues by formalising an event space and examining a case study that 
demonstrates the processes undertaken by the Event Space Generator in turning an abstract 
goal into a series of specialised plans. The discussion begins by re-examining the earlier 
definition of an event, and creating an alternative definition in terms of its constituents. 
This new definition is necessary for measuring the emotional attachment that an agent has 
towards each and every entity associated with a particular goal. 
6.2 Events 
As described earlier, events are represented as activities in the EMAIs Activity 
Digraphs (see Section 4.3.2).  Each event represents a self-contained independent activity 
the agent can perform.  It is represented in the EMAI Ontology as an Activity Digraph with 
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a set of preconditions, postconditions and a delete list.  Figure 6.1 illustrates a simple 
Activity Digraph with three events. 
 
 
 
This Activity Digraph can be represented as a conceptual graph by using the temporal 
relation FINISH-BEFORE-START (FBS), as shown below: 
 [FIND FOOD]->(FBS)->[PREPARE FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
where FIND FOOD, PREPARE FOOD and CONSUME FOOD are events. 
An event is also represented in an EMAIs Ontology as a conceptual graph.  It defines a 
behavioural event as having the four elements of action, object, time and context.  The type 
definition of an event is thus: 
type EVENT(x) is: 
   [ACTION:*x]- 
(OBJ) -> [ENTITY:*m] 
  (AGNT) -> [ENTITY:*n] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME:*t] 
  (CON) -> [CONTEXT:*c] 
The type EVENT appears in the Type Hierarchy as a subtype of ACTION as shown in 
Figure 6.2. Specific events, such as the ones shown in Figure 6.1 are subtypes of the type 
EVENT. 
    
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.1 A Simple Activity Digraph with Three Events 
Figure 6.2 Type Hierarchy Showing Event Types 
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By specialising the conceptual graph for the generic event the graph for the specific 
event can be obtained.  The conceptual graph representation of FIND FOOD could be: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (CONT) -> [BACKYARD] 
This graph provides the agent with precise knowledge about how, when, where and with 
what an action should occur to execute the associated event.  Thus an event can be re-
defined as Expression 6.1: 
},,,{ tcoaE =                                                     6.1 
where a is the action that relates to the event, o is the object involved or affected by a, c is 
the context or condition where a is taking place or being performed and t is the temporal 
component of a.  Each of these elements may vary along a dimension of explicitness. At 
the most exact level of identifying the event, an EMAI agent will intend to perform a 
specific action, with or towards a certain object, in a particular context or situation at an 
exact point in time.  For example, an EMAI agent may intend to buy a bunch of flowers 
(action) for Georgina (object) from Barry's House of Posies (context) at 12:30 p.m. on 
Tuesday (time).  At the other end of the spectrum, an EMAI agent may intend to be 
affectionate without referral to any exact elements of the event. For example, an EMAI 
agent may intend to buy a gift for a friend.  How each component of the intended 
behaviour is categorised is inconsequential.  The bunch of flowers could also be defined as 
an object of the EMAI agents behaviour.  It could also just as easily intend to buy 
Georgina a box of chocolates. As there may be multiple elements of the same type 
involved, the event and its elements are evaluated using the same method, it is unimportant 
how they are precisely defined. 
To continue with the EAT goal example (from previous chapters), the Event Space 
Generator constructs events from the abstract goals that are passed to it.  From this 
information the Event Space Generator has the Activity Digraph of: 
 [FIND FOOD]->(FBS)->[PREPARE FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
Because of the level of abstraction of the EAT goal, no specific item of food or other 
contexts have been designated, the agent needs to construct specialised conceptual graphs 
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that give the agent an exact perception of how it is meant to behave.  The agents Event 
Space Generator component takes the conceptual graph and specialises its concept types 
into subtypes in the Ontology that exist on sublevels of the Type and Relation Hierarchies.  
This creates a set of specialised events from which the agent can select in order to satisfy a 
goal.  For example, given the FIND FOOD conceptual graph: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [SHOP] 
By using the Type Hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2, the agent can specialise to better define 
the FIND FOOD event by specifying the exact type of food for which the agent should 
look.  Subtypes of FOOD include MEAT and FRUIT and therefore, the graphs: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MEAT] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [SHOP] 
and 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FRUIT] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: EMAI] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [SHOP] 
will be constructed.  In this agents knowledge base, the types of MEAT and FRUIT are 
still abstract and could be further specialised into graphs that substitute MEAT for PORK 
or LAMB and FRUIT for APPLE or BANANA. If this were all the specialisation the agent 
were to perform on the graph for EAT, instead of one event plan, the agent would now 
have four specific event plans, one for each type of food.  The specialisation of concept 
types and the resultant set of new specific events form the basis of the event space. 
6.3 Event Space 
A goal can have one or more associated Activity Digraphs that could, when executed 
successfully, achieve the goal (see Section 4.3.1).  Each of the Activity Digraphs 
associated with a goal can embody one or move events.  A goal can therefore, have any 
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number of individual events associated with it.  This collection of events will be called the 
event space.  As with the definition of event in terms of its constituent, the definition of 
Activity Digraph, AD, in terms of fundamental elements can be defined as in Expression 
6.2: 
U
n
j
jEAD
1=
=                                                                    6.2 
Given the definition of an event shown in Expression 6.1, the definition of an Activity 
Digraph can be rewritten as Expression 6.3: 
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An event space for a goal g, written as ESg, can be defined as shown in Expression 6.4 
U
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where m is the number of Activity Digraphs, AD, associated with the goal, g.  By 
substituting AD in Expression 6.4 for Expression 6.3, an event space can be defined in 
terms of all elementary entities involved in achieving the goal as Expression 6.5: 
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Through the use of conceptual graphs, that provide structure for events, and temporal 
sequences for Activity Digraphs, the Event Space Generator accepts an abstract goal from 
the Sensory Processor and builds the event space through a series of canonical graph 
formation rules.  This process is examined in the following case study. 
6.4 Case Study 
The Event Space Generator accepts a primitive set of goals from the Sensory Processor 
and constructs actual behavioural processes in the form of specialised Activity Digraphs.  
This representation contains atomic and individual concepts from the Type and Relation 
Hierarchy.   This case study examines how the Event Space Generator creates an event 
space from the abstract goals used to generate behaviours in an EMAI agent.   
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Assume that an EMAI agent has a goal of EAT and two Activity Digraphs that can be 
performed to satisfy the EAT goal.  These Activity Digraphs, ad1 and ad2, are defined as: 
 ad1:[FIND FOOD]->(FBS)->[PREPARE FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
 ad2:[FIND MONEY]->(FBS)->[BUY FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
and illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As these Activity Digraphs describe generic events, the Event Space Generator must 
specialise each using atomic concepts from the Type Hierarchy to identify actual elements 
that exist in the agents environment.  However, before this can occur the Event Space 
Generator must expand the Activity Digraphs so the events and their elements are visible.  
It does this by projecting the Event Graphs into the Activity Digraph from the agents 
Ontology that represent each of the events in the Activity Digraphs with the conceptual 
graphs for the digraphs.  Assuming the conceptual graph for the FIND FOOD event is: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
the conceptual graph for the PREPARE FOOD event is:  
[PREPARE] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] 
  (TIM) -> [AFTER FIND] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
Figure 6.3  Two Activity Digraphs to Satisfy the Goal EAT 
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and the conceptual graph for CONSUME FOOD event is: 
[CONSUME] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] 
  (TIM) -> [AFTER PREPARE] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
the Event Space Generator will process the graph representing ad1 (EAT OWN FOOD): 
[FIND FOOD]->(FBS)->[PREPARE FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
into the expanded graph as shown below: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD: *y] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [?y] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (TIM) -> [AFTER FIND] 
 (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
    (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?y] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
  (TIM) -> [AFTER PREPARE] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
The different coloured regions of the above conceptual graph represent the individual 
events that constitute the plan represented by the Activity Digraph.  Rather than a graph 
that generally states that some action should be taken toward something in someplace at 
sometime, the Event Space Generator reduces this to more exact terms that specifically 
define an event such as the finding of the food will take place in the shop now.  The same 
process that specialised ad1 will also be performed on ad2. Assuming the conceptual graph 
for the FIND MONEY event is: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (CONT) -> [AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINE] 
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the conceptual graph for the BUY FOOD event is:  
[BUY] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT] 
  (TIM) -> [AFTER FIND MONEY] 
  (CONT) -> [SHOP] 
and the graph representing ad2 (EAT BOUGHT FOOD): 
[FIND MONEY]->(FBS)->[BUY FOOD]->(FBS)->[CONSUME FOOD] 
will be processed into the expanded graph as shown below: 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (CONT) -> [AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINE] 
  (FBS) -> [BUY] – 
 (OBJ) -> [FOOD: *y] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (TIM) -> [AFTER FIND] 
 (CONT) -> [AT SHOP] 
    (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?y] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
  (TIM) -> [AFTER PREPARE] 
  (CONT) -> [AT HOME] 
Given the Type Hierarchy of Figure 6.2 the above graph can be specialised further to 
include the elementary types of FOOD: APPLE, BANANA, PORK and LAMB.  Before 
continuing the relations of (TIM) and (CONT) and their linked types will be dropped from 
the example as this example is going to concentrate on the specialisation of the FOOD 
type.  The reader should assume they are still part of the graphs although they will not be 
shown or specialised any further. 
Once the Event Space Generator has produced an expanded conceptual graph from the 
Activity Digraph graph and the graphs that represent the individual events, the Event 
Space Generator attempts to further specialise each type in the graph.  The process 
continues until the Event Space Generator has a set of graphs containing the most 
elementary types in the Type Hierarchy.  Given the four FOOD types the Event Space 
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Generator will specialise the above conceptual graphs of ad1 into a further four graphs 
thus:  
1.  EAT OWN APPLE is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [APPLE: *a] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [?a] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?a] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
2.  EAT OWN BANANA is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [BANANA: *b] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [?b] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?b] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  EAT OWN PORK is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [PORK: *p] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [?p] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?p] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
4.  EAT OWN LAMB is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [LAMB: *l] 
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  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [?l] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?l] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
As the initial goal of EAT could have been satisfied by one of two Activity Digraphs, 
the Event Space Generator will repeat the above process for the Activity Digraph ad2 (EAT 
BOUGHT FOOD).  As there are four types of FOOD this graph will also be specialised 
into four new graphs: EAT BOUGHT APPLE, EAT BOUGHT BANANA, EAT 
BOUGHT PORK and EAT BOUGHT LAMB as shown below: 
1.  EAT BOUGHT APPLE is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [BUY] – 
 (OBJ) -> [APPLE: *a] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?a] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  EAT BOUGHT BANANA is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [BUY] – 
 (OBJ) -> [BANANA: *b] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?b] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
3.  EAT BOUGHT PORK is 
[FIND] – 
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  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [PORK: *p] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?p] 
(AGNT) -> [*x] 
4.  EAT BOUGHT LAMB is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [MONEY] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: *x] 
  (FBS) -> [PREPARE] – 
 (OBJ) -> [LAMB: *l] 
 (AGNT) -> [?x] 
 (FBS) -> [CONSUME] – 
(OBJ) -> [?l] 
(AGNT) -> [?x] 
For an EMAI agent to choose among the alternative plans (or to perform meaningful 
affective decision making), it has to measure its emotional attachment to each and every 
element in the plan. For this reason, the event space is defined in terms of its constituent 
elements as in Expression 6.5. In this case study, the event space for the goal EAT, written 
as ESEAT, is as shown below: 
U 





−−−
−−
=
EEE
EE
ES
FOODCONSUMEFOODBUYMONEYFIND
FOODPREPAREFOODFIND
EAT ,,
,,
 
where each of these generalised events (except FIND MONEY because it has no subtypes) 
are specialised into: 
( )U EEEEE LAMBFINDPORKFINDBANANAFINDAPPLEFINDFOODFIND −−−−− = ,,,                                                     
( )U EEEEE LAMBPREPAREPORKPREPAREBANANAPREPAREAPPLEPREPAREFOODPREPARE −−−−− = ,,,                    
( )U EEEEE LAMBBUYPORKBUYBANANABUYAPPLEBUYFOODBUY −−−−− = ,,,                                 
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( )U EEEEE LAMBCONSUMEPORKCONSUMEBANANACONSUMEAPPLECONSUMEFOODCONSUME −−−−− = ,,,
                                                    
Furthermore, each of the specialised events in the above expressions can be written in 
the format of Expression 6.1 thus: 
EFIND APPLE = {FIND, APPLE, AT HOME, TIME:#now} 
EFIND BANANA = {FIND, BANANA, AT HOME, TIME:#now } 
EFIND PORK = {FIND, PORK, AT HOME, TIME:#now } 
EFIND LAMB = {FIND, LAMB, AT HOME, TIME:#now } 
EFIND MONEY = {FIND, MONEY, AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINE, TIME:#now } 
EBUY APPLE = {BUY, APPLE, AT SHOP, AFTER EFIND MONEY} 
EBUY BANANA = {BUY, BANANA, AT SHOP, AFTER EFIND MONEY} 
EBUY PORK = {BUY, PORK, AT SHOP, AFTER EFIND MONEY} 
EBUY LAMB = {BUY, LAMB, AT SHOP, AFTER EFIND MONEY} 
EPREPARE APPLE = {PREPARE, APPLE, AT HOME, AFTER EFIND APPLE} 
EPREPARE BANANA = {PREPARE, BANANA, AT HOME, AFTER EFIND BANANA} 
EPREPARE PORK = {PREPARE, PORK, AT HOME, AFTER EFIND PORK} 
EPREPARE LAMB = {PREPARE, LAMB, AT HOME, AFTER EFIND LAMB} 
ECONSUME APPLE = {CONSUME, APPLE, AT HOME, AFTER EPREPARE APPLE} 
ECONSUME BANANA = {CONSUME, BANANA, AT HOME, AFTER EPREPARE BANANA} 
ECONSUME PORK = {CONSUME, PORK, AT HOME, AFTER EPREPARE PORK} 
ECONSUME LAMB = {CONSUME, LAMB, AT HOME, AFTER EPREPARE LAMB} 
ECONSUME APPLE = {CONSUME, APPLE, AT HOME, AFTER EBUY APPLE} 
ECONSUME BANANA = {CONSUME, BANANA, AT HOME, AFTER EBUY BANANA} 
ECONSUME PORK = {CONSUME, PORK, AT HOME, AFTER EBUY PORK} 
ECONSUME LAMB = {CONSUME, LAMB, AT HOME, AFTER EBUY LAMB} 
The event space, ESEAT, could then be defined as containing the union of all of the 
above event elements as shown below: 
ESEAT =  
{FIND, BUY, PREPARE, CONSUME, MONEY, APPLE, BANANA, PORK 
LAMB, AT HOME, AT SHOP, AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINE, AFTER 
EFIND MONEY, AFTER EFIND APPLE, AFTER EFIND BANANA, AFTER EFIND PORK, AFTER 
EFIND LAMB, AFTER EBUY APPLE, AFTER EBUY BANANA, AFTER EBUY PORK, AFTER 
EBUY LAMB, AFTER EPREPARE APPLE, AFTER EPREPARE BANANA, AFTER EPREPARE PORK, 
AFTER EPREPARE LAMB} 
 
For this example, the Event Space Generators processing results in the creation of 
eight specialised graphs, four for the EAT OWN FOOD Activity Digraph and four for the 
EAT BOUGHT FOOD Activity Digraph.  The EMAI agent now has eight plans from 
which to choose from to satisfy the initial goal of EAT.  Any one of the eight plans, when 
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successfully executed will satisfy the goal.  So the agent must choose one plan out of eight.  
How the EMAI makes a choice among these plans is explained in the next chapter. 
6.5 Summary 
An event describes a potential behaviour of an EMAI agent.  It constitutes an action 
taking place with respect to a target object at a particular time in a particular context. An 
event is partially-ordered with other events and arranged into Activity Digraphs.  These 
digraphs represent plans that an EMAI agent can follow to achieve its goals.  For any one 
goal there may exist one or more Activity Digraphs that could be used to achieve the goal.  
Each Activity Digraph may contain one or more events.  Activity Digraphs are stored in 
the EMAI Ontology as a series of conceptual graphs representing generic events and plans.  
The objective of the Event Space Generator is to take these generic graphs and specialise 
the concept types into elementary types from the Type Hierarchy.  Having achieved this, 
the Event Space Generator can turn one goal into one or more specialised plans the EMAI 
agent can execute to achieve its goal.  As only one plan needs to be executed to satisfy the 
initial goal, an EMAI agent is placed in a decision making situation. For this purpose, the 
Activity Digraph is viewed in terms of all its constituent elements. 
The EMAI agent uses an affective decision making method to select among its plans.  
This concept and process is examined in the next chapter. 
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7.  Single-Dimensional Affective Decision Making 
There are two tragedies in life. One is not to get your heart’s desire. The other is to get it. 
- George Bernard Shaw 
7.1 Introduction 
Todays lifestyle means that people are constantly bombarded with decisions.  Very 
rarely do these decisions involve right and wrong answers.  Often they have to choose 
from a number of solutions that would all suit a purpose equally as well.  For example, a 
person might decide to purchase a car.  Having chosen the make and model, the final 
decision may come down to, Do I take the red one or the green one?  In this case, the 
colour will not affect the ability of the car to fulfill the requirements for which it is being 
purchased.   So a decision is made based on personal preference.  Whatever the collection 
of past experiences that makes someone prefer green cars to red cars, it defines who they 
are as individuals, their likes and dislikes and determines their behaviour.  If all people 
held the same attitudes they would all be driving the same car, eating at the same 
restaurants and using the same washing power.  But this is not the case. 
The domain-independent EMAI architecture allows its agents to assess their beliefs and 
satisfy their goals based on their attitudes towards other agents and objects in their 
environment.  Before the implementation of the Theory of Reasoned Action (to be 
examined in this chapter), the EMAI architecture used an opportunistic approach to 
carrying out processes in order to satisfy an active goal.  By establishing an algorithm by 
which the agent can apply a theory of attitude in decision-making, the agent becomes 
emotionally intelligent with the ability to make affective decisions and order intentions 
with human reasoning-like ability. For example, in the case study presented in the previous 
chapter, the agent had two Activity Digraphs that could be executed to achieve the EAT 
goal.  From these, the Event Space Generator created an event space embodying eight 
individual specialised plans. The agent did not perform any assessment of the plans or 
explore how it might order them.  Given an event space with a number of plans, each 
equally capable of satisfying the same goal, the agent must choose just one. 
In this chapter, the Theory of Reasoned Action is used to generate a one-dimensional 
appraisal model for emotional decision making.   The theory applies an intention to each 
plan of events based on the agents beliefs.  The intention toward a plan indicates an EMAI 
agents preferences toward executing it. 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  97 
 This mechanism allows an EMAI agent to deal with situations where problem solutions 
are innumerable or time dependent. These mechanisms will be examined through four case 
studies that explore individual preferences and affective decision making.  
7.2 Intentions, Attitudes and Subjective Norms 
While there is no clear definition of attitude, there is popular consensus among social 
psychologists that the term refers to the general enduring disposition to feel positively or 
negatively towards an object, person or issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1996).  By using a 
relevant collection of a person's attitudes, it is possible to closely predict the behaviour of 
that person where the same set of attitudes is applied (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).  Ajzen 
and Fishbein as noted by Petty and Cacioppo (1996) concluded this behaviour can be 
viewed as consisting of four key elements.  They are: 
1. the action being performed;  
2. the target or targets that are the object of the action;  
3. the context of the action, for example, where it is being performed; and 
4. the temporal alignment of the action, for example, the time of day or month.   
These four elements can be used to define a behavioural event (as per Chapter 6). All the 
elements of each of the events within all the competing Activity Digraphs form the event 
space. 
In an empirical sense there is very little mention of attitude in the cognitive appraisal 
theories that have been integrated into intelligent agent architectures.  The models (as 
discussed in Chapter 2) use valenced reactions to situations and events to determine an 
emotional state. By determining the effect that an event will have on an agents goal, an 
emotional response can be generated.  For example, the occurrence of a desirable event 
will synthesise joy.  But how is an event evaluated as being desirable?  What if more than 
one desirable event exists for the agent to select?  How does it decide?  To solve this issue 
the EMAI architecture implements a model of attitude.  In general, attitudes serve as 
convenient summaries of a persons beliefs (Petty and Cacioppo 1996). A statement such 
as, I liked the movie sums up the speakers feelings about an event conveniently for the 
listener rather than having the speaker explicitly state all the reasons why. They also help 
others to predict our behaviour. For example, if one was to say, I do not like horror 
movies, their friend may predict they will not be going to see the Wes Craven movie 
Scream II. 
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It is this method of predicting behaviour that is the focus of the ideas on attitude that 
have been integrated into the EMAI architecture.  Fishbein and Ajzens Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Petty and Cacioppo 1996) specifies that the prediction of behaviour is 
based on a persons attitudes toward a behaviour in addition to the persons disposition 
toward the effects of social pressures.  The persons attitudes are based on learned 
experiences and beliefs about a particular behaviour, the consequences of performing that 
behaviour and an evaluation of those consequences. 
Petty and Cacioppo (1996) give an example of the Theory of Reasoned Action.  The 
example is of selecting a favourite car where the colour and make of a car are considered 
as elements for assessment in determining the overall attitude towards a car.  This example 
will be explored in relation to decision-making later in the chapter. 
For the purposes of the research presented in this dissertation, attitude is calculated in 
order to prioritise the plans of events in an EMAI agents event space.  The Intention 
Generator (see Chapter 3) performs this function after the event space has been placed in 
order into the agents schedule by assessing its motivational priority as explained in 
Chapter 4. Briefly, in the EMAI, the event space contains the plans the agent has 
formalised in response to an activated goal.  This event space is scheduled for 
performance.  The behaviour of the agent is determined by a plan in the event space being 
acted upon.  Not all plans in an event space become the agents behaviours, and when one 
plan satisfies the agents goal, any other plans in the same event space, that would also 
satisfy the same goal, are no longer necessary and may be discarded. The Intention 
Generator of the EMAI architectures Deliberate Area prioritises the event spaces firstly by 
assessing the urgency associated with the goal needing to be satisfied and secondly it 
orders the plans within the event space by preference using the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).  Although Fishbein and Ajzen outlined Expressions 7.3, 7.6, 
and 7.7, this dissertation attempts to clarify these expressions. It extends the use of the 
Theory of Reasoned Action to determine the intention that an EMAI agent has towards a 
plan of events by introducing and formalising the key concept of event space appraisal. 
7.2.1 Attitude and its Definition in EMAI 
The Theory of Reasoned Action is twofold. Firstly, the attitude towards performing the 
behaviour is calculated.  This is determined by the summation of the agents assessment of 
the consequences of performing the behaviour.  Expression 7.1 states that each 
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consequence Ci is equal to the product of the agents belief bi about the consequence being 
on a scale between likely and unlikely and the agents evaluation ei of that belief as being 
between bad and good.   
ebC = iii                                                        
  7.1 
The attitude A, towards performing a behaviour B (AB), can thus be determined by the 
number, n, of beliefs bi, that performing the behaviour will lead to consequences Ci, with 
respect to the agents evaluation ei of those consequences.  Thus: 
CA
n
i
iB ∑
=
=
1                                                          
  7.2 
In other words, the above two formulae can be combined to form Expression 7.3: 
ebA i
n
i
iB ∑
=
=
1                                                           
  7.3 
In brief, the agent's attitude toward performing certain behaviours is determined by the 
set of beliefs the agent holds about the behaviour and how the agent assesses each of these 
beliefs.  Before a behaviour is expressed or performed by the agent, it is referred to as an 
intention. To illustrate the attitude assessment of an intention, the example in Table 7.1, is 
given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determining Attitude from Beliefs and Evaluations Belief Evaluation  
 
i   Consequences of Eating at a Five Star Restaurant  
(b) 
3 = likely 
-3 = unlikely 
(e) 
3 = good 
-3 = bad 
(bi)(ei) 
1. Excellent Service. 3 × 3 = 9 
2. Have to Tip the Waiter. 1 × -3 = -3 
3. Food would be of highest quality 2 × 3 = 6 
4. Food would be expensive 3 × -2 = -6 
ebA i
n
i
iB ∑
=
=
1
 
  
= 
 
6 
 
Table 7.1  Determining an Attitude for a Restaurant 
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In this example, the attitude is being determined about the plan for eating at a five star 
restaurant.  In order to calculate the attitude, all resultant consequences of eating at a five 
star restaurant are considered.  Firstly, each one of the consequences is rated on the 
likelihood of them occurring.   Secondly, the consequences, if they were to occur, are 
assessed on whether they would be good or bad.  In Table 7.1 the seven point scale used in 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1996) is applied where 3 is unlikely or bad and +3 is likely or good.  
7.2.2 Subjective Norm and its Definition in EMAI 
Not only are attitudes determined by assessing beliefs and evaluations about 
behaviours, but a second factor should be considered. The predictability that an intention 
will become a behaviour must also be evaluated with respect to the agent's assessment of 
what others (artificial or human agents) will think about it performing the behaviour.  This 
evaluation has been termed the subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). The subjective 
norm can be seen as the agents sense of moral obligation.  The agent assesses the value 
placed on its behaviour by an individual j (written as Vj) by calculating the product of the 
individuals endorsement of the belief bj as being on a scale between likely and unlikely 
and the agents motivation to comply mj with the individual as being between always and 
never.  This can be written as Expression 7.4: 
=
jjj mbV
                                                         
  7.4 
Thus, the agents subjective norm to performing behaviour B, (SNB), is a summation of 
all the Vjs as shown in Expression 7.5: 
∑
=
=
p
j
jB VSN
1                                                   
  7.5 
The above two formulae can be re-written as Expression 7.6: 
∑
=
=
p
j
jjB mbSN
1                                                    
  7.6 
where bj is the belief of individual j towards behaviour B, mj is the motivation of individual 
j to comply to behaviour B, and p is the number of individuals concerned. The use of this 
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calculation is demonstrated in Table 7.2.  Here, the group of individuals that will have an 
influence on the agents decision about eating as a five star restaurant are listed and how 
they will affect the agents attitude is calculated.  Firstly, each individual is assessed on 
how much the agent believes the individual will approve of the agents decision, and 
secondly an assessment is made on how often the agent takes the advice of that individual.  
In the given example, the individual Tom is rated most likely to agree with the agents 
choice to eat at a five star restaurant and is also rated as someone with whom the agent 
often complies.  On the other hand the individual Katherine is considered to be someone 
with whom the agent believes would disagree with its choice to eat at a five star restaurant 
and is also someone from whom the agent rarely takes advice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.3 Calculating Intention 
Having determined a formula for attitude (Expression 7.3) and one for the subjective 
norm (Expression 7.6), they can now be combined to produce the agents intention, I, as 
shown in Expression 7.7: 
∑∑
==
+=
p
j
jj
n
i
ii mbwebwI
1
2
1
1                                             7.7 
where w1 and w2 are weightings added to represent that attitudes and subjective norms are 
not always evaluated equally in the formation of behavioural intentions. In other words, the 
intention of an agent towards a behaviour, IB, is the combination of its attitude towards the 
behaviour and its subjective norm towards the same behaviour.  For example, consider the 
plan eating at a five star restaurant, whose attitude and subjective norm were previously 
Important Referents Belief Motivation to Comply   
Subjective norm about eating at a 
five star restaurant. 
 
(b) 
3 = likely 
-3 = unlikely 
(m) 
3 = always 
-3 = never 
 (bj)(mj) 
1. Tom 3 × 2 = 6 
2. Harry -1 × -2 = 2 
3. Katherine -3 × -2 = -6 
∑
=
=
p
j
jjB mbSN
1
   
= 
 
2 
Table 7.2  Determining Subjective Norm (SN) from bj mj
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calculated. If the agents attitude about the plan was weighted to be twice as important as 
the subjective norm (w1 = 2 and w2 = 1 ) the agents intention toward the plan would be 
calculated to be 14 (6*2 + 2*1). 
The higher the resultant intention the more favourable the behaviour and the more 
likely that an EMAI agent will choose to act on it.  However, the intention value on a 
single plan or event is meaningless in isolation. It must be compared with intentions about 
other plans in the same event space.  The intention value of 14 for eating at a five star 
restaurant would have to be compared with the intention of the agents other choices of 
places to eat in the event space.  Calculations of intention might be performed on eating at 
a two star restaurant, eating at MacDonalds or eating at a hotel.  When intentions for 
each of these plans is calculated only then can the agents chosen behaviour be predicted.  
Given the collection of intentions about places to eat, the agent would most likely select 
the choice with the highest value for intention.  
7.3 Event Space Appraisal 
Although the intention calculation equation is used in the Theory of Reasoned 
Action to holistically assess an intention, according to Petty and Cacioppo (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1996), it can also be used to assess attitudes towards elements (such as people, 
objects and issues) involved in intentional activities.  These elements (as discussed in 
Chapter 6) collectively define the event space.   For each of an EMAI agents goals there 
exists an event space that may contain one or more plans of events and each event, E, will 
include an action, a, an object, o, a time, t and a context, c as shown in Expression 7.8.  
},,,{ tcoaE =                                                   7.8 
The task of the Intention Generator, on receipt of the event space, is to appraise each 
element of each event and order the plans according to the EMAI agents preferences. In 
this chapter, affective decision making is being examined through the use of a single-
dimensional appraisal.  The Intention Generator achieves a single-dimensional appraisal 
ordering of an event space by applying the Theory of Reasoned Action to the elements of 
the events in the event space and calculates the single-dimension of intention for each plan 
of events.  Just as intention (using attitude and subjective norm) can be calculated about a 
particular behaviour using expression 7.7, intention can also be calculated about the 
elements of an event. 
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Let TE represent the set that is the union of all the elements of event E. Therefore: 
ctoaT E UUU=      7.9 
where eE is an element of the set TE, written as: 
Te EE∈      7.10 
The number of elements n, of an event E is: 
||T En =      7.11 
For each element el, in an event E, the attitude is defined as Expression 7.12: 
∑
=
=
k
i
iiel ebA
1
                                                        7.12 
where k is the number of beliefs, b, the agent holds about the element and e is the 
evaluation of the belief.   
The subjective norm for each element in the event is defined as Expression 7.13: 
∑
=
=
p
j
jjel mbSN
1
                                                    7.13 
where p is the number of beliefs that other agents have about el and m is the agents 
motivation to comply with the beliefs of the others. 
The intention, I, toward an element of the event can now be defined as Expression 7.14: 
SNwAwI elelel 21 +=                                                7.14 
where Iel is the intention the EMAI agent has about interacting with an element during the 
performance of a behaviour and the attitude and subjective norm are weighted as before.  
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The intention toward the event, IE, is further calculated by summing the intentions toward 
all the elements involved with the event as shown in Expression 7.15: 
∑
=
=
n
k
E II el k1                                                           7.15 
Furthermore, as the agent is making a decision about performing a particular plan of events 
which in most cases may not be a single event, the intention toward the entire plan, Ip, 
should also be calculated using expression 7.16: 
∑
=
=
m
i
p II Ei1                                                         7.16 
where m is the number of events in the plan. 
Once the Intention Generator performs the single-dimensional appraisal on the events in 
the event space, the EMAI agent can begin executing the plans from most intended to least 
intended. After the execution of each individual event in a plan, the EMAI agent updates 
its beliefs and recalculates its attitudes and intentions towards all events, event elements, 
and plans in the event space.  At this time, the plans may be reordered.  
Based on the outcome of the event, E, the agent will assign a weighting w, to its attitude 
toward each of the elements, e.  It should be noted at this point that the agent is not 
updating its intentions toward the elements in a holistic fashion.  The reason for this is that 
the value of intention is calculated from the agents own attitudes with the addition of the 
attitudes of others (the subjective norm).  However, after an agent has performed an event 
and been involved with the event elements, the assessment the agent makes is based on the 
outcome of the event with respect to the agent itself.  Therefore, the agent only updates its 
attitude towards events and event elements having completed and event.  The subjective 
norm is not recalculated13. 
                                                   
13
 While the attitude of others (subjective norm) may change, it is not the purpose of the EMAI agent to 
speculate how its own interaction with an event or event element may affect another’s opinion of it.  
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As the weighting of an element and the agents attitude with respect to an event are 
dynamic, the time, t, at which the intention is being calculated, must also be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the attitude resulting from an event E, written as A tE ,  is 
calculated as Expression 7.17: 
∑
=
=
n
e
tetetE AwA
1
,,,                             7.17 
where n is the number of elements in the event E, and  
10 ≤≤we and ∑=
=
n
e
ew
1
1
 
Once an event has been completed, each of the elements, involved in the event, have 
their attitude values updated.   These new attitude values can then be used for future 
calculations of intention toward events, event elements and plans.  As the scale on which 
belief is rated is between good and bad, each time and event occurs, if it is successful the 
rating of belief, b for the event element is increased by 1 and if the event is not successful 
the rating is decreased by 1.  There is no particular reason why the value of 1 has been 
chosen to increment and decrement the value for b except that it is the simplest way of 
updating the value.  Therefore, the value of b at time t is equal to the initial value of b plus 
all the past evaluations of b as defined in Expression 7.18: 
∑
=
+=
m
i
ieleltel bbb
1
,0,, )(β                 7.18 
where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element el, and β is 
a function that returns 1 if encounter, i,  with e was good and 1 if the encounter was bad.  
How the agent evaluates these beliefs, e, is also determined at each encounter with the 
element.  The scale on which an evaluation is made ranges from likely to unlikely. For the 
purpose of the EMAI model this equates to a certainty rating and therefore, the evaluation 
of a belief is calculated by averaging the past likelihood of the belief.   This is defined by 
Expression 7.19: 
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where α is a function that returns 1 if the belief occurred on encounter i,  with the element 
and 0 if it did not. 
For example, assume an event E with one element A. At the beginning of the event, 
element A has values for attitude, subjective norm and intention as shown below. Assume 
for this example the weighting value is 1 (wA = 1) for simplification. 
 10,3,7 ,,, === ISNA tAtAtA  
where the value of AA,t was calculated using Expression 7.12 with two beliefs as follows: 
 5.0,2
 1,6
22
11
==
==
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eb  
where e1 indicates that b1 is always likely and e2 indicates that b2 is likely half of the time.  
This would result in an intention for the event before execution as: 
10
,,,
=
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Assuming after the event has occurred, the outcome is successful and A is still weighted 
the same, the attitude toward A, AA,t, can be updated by reevaluating the beliefs involved 
with the element (in this example b1 and b2).   As the event was successful both beliefs for 
the involved element have their values updated by 1 indicating the agent feels more 
favourably about each belief.   In addition to this update, the evaluation of the beliefs will 
also be updated using Expression 7.18.  If the belief about the element was instrumental 
during the event the value is set to α(b) = 1 and if not α(b) = 0.  Given that during past 
involvement with b1 the agent recorded evaluations of 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 and 1 and during the 
latest occurrence the agent recorded a 0, e2 would now have a value of 0.86 
((1+1+1+1+1+1+0)/7).  This gives b1 a less likelihood of occurring next time compared 
with the previous values of 1 where b1 had occurred each time in past events.  Assuming 
that α(b2) = 1, and past evaluations of b2 where 1, 0, 1, 0 , 1 and  0 (a previous value for e2 
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of 0.5; likely to occur half of the time), e2 will now equate to 0.57((1+0+1+0+1+0+1)/7) 
indicating the likelihood of b2 has slightly increased.  The resulting intention value 
calculated for the event would now be: 
59.10
357.102.6
357.0386.07
,,2,2,1,1,
=
++=
+×+×=
+×+×=
++++++ SNebebI tAtttttE δδδδδδ
 
where the subjective norm for the element has not been changed.  Therefore, due to the 
success of the past occurrence of the event E and the updating of the agents attitude 
towards the element involved in E the intention towards E is stronger.  This means the next 
time this event is schedule for execution it will be rated more highly. 
7.4 Affective Decision Making 
The EMAI architecture implements affective decision making to choose among 
multiple plans that it may execute in order to satisfy a goal.  For each goal there exists an 
event space that may contain one or more mutually exclusive plans.  The EMAI agent 
needs only to satisfactorily execute one of these plans to satisfy the corresponding goal.  
When there are more than one plan in the event space, the agent must make a choice.  The 
difficulty in making the choice comes when a collection of plans in the event space can 
satisfy the goal equally as well as each other.  The agent must therefore, make a choice 
based on its own preference.  The concept of preference refers to attitude theory and 
calculating the intentions the agent has toward each event and subsequent plan.  Preference 
may be different in different EMAI agents as it correlates directly with past experiences.  
The Intention Generator prioritises event preferences in an EMAI agent with respect to 
performing plans that will satisfy an associated goal.  Given a goal to satisfy and a number 
of plans (represented by Activity Digraphs) that will satisfy the goal, the agent calculates 
its preferred choice of plan from values (measures of intention) that it holds about the 
elements in the event spaces for those plans using the expressions defined in Section 7.3.  
When combinatorial explosion becomes an issue, the event space for a goal is restricted 
to a specific number of plans. This means the Intention Generator will only determined 
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priorities for plans in the current event space.  If no suitable plan is identified after the 
agent has exhausted its options within the current event space, the event space is 
repopulated with a new set of Activity Digraphs and the process begins again. Initially the 
process of finding a suitable activity to achieve a goal can be extensive.  However, as more 
plans are attempted and intentions calculated for each, the agent quickly builds an ordered 
list of plans that can best achieve associated goals.  This process is demonstrated in Case 
Study 2 of this chapter, where plans are reordered by the agent to the point where the most 
successful plans for solving a goal are highly prioritised and therefore always attempted 
before others are considered. 
The formulae presented in the previous section have been implemented as part of the 
EMAI architecture and are performed by the Intention Generator to order the agents 
schedule using the Theory of Reasoned Action.  This process allows the agent to make 
intuitive decisions and judge activities as liked or disliked in order to enhance its decision 
making and reasoning capabilities.  As the EMAI agent is making a decision based on the 
single appraisal of the value of intention, this model is referred to as a single-dimensional 
model of affective decision making. 
The remainder of this chapter presents four case studies to illustrate how attitude theory 
has been integrated into the EMAI architecture and its influence on the agents reasoning 
and decision making capabilities.  The first two case studies examine the separate parts of 
the strength of intention equation; attitude and subjective norm, respectively.  The third 
case study examines the use of attitudes implemented in the EMAI architecture for 
decision making purposes.  It compares the results obtained from the EMAI agent against 
the results collected from a human subject who is given the same decision making activity.  
The fourth case study examines a decision making dilemma proposed by Picard (1998) and 
demonstrates the use of the Theory of Reasoned Action via an EMAI agent to solve it 
using affective methods. 
7.5 Case Study 1: Decision Making and Reasoning with Attitude 
According to Velasquez (1998a) most theories about human performance in reasoning 
and decision-making can be classified into two different positions.  Firstly, humans reduce 
all decisions to a list of possible outcomes and use logic to conduct a feasibility study that 
will give a list of best possible choices.  Secondly, new decision situations are compared to 
past experiences and people tend to make choices that follow consistent patterns of 
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previous choices. This case study examines the use of a combination of decision making 
techniques. 
In many situations, it is impractical to analyse all possible courses of action and make a 
decision based on the measured plausibility of each.  Picard (1998) suggests a model of 
decision making using intuition as a guide to reasoning.  In her affective decision making 
scenario, high level or general decisions are made using measures of bad or good to assess 
options.  While choices deemed to be bad or negative overall are not dismissed as 
alternatives, choices that are good or positive overall are explored further. 
By the given definition, the weightings on the choices mentioned above are the attitude 
towards the options.  Given a set of choices, if a direct attitude for the choice does not 
exist, the attitude towards each of the options can be calculated from other attitudes and 
beliefs of associated concepts involved with the choice.  In this way, attitude 
measurements of atomic concepts can be used as internal states that determine the attitude 
value of complex situations.  The method described above for determining overall attitude 
can also be implemented in emotional agents to enhance their emotion synthesis process.  
This topic will be explored further in Chapter 9. 
The aim of this case study is to provide a worked example of the agent making an 
affective decision using the car example as introduced in Section 7.1.  Assume that the 
agent has the Goal Hierarchy as shown in Figure 7.1 and a Type Hierarchy as shown in 
Figure 7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Goal Hierarchy for BUY TRANSPORTATION 
Figure 7.2 Type Hierarchy Showing CAR and COLOUR Types 
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When the BUY TRANSPORTATION goal becomes active so too will the BUY CAR 
and BUY MOTORCYCLE subgoals.  To illustrate the way in which multiple activities are 
ordered by preference, the BUY CAR subgoal will be the focus of this example as there 
are multiple CAR subtypes for the agent to choose among.  At this point it is important to 
remember that either purchasing the UTE, SEDAN or COUPE would all satisfy the agents 
goal to BUY TRANSPORTATION.  The conceptual graph that explains the associated 
Activity Digraph for the BUY TRANPORTATION goal may look similar to this: 
[BUY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [PERSON: EMAI] 
 (SRCE) -> [PERSON: Joe] 
 (OBJ) -> [VEHICLE] -> (ATTR) -> [COLOUR] 
 (INST) -> [MONEY] 
By restricting this graph to specialisations from the Type Hierarchy, the conceptual graph 
for the BUY CAR goal would look like this: 
[BUY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [PERSON: EMAI] 
 (SRCE) -> [PERSON: Joe] 
 (OBJ) -> [CAR] -> (ATTR) -> [COLOUR] 
 (INST) -> [MONEY] 
As this subgoal is the last in the agents Goal Hierarchy, the agent will treat this graph 
as atomic and representative of the exact activity that it is to perform.  This graph and the 
Type Hierarchy are passed to the Event Space Generator where event spaces are 
constructed using atomic elements from the Type Hierarchy to further specialise the 
subgoal BUY CAR into specific events. The Event Space Generator will produce 
conceptual graphs describing every different combination of atomic types.  In this 
example, the Event Space Generator will produce nine graphs, three of which are shown 
below:  
[BUY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [PERSON: EMAI] 
 (SRCE) -> [PERSON: Joe] 
 (OBJ) -> [UTE] -> (ATTR) -> [GREEN] 
 (INST) -> [MONEY] 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  111 
 
[BUY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [PERSON: EMAI] 
 (SRCE) -> [PERSON: Joe] 
 (OBJ) -> [UTE] -> (ATTR) -> [BLUE] 
 (INST) -> [MONEY] 
 
[BUY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [PERSON: EMAI] 
 (SRCE) -> [PERSON: Joe] 
 (OBJ) -> [SEDAN] -> (ATTR) -> [RED] 
 (INST) -> [MONEY] 
The agent will continue producing graphs until it has created events for each 
combination of CAR type and COLOUR type. In this case, the nine separate graphs will 
constitute the event space. 
To keep this example simple, the agents decision on buying a car will be determined 
by its attitude toward each car based on the cars colour and make only. Assume the agent 
is programmed with the information that the cars make is weighted as 4 times more 
important than its colour when performing the activity of BUY CAR.  Table 7.3 provides 
an example of possible weights, w, and attitudes, A, with which the agent may be 
programmed, that could be used to determine an attitude for each combination. 
Cars 
Colours  w A  w A  w A 
 w A Honda  4 5 Ford 4 3 Holden 4 2 
   Overall Attitude Overall Attitude Overall Attitude 
Red 1 5 (1x5) + (4x5) = 25 (1x5) + (4x3) = 17 (1x5) + (4x2) = 13  
Green 1 2 (1x2) + (4x5) = 22 (1x2) + (4x3) = 14 (1x2) + (4x2) = 10 
Blue 1 1 (1x1) + (4x5) = 21 (1x1) + (4x3) = 13 (1x1) + (4x2) = 9 
Table 7.3 Hypothetical Weights and Attitude Values Assigned to 9 Car and Colour Combinations 
In this example, the red Honda is the favourite car and the blue Holden is the least 
favourite car.  When these values are used by the Event Space Generator to order the cars 
for the BUY CAR activity, the red Honda will appear first in the agents schedule and the 
agent would try to perform the activity of buying a red Honda.  Should this activity be 
unsuccessful, the agent would go to its next most favourite choice of the green Honda.  If 
the agent had car types in its Type Hierarchy that it had no attitudes about, these would be 
given the value of A = 0 and overall attitudes would be calculated for them and they would 
be included in the order of activities.  If the agent had a negative attitude towards a type of 
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car this would result in an overall negative attitude and the car type that the agent had no 
attitude about would be ranked higher in the activity list. 
The next case study compares human attitudes used in decision making against a 
simulation run using EMAI. 
7.6 Case Study 2: Human versus Computer in Attitude Choice 
Making 
7.6.1 Introduction 
For this attitude experiment, the agent has been given one simple goal.  The agent is 
preprogrammed with the knowledge that there are 10 different ways in which to satisfy this 
goal.  The agent is then asked to satisfy this goal 100 times.  Data is gathered about the 
choices the agent makes.  This same goal was also given to a human subject.  At this point 
it may be simpler to insert the narrative given to the human subject at the outset of the 
experiment in order to explain it. 
You are in a plane crash and find yourself stranded in the Jungle. 
It is 9am on a clear sunny morning.  You have to find your way back 
to civilization. In the back of the plane you find 10 survival 
packs. Each survival pack contains a number of items to help you 
with your journey.  Each pack weighs the same and is comfortable to 
carry. You have been given a list of the packs and their contents. 
Each item in the pack can be responsible for your success or 
failure. If just one item fails when you try to use it then your 
mission fails. 
 
When asked, select a pack by entering the number. Each item in the 
pack will be examined to see if you can use it. 
 
To complete a game you have to keep trying to escape the Jungle by 
selecting a mission survival pack. 
Each survival pack represents one of ten ways to attempt a task that will satisfy the goal 
of escaping from the Jungle (alive).  The list given to the human subject inventories the ten 
packs and their contents.  The packs randomly contain up to five items named a, b, c, d and 
e.  For example, survival pack 1 may contain items a, c and e and survival pack 5 may 
contain items a and b.  Each items alphabetical designation refers to the same item in each 
pack.  For example, item a in pack 1 is the same as item a in pack 5.  It was chosen not to 
associate the items with real world objects in an attempt to eliminate any preconceived 
attitudes that could influence the human subjects decision making process. 
The agents (both artificial and human) had to try and escape from the jungle 100 times.  
Each of these times was called a game.  To complete a game the agents had to find a pack 
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that helped them to successfully escape.  Before the start of the experiment, each item in 
the pack was given a static uniformly random probability rating of failure.  When either 
agent chose a pack, the success or failure of that pack was calculated by assessing a 
success or failure on each item in the pack.  If one item in the pack produces a failure 
rating, the whole task was rated as a failure.  The agents were then made aware of which 
items were responsible.  
As the experiment ran, data was gathered about the number of packs chosen in a single 
game before a success was found, the order in which the packs were chosen and how the 
agents felt about the items.  The aim was to determine if the attitude model implemented in 
the agent performs the task in a similar manner to a human. 
7.6.2 Results 
The initial results were encouraging.  Figure 7.3 is a box plot showing a 95% 
confidence interval for the mean number of survival packs chosen in a single game before 
a successful one was found.  As can be seen there is statistically no difference between the 
EMAI agent and the human subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further investigation showed different results for the choice patterns made by the two 
agents.  Figures 7.4 and 7.5 display the sequence of choices the agents made in selecting a 
survival pack.  The dark points show each pack chosen and the white dots represent when 
the chosen pack was successful. Although the packs chosen were quite different, similar 
patterns can be seen in each graph, as explained below. 
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Figure 7.3 95% Confidence Intervals on Mean Number of Pack Choices per Game 
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Firstly, plateaus are apparent where the agents selected a pack and the pack was 
successful. This caused the agents to select this same pack first for the very next game.  
For the human this is mostly evident for packs 7, 2 and 1.  For the EMAI agent they were 
packs 9, 4 and 3.  For each of the agents, these were the packs that were successful most of 
the time and therefore, the agents returned to use them again. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, there were set sequences of pack choice.  Should a chosen pack have failed, 
each agent had a backup or alternative pack from which to select.  For the human agent 
this sequence consisted of the packs identified in the graph plateaus.  One emerging pattern 
was to select pack 1 should pack 2 fail and vice versa.  Pack 7 was also chosen several 
times when packs 1 or 2 failed or both and a sequence of packs 2 then 1 were chosen 
should pack 7 fail. 
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Figure 7.5 EMAI Agent Pack Choice Sequence 
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In the case of the EMAI agent the patterns were more obvious.  This should be expected, 
as the agent is a logical machine basing its reasoning on discrete values.  This agents 
favourite sequence was 9, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Thirdly, at the initial stage each of the agents tried several tasks before establishing a 
pattern.  These initial tries also had an effect on future choices.  In the case of the human 
agent, at the beginning of the graph it can be seen that several tasks were tried.  The failure 
of these tasks had an impact on other pack choices made by the human subject.  Packs 10 
and 3 were never chosen again and pack 6 was chosen again only after a succession of 
other failures. 
The graph produced by the EMAI agent was slightly different.  In the beginning the 
agent was fortunate enough to select packs 4 and 9, which had a high success rate, so it 
continued using them.  Once they both failed in succession around the 15th game, it can be 
seen that the agent tried a number of other packs before finding one that worked.  During 
this time it tried three packs that it never chose again.  These were packs 2, 10 and 1 (even 
though 1 was successful). 
Finally, in each case there were packs that were not chosen at all.  The human agent did 
not select pack 9 and the EMAI agent did not choose pack 8. 
7.6.3 Discussion 
While computers can outperform humans in many logical problem-solving situations, 
there are often times when optimal solutions to problems cannot be enumerated with the 
available resources or within a finite time.  Humans have the remarkable ability to respond 
in situations with limited knowledge, limited memory and comparatively slower 
processing speeds (Picard 1998). 
This case study shows the results of using attitude prediction theories to produce 
humanistic reasoning patterns in the EMAI architecture.  In this experiment neither agent 
knew the success rates of the survival packs.  Only by using the packs could the agents 
form an opinion about them.  In both agents, the packs that succeeded most often had a 
higher attitude formed towards them.  This caused these favourite packs to be chosen time 
after time. 
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In the human agent, a popular pack did not lose favour with the subject after several 
failures.  This too can be seen in the artificial agent.  The information integration formulae 
used to update EMAIs attitude towards the packs increases the attitude value for a pack 
each time it succeeds.  After many successes, the agent can have a high attitude value for a 
pack.  This attitude value may be much higher than any other pack.  When such a pack 
fails, the agent decreases its attitude value towards the pack.  However, when the attitude 
value is very high, one failure of a favourite pack will not cause it to become unpopular.  
Depending on its attitude value relative to other packs, the pack may continue to remain 
the favourite. 
The exercise in this experiment was to find a pack that helped the agent escape from the 
jungle.  The agents did not have to identify the optimal pack.  For interests sake, the pack 
with the least probability of failure was pack 7.  The human subject identified this pack 
although it was ranked as third most used, as can be seen in Figure 7.6.  The EMAI agent 
chose pack 7 rarely.  Agents identified a small number of packs that could help them 
achieve their task in the least number of choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In many real life situations, humans tend to select a solution that works within specified 
parameters, and if it is successful, there is often no need to look for another solution. For 
example, a person may drive to work the same way everyday.  The route may not be the 
optimal route (the shortest, a better road or with less traffic) but for one reason or another, 
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this route has worked successfully for the person day after day.  Imagine that one day the 
route is closed due to road works.  The person will find another route that works for then.  
When the road works are finished, they may return to the old route, or if they found the 
newer route to be better in some sense of the word, they may stick with it. 
In this experiment, it was not possible for either agent to initially access the success 
probabilities of the packs without using them.  Only through experience can the agent form 
an attitude toward a pack.  The more games the agents played, the more information they 
had about a packs success probability.  This is an example of a problem where it was not 
possible to calculate an optimal solution before applying one.  Each agent was not given 
the opportunity to examine each of the packs before making a selection.  Therefore, the 
agents did not know which pack would have had the highest probability of success for each 
game.  In each game they could make only one decision and as the games progressed they 
were able to use their experiences in past games to make a decision. 
The next case study continues to examine attitude formation and its use in selecting an 
activity but also includes the use of subjective norms. 
7.7 Case Study 3: Restaurant Selection via Peer Pressure 
In order to demonstrate how attitude values and subjective norms can be used by an 
agent to make an affective decision, this case study examines a simple cell automata 
simulation.  In this simulation there are 2500 cells that represent 2500 individuals.   Each 
decision making event in the simulation is referred to as an iteration. At each iteration, 
each individual makes a decision among five choices. The outcome from each decision has 
the same probability of success.   The decision making process is the same one that is 
integrated in the EMAI architectures Intention Generator.   
To visualise the experiment consider a population that has a choice of five restaurants.  
Initially the members of the population have not eaten at any of the restaurants and 
therefore, they have no preconceived attitudes about them.  In each iteration, an individual 
selects a restaurant based on how it feels about that restaurant.  On the first iteration there 
only exists neutral attitudes about each and so the individuals just pick one based on the 
FIFO method used by EMAIs Intention Generator (see Section 3.5.1).  Having chosen a 
restaurant at which to eat, the simulation is programmed with a 10% chance that an 
individual will have a bad experience.  If this occurs the attitude held by the individual 
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about the restaurant decreases otherwise its attitudinal beliefs about the restaurant are 
reconfirmed and its attitude becomes stronger.  Figure 7.7 displays progressive iterations 
of the simulation with each cells restaurant preference represented by a different colour.  
In this first simulation the individual cells change their preferences based on failure or 
success of the restaurant only.  Subjective norms have not been calculated. 
Notice that in this simulation, favourite restaurant selection is randomly distributed 
among the cells and very little fluctuation takes place when individuals change their 
restaurant preferences. 
As intentions are not only governed by attitudes, in the second simulation, each 
individual makes a choice of which restaurant to eat at as well as gathering the attitudes 
about the restaurants from each of the individuals in the neighbouring cells and uses these 
to calculate an overall attitude.  Figure 7.8 displays several iterations of the simulation that 
includes subjective norms. 
 
1st iteration                                       2nd iteration                               3rd iteration 
5th iteration                                       10th iteration                           20th  iteration 
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Not unexpectedly, from random beginnings the individuals in close vicinity formulate 
the same attitudes about their favourite restaurant.  Eventually just one restaurant wins out 
as the favourite of the whole population.  In the above simulation, each member of the 
population had an equal influence over other members.   This of course does not occur in a 
real population and the Theory of Reasoned Action allows for some individuals to have a 
stronger influence over others.  The simulation was run again and this time several 
individuals with a stronger influence over the surrounding population were added.  Black 
cells in Figure 7.9 represent these individuals. 
The number of influential individuals had a significant impact on the stability of 
favourite restaurants.  As with the previous simulation, where cells with the same 
restaurant preferences began to group together, the influential individuals have groups 
form around them.  Groups without influential individuals also form in the beginning of 
the simulation.  However, in the end the groups with an influential individual as a member 
grew the largest and instead of one restaurant winning out overall, as was the case in the 
previous simulation, the influential individuals added stability to the population and 
separate groups remained. 
 
1st iteration                               2nd iteration                             3rd iteration 
5th iteration                          10th  iteration                           20th  iteration 
Figure 7.8 Cellular Automata of Favourite Restaurants with Social Norms 
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This case study has illustrated the mechanisms that are part of the EMAI architecture 
that update attitude values based on success and failure of activity choices with social 
influences.  The last case study in this chapter examines a challenge initiated by Picard in 
her book Affective Computing (Picard 1998). How can attitude theory be used to produce 
an artificial agent acting within the parameters she supplies? 
7.8 Case Study 4: Picards Albert 
7.8.1 Introduction 
This case study whose results are published in (Baillie et al. 2000a), examines an 
example of affective decision making suggested by Picard (1998): 
Albert, a very busy scientist, has a beloved eight-week-old boy, and is trying to 
decide how to provide for his son while he works during the day.  He does not know 
any family members or friends who could help.  He acquires lists for three kinds of 
5th iteration                           10th iteration                           15th iteration 
20th iteration                           50th iteration                           100th iteration 
Figure 7.9 Favourite Restaurants with Influential Individuals 
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day care providers: a list of ten nanny referral services, a list of 145 licensed family 
car providers, and a list of 24 day care centers located nearby.  He contemplates 
posting notices in newspapers and on bulletin boards.  Albert loves his son, and 
want's to choose the best care for him.  He needs a care-provider within a month.  
Albert is a highly rational man; how does he decide what to do? 
In Picard's proposed solution there is a narrative that illustrates how each of the options 
available to Albert are weighed against each other by his valenced reactions towards them.  
Albert's feelings towards the options are based in associated concepts that Albert already 
has experienced.  Picard sums up Alberts decision making process thus: 
Albert did not search all the possibilities, but he searched until he ran into either 
negative feelings or logical constraints, and then he stopped and tried something else.  
He continued this strategy  exploring possibilities that felt reasonable and good, and 
modifying his criteria as he accumulated more information.............Before his time 
ran out, he arrived at a decision that combined logical constraints with weighing the 
good and bad valences associated with his options.  Emotions played an integral part 
not only in his final decision, but also in his process of gathering information.  
(Picard 1998) 
From the point of view of the research in this dissertation, the valenced reactions that 
Picard discusses are attitudes and each of the possibilities represents an event space. To 
evaluate his options, Albert forms an attitude about the new event based on overlapping 
events about which he has already formed attitudes. For example, one of Alberts options 
is to advertise, however, Picard states that Albert believes that advertising attracts 
weirdoes.  From this, it may be assumed that Albert (or someone he knows) has had a bad 
experience with advertising and he is applying that belief to this new situation.  The 
following is an examination of one of Albert's options and an explanation of how he 
formulated an intention toward it.  
One of Albert's options is to choose from a list of nannies. In order to calculate Albert's 
intention toward this option two parts need to be calculated; his attitudes and subjective 
norms toward the behaviour options.  Table 7.4 displays Albert's beliefs (taken from 
Picard's narrative solution) about using a nanny for day care and his evaluation of each of 
these beliefs.  The beliefs are extracted from the elements that Albert considers to be in the 
event space for this behaviour. A seven point scale, similar to the one used in (Petty and 
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Cacioppo 1996) for assessing evaluations and beliefs, (such as +3 for good or likely and -3 
for bad or unlikely) has been applied to give hypothetical values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given these are all of Albert's beliefs that are relevant to the hiring of a nanny and if 
this is how he assessed them, Albert's attitude towards the option of hiring a nanny is 
calculated to have a value of 6.  To fully assess Albert's intention to hire a nanny, his belief 
regarding others opinions about this action and his motivation to comply with them must 
also be examined.  Picard's narrative is not clear on the influence that other's opinions have 
on Albert's decision making, so hypothetical values are given to calculate his subjective 
norm in Table 7.5.  Belief is again rated on a 7 point scale where 3 infers the person is 
likely to approve of Alberts hiring a nanny and -3 infers they do not.  Motivation to 
comply is rated in a similar manner where 3 implies Albert generally does what this person 
wants him to do and -3 implies Albert hardly ever complies with this person's wishes.  
From the examples given, it is calculated that Albert's subjective norm about hiring a 
nanny has a value of 8.  Assuming that Albert weights his attitude to be twice as important 
as his subjective norm  (w1 = 2 and w2 = 1), his intention to hire a nanny is calculated to be 
20.  Although this would suggest a high motivation in Albert to perform this intention, the 
Consequences of Hiring a Nanny                             
for Day Care for Son. 
Belief Evaluation  
 
 
(b) 
3 = likely 
-3 = unlikely 
(e) 
3 = good 
-3 = bad 
(bi)(ei) 
1. nanny would come to the house during the day. 3 × 3 = 9 
2. A nanny would be expensive. 3 × -1 = -3 
3. nanny-referral services want fees up front 3 × -2 = -6 
4. nanny could be with us for many years 2 × 3 = 6 
5. nanny may not be available to start within four weeks 
- same newspaper ads for nanny positions repeated over 
several weeks* 
2 × -3 = -6 
6. nannies can be abusive 
- a documentary he saw on TV* 
-2 × -3 = 6 
ebA i
n
i
iB ∑
=
=
1  
* how these beliefs were formed. 
  
= 
 
6 
 
Table 7.4  Determining Attitude (A) from bi and ei
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other options that Albert has available to him should also be assessed and attitudes 
compared. A similar method would be applied to his other options for determining their 
attitude values.  Ranking these options in order of intention would give further insight into 
an improved prediction of Albert's choice of behaviour regarding the search for a day care 
provider. 
 
 
 
 
 
The next section examines the EMAI agent while simulating this decision making 
process. 
7.8.2 Simulating Albert 
The goal, type and relation hierarchies necessary to produce a partial simulation of 
Albert have been programmed into EMAI agent.   Instead of simulating all of Alberts 
choices as goals, a partial selection of three goals has been chosen as these provide a 
complex simulation and illustrate the nature of the agent without the need for including all 
of Alberts choices.   Please note that different colours have been used throughout to 
distinguish different event graphs. 
Initially Albert is given the goal of finding day care for his son.  Since the agent that is 
simulating Alberts behaviour has never performed a plan to solve this goal before, it has 
all of its attitude values set to zero.  This means the agent has no preferences toward any of 
the subgoals and related process plans from which it can choose.  As the agent gathers 
information about each process by analysing the elements of the associated event, it sorts 
and stores its preferences about each process choice in its belief system. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.10, the agent is simulating the FIND CARER FOR SON goal as a choice of three 
subgoals, each of which is mutually exclusive, to achieve the highest goal. At atomic goal 
Important Referents Belief Motivation to Comply   
 
 
(b) 
3 = likely 
-3 = unlikely 
(m) 
3 = always 
-3 = never 
 (bi)(mi) 
1. his mother Anna 3 × 2 = 6 
2. his friend Joe -1 × -2 = 2 
3. his brother Phillip -3 × 0 = 0 
∑
=
=
p
j
jjB mbSN
1
   
= 
 
8 
Table 7.5  Determining Subjective Norm (SN bj mj
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level, each of the three choices becomes a two or three-fold plan.  Firstly, the agent will 
perform the ASK ABOUT DAY CARE, ASK ABOUT NANNY and ASK FRIEND 
activities and secondly, the agent attempts a procurement type process. This is represented 
in the PLACE IN DAY CARE goal as the subgoal INQUIRE ABOUT VACANCY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the FIND CARER FOR SON goal is triggered the Activity Digraphs that explain 
the process plans that satisfy this goal are sent to the Event Space Generator along with the 
agents hierarchy of concept types.  The Type Hierarchy used for this simulation is shown 
in Figure 7.11.  This hierarchy provides the agent with sufficient knowledge to find 
concepts that can be used by the Event Space Generator for conceiving new event spaces 
to explore with regards to the FIND CARER FOR SON goal. 
 
 
 
For example, the conceptual graph constructed from the agents set of Activity 
Digraphs (see Figure 7.12) that defines the goal is shown below: 
  
Figure 7.10 A Partial View of Albert’s Goal Hierarchy 
Figure 7.11 Albert’s Type Hierarchy for Caregiver Types 
Type Individual 
Joe NANNY 
Jenny 
Mum 
Harry 
FRIEND 
Mary 
Little Pumpkins DAY CARE 
CENTRE Sunny Day 
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[ASK ABOUT NANNY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY] 
 (INST) -> [TELEPHONE] 
 (RCPT) -> [FRIEND] 
 (FBS) -> [HIRE NANNY] – 
(AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the Type Hierarchy of Figure 7.11, the Event Space Generator would create two 
events that could satisfy the EMPLOY NANNY goal with appropriate conceptual graphs 
built by restricting the concept NANNY to the individual Joe for the first graph and Jenny 
for the second graph thus generating the graphs below: 
 [ASK ABOUT NANNY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Joe] 
 (INST) -> [TELEPHONE] 
(RCPT) -> [FRIEND] 
 (FBS) -> [HIRE NANNY] – 
(AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Joe]  
and 
  
 
 
Figure 7.12 Albert’s Activity Digraphs for the FIND CARER FOR SON Goal 
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[ASK ABOUT NANNY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Jenny] 
 (INST) -> [TELEPHONE] 
(RCPT) -> [FRIEND] 
 (FBS) -> [HIRE NANNY] – 
(AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Jenny]  
Furthermore, the Event Space Generator would recognise the type concept of FRIEND 
and its associated referents and would generate further events where each of the FRIEND 
referents in the EMPLOY NANNY graph are specialised to the individuals Mum, Harry 
and Mary. This would lead to the creation of six separate Activity Digraphs (two NANNY 
referents by three FRIEND referents) for the goal of EMPLOY NANNY. They would look 
similar to the following graph: 
 [ASK ABOUT NANNY] – 
 (AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Jenny] 
 (INST) -> [TELEPHONE] 
(RCPT) -> [FRIEND: Harry] 
 (FBS) -> [HIRE NANNY] – 
(AGNT) -> [AGENT: ALBERT] 
(OBJ) -> [NANNY: Jenny]  
Each of these Activity Digraphs would consist of two distinct events.  For both the 
EMPLOY NANNY and EMPLOY FRIEND goals there exist two subgoals that are 
satisfied by processes in the Activity Digraphs as shown in Figure 7.12. The EMPLOY 
NANNY goal can be satisfied by executing ASK NANNY followed by HIRE NANNY 
and the EMPLOY FRIEND goal can be satisfied by executing the ASK FRIEND followed 
by EMPLOY FRIEND.  Due to the way in which the agent selects a process, an Activity 
Digraph may not be followed through to its completion. The agent could complete the first 
part of a digraph and reevaluate its attitudes toward that part.  This in turn could influence 
the agents attitudes toward the rest of the digraph.  If the agent considered the rest of the 
digraph to have a lower attitude value than parts of other digraphs, the agent would 
abandon the current digraph for another.   This is in keeping with Picards narrative 
solution for Alberts decision-making process where she states:  
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Albert did not search all the possibilities, but he searched until he ran 
into either negative feelings or logical constraints, and then he stopped 
and tried something else. 
To produce the type of behaviour mentioned above, the agent evaluates each event in an 
Activity Digraph individually.   In the case of the EMPLOY NANNY goal and associated 
Activity Digraphs, that in this simulation number six, the Event Space Generator takes 
each of the six plans, specialises them into graphs that represent individual events and 
determines the referent (if any) to create specific events.  As there are six plans that could 
satisfy the EMPLOY NANNY goal, each with two generic events, the associated event 
space would contain 12 specific events thus:   
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 21 NULLNULLJoeNANNYHIRENULLMaryFRIENDJoeNANNYASK EE =>−=
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 43 NULLNULLJoeNANNYHIRENULLHarryFRIENDJoeNANNYASK EE =>−=
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 65 NULLNULLJoeNANNYHIRENULLMumFRIENDJoeNANNYASK EE =>−=
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 87 NULLNULLJennyNANNYHIRENULLMaryFRIENDJennyNANNYASK EE =>−=
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 109 NULLNULLJennyNANNYHIRENULLHarryFRIENDJennyNANNYASK EE =>−=
]}[],[],:[],{[]}[],:[],:[],{[ 1211 NULLNULLJennyNANNYHIRENULLMumFRIENDJennyNANNYASK EE =>−=
 
where sequential events that make up the individual Activity Digraphs are joined with the 
characters ->. The 12 events, however, only consist of eight unique events as the events 
for hiring joe and hiring jenny are repeated three times each.  As previously mentioned the 
dimension of explicitness of each element of the event is inconsequential.  In this case, the 
temporal component is nondescript.  Not all elementary factors need to be present in the 
event. 
Once the event space has been generated, it is passed to the Intention Generator.  In the 
Intention Generator, each event in the event space is assigned an attitude value calculated 
by summing the attitude values the agent has about each of the elements in the event. From 
these assessments, the agent's intentions toward each event and associated Activity 
Digraph are formalized and the value of the intention is used as a prioritising mechanism 
that determines the agent's behaviour.  Once each option has been assessed, the agent's 
highest intended Activity Digraph becomes its behaviour and the agent begins work on that 
plan. 
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7.8.3 Results and Discussion 
The partial narrative output from one simulation run with the EMAI agent can be seen 
in Table 7.6. The agent begins by executing the Activity Digraph for the EMPLOY 
NANNY goal.  As the agent does not have any preconceived attitudes, the events are 
executed in a FIFO order. The agent executes the ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny14 event.  The 
agent receives positive feedback about Jenny.  However, the agent does not follow this 
process with the subsequent event HIRE NANNYJenny, instead it executes an activity for 
the ASK ABOUT NANNYJoe.  The agent selected this activity next because the positive 
feedback from the ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny event updated the agents attitudes about the 
event elements and in turn affected the overall attitudes of other events that included some 
or all of the same elements. 
 
 
 
The ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny event includes the elements of the action ASK ABOUT 
NANNY and the object Jenny.  The ASK ABOUT NANNYJoe event includes the same 
action element as the previous event.  The intersection of these events can be seen in 
Figure 7.13.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
14
 As there are similar events that involve different referents, for the rest of this discussion an event that 
involves a particular referent will be written as EVENT NAMEReferent. For example, the ASK ABOUT 
NANNY event involving the referent Jenny will be written ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny. 
EMAI ask about Nanny Jenny 
EMAI hears GOOD things about Jenny. 
EMAI ask about Nanny Joe 
EMAI hears BAD things about Joe. 
EMAI tries to hire Nanny Jenny 
EMAI hires Nanny Jenny.
Table 7.6 Narrative Output from Albert Simulation 
Figure 7.13 Intersection of ASK ABOUT NANNY Events 
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Therefore, when the event ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny is performed, the resultant 
attitude affects the ASK ABOUT NANNYJoe event.  In other words, the agent is simulating 
Albert asking about the hiring of a nanny, in particular one called Jenny.  When Albert 
receives good feedback about the prospect of not only Jenny but also the hiring of any 
nanny, Albert decides to ask about other nannies.  The narrative continues to show that the 
agent receives negative feedback about the Joe referent and makes the decision to continue 
with the employment of the Jenny referent. 
The results of this simulation are similar to those in Case Study 2 in this chapter.  This 
is not a surprise as the mechanisms within the agent are identical. The only difference lies 
in the agents Ontology.  The same processing is occurring, however, for this simulation, 
rather than selecting an abstract pack concept the concepts relate to a specific domain (in 
this case day care selection).  Figure 7.14 displays the agents attitudes toward each of the 
events during a simulation run. In a similar method used in Case Study 2, the agent is 
asked to satisfy the FIND CARER FOR SON goal a number of times. Each time the agent 
satisfies the goal, the goal is triggered again.  This allows the agent to build up the attitude 
values of its events with each success and failure. The agent is also able to use these 
attitude values to make decisions the next time it has to satisfy the goal.  Notice the second 
process for each of the PLACE IN DAY CARE subgoals has been used because the final 
processes in the PLACE IN DAY CARE Activity Digraphs are not dependent on chance 
determining their success or failure, as is the case with each of the other processes.  They 
were added for illustrative and narrative purposes only.  Subgoals such as GIVE SON TO 
FRIEND and GIVE SON TO NANNY could have also been employed under the 
appropriate graphs but are unnecessary to illustrate Alberts decision making process. The 
graph in Figure 7.14 displays the agent's attitude toward each of the events with respect to 
time.  The attitude value towards each event rises when the execution of the event is 
successful and falls when it fails.  The attitude toward an event is also affected by other 
events that contain similar elements such as actions.  This was previously illustrated in 
Figure 7.13 where the goals ASK ABOUT NANNYJoe and ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny 
have the action ASK ABOUT NANNY in common. 
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In contrast to Case Study 2 where only one subgoal needed to be completed 
successfully to achieve the agents goal, this simulation employs two and three subgoals.  
This makes the data more complex to display in a simple graph showing choice selection 
order (as was the case in Case Study 2).  However, similar results can be shown by 
displaying the attitude values of the events involved in the decision making process and the 
associated successful processes as shown in Figure 7.14.  This graph displays how pleasant 
or unpleasant the agent assesses the events of each of the final processes for an Activity 
Digraph of the FIND CARER FOR SON goal.  
As was the case in Case Study 2, the agent did not need to attempt all of its options 
before finding a successful solution.  In the graph shown in Figure 7.14, areas can be seen 
where the attitude value for a particular event forms a plateau over a number of time 
intervals.  This illustrates a time period when the agents attitude value for this event did 
not change because the agent did not attempt this event or any other event that had 
overlapping elements.  The large coloured arrows indicate when an attempted event was 
successful and thus satisfied the goal.  Due to the event being successful, the attitude value 
of the associated element is increased.  This can be seen by an immediate increase in the 
attitude value for a successful event shown on the graph.  Increases in attitude value also 
occur when there has been a failed event execution.  This also happens where elements 
involved in one event have their attitudes updated and thus influence the other events.  The 
way in which the elements overlap for this simulation can be seen in Figure 7.15.  For 
Figure 7.14 Attitude Values for Terminating Activity Subgoals 
Indicates successful 
goal completion
Hire Harry 
Hire Jenny 
Hire Joe 
Hire Harry 
Hire Mum 
Inq_Little_Pumpkins
Inq_Sunny_Day 
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example the individual Jenny is present in both ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny and HIRE 
NANNYJenny events.  If the agents attitude toward Jenny changes as a result of executing 
the goal ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny this in turn will influence the overall attitude for the 
event HIRE NANNYJenny without the goal having to be executed. 
 
 
 
 
 
This interaction is difficult to see when the simulation is examined in its entirety and so 
the graph in Figure 7.16 has been produced to isolate and demonstrate this event 
interaction. The graph in Figure 7.16 takes a slice of the simulation run between time 
indexes 35 and 45 and shows the attitude values for the events generated from the 
EMPLOY NANNY goal.   
Keeping in mind that the attitude value is updated after the event and that it is not 
shown on the graph until the following time index, the effects of the positive response the 
agent receives about Joe at time index 36 are shown at time index 37.  The event for ASK 
ABOUT NANNYJoe affects all events containing the individual Joe and all events 
containing the action ASK ABOUT NANNY. Thus, the attitude values for the events ASK 
ABOUT NANNYJoe, ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny and HIRE NANNYJoe all receive an 
updated attitude value.  This can be seen in Figure 7.16 at time index 37.  The event for 
HIRE NANNYJenny is not affected as it does not intersect with the ASK ABOUT 
NANNYJoe event. 
At time index 37 the agent receives negative feedback about the event ASK ABOUT 
NANNYJenny and positive feedback about the event HIRE NANNYJoe.  This results in the 
attitude value changes displayed at time index 38.  All events including ASK ABOUT 
NANNY are decreased and the events containing the action HIRE NANNY are increased.  
However, as positive feedback was received regarding an event containing the referent Joe, 
the attitude toward the event ASK ABOUT NANNYJoe decreases less than the attitude for 
Figure 7.15 Event Intersections for the EMPLOY NANNY Goal 
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the event ASK ABOUT NANNYJenny.  The reverse is true for the HIRE NANNYJoe event 
whose attitude value increases by a greater amount than the event ASK ABOUT 
NANNYJenny  as  Joe had a positive influence on the event and Jenny had a negative one. 
Further interactions of this type can be seen after time index 41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time Index: 35 
 
 
 
 
Time Index: 36 
EMAI ask about Nanny Joe. 
EMAI hears GOOD things about 
Joe. 
 
Time Index: 37 
EMAI ask about Nanny Jenny. 
EMAI hears BAD things about 
Jenny. 
EMAI tries to hire Nanny Joe. 
EMAI hires Nanny Joe. 
Time Index: 38 
 
 
 
 
Time Index: 39 
 
 
 
 
Time Index: 40 
 
 
 
 
Time Index: 41 
EMAI ask about Nanny Joe. 
EMAI hears BAD things about Joe. 
EMAI ask about Nanny Jenny. 
EMAI hears BAD things about 
Jenny. 
Time Index: 42 
EMAI ask about Nanny Joe. 
EMAI hears GOOD things about 
Joe. 
 
Time Index: 43 
EMAI tries to hire Nanny Joe. 
Joe cannot do it this time. 
EMAI ask about Nanny Joe. 
EMAI hears BAD things about Joe. 
EMAI ask about Nanny Jenny. 
EMAI hears BAD things about 
Jenny. 
Time Index: 44 
 
Time Index: 45 
Figure 7.16 Event Attitude versus Time Showing Interrelated Event Effects 
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In the time between time index 39 and 42, the attitude values on all events remain 
constant. This result is caused when the agent does not interact with these elements and 
therefore, there are no new negative or positive influences over the elements for these 
events. 
7.8.4 Conclusions 
In Picards suggested solution to Alberts problem, she explains that in making his 
decision, Albert does not evaluate all possible solutions but works along a path of feel 
good options until a negative feeling arises at which point he changes tack and begins 
evaluating other options.  In the simulation presented in this case study the agent performs 
the same kind of process: it selects a process from one Activity Digraph and proceeds to 
work on that as a plan to achieving its goal.  However, at any time, the agent can decide it 
does not like the current plan it is working and can abandon it for another.  The agent can, 
of course, return to the abandoned plan at any time if it evaluates it as being more liked or 
better than the other plans.  
The attitude values stored by the agent are based on the agents experiences within its 
environment.  In the case of the child-care problem the solution is neither right nor wrong.  
Any of the agents subgoals and associated digraphs, when completed successfully, would 
satisfy the agents initial goal.  By setting attitude values the agent can form opinions about 
which process it likes the best and can use these values to make a final decision about its 
choices without exploring all the processes that it has available to it through its hierarchy. 
7.9 Summary 
Attitude theory provides a firm foundation for integrating single-dimensional emotion-
inducing mechanisms into an agent architecture. In this chapter, the foundations for 
development of an affective reasoning agent have been examined.  The concept of attitude 
has been used to calculate values for an affective reasoning system.  By using attitude as a 
measurement, the EMAI agent is programmed with the means of appraising an event as 
either pleasurable or displeasurable.  This pleasure rating is calculated for the events of 
processes that the agent is to perform and acts as a device for the prioritising of an agents 
intentions with respect to the agents current set of goals. 
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Fishbein and Ajzens Theory of Reasoned Action fits well with goal-orientated agent 
architectures such as the EMAI architecture and the discrete nature of computational AI 
systems. The Theory of Reasoned Action can not only be used to determine an attitude 
about an activity from a holistic viewpoint, but it can also be used to assess atomic 
elements of an event, namely the action being performed, the target object, the context and 
the time of the action.  This makes it ideal for integration into an agent architecture to 
simulate affective decision making across a series of processes and the associated events 
where event elements may overlap.  This gives the agent the ability to assess its attitude 
towards a process it has not performed before where it has had contact with several of the 
elements associated with an event. 
Attitude theory provides the agent with a one-dimensional emotion system.  This may 
be adequate for simulating simple decision making scenarios where the complex effects of 
such decisions on the agents state are not necessary.  However, when an agent is required 
to exhibit emotional human-like behaviour, it is essential to allow activities and the 
environment to have a complex influence on the agents internal state, which will in turn 
influence the agents outward behaviour.  Attitude ratings of liked and disliked may allow 
a shallow implementation of emotions that are highly correlated to this dimension, such as 
happiness equating with liked and sadness equating with disliked.  However, complex 
emotional states are beyond the definitions of only liked and disliked.  For example the 
question may be asked, Is pride more or less liked than happiness?   This illustrates that 
a wide range of emotional states cannot adequately be represented on a one-dimensional 
scale. 
The next chapter builds on the one-dimensional aspect of attitude theory presented in 
this chapter in order to create a mechanism within the agent architecture that is capable of 
generating complex emotional states.  This is achieved by the inclusion of a component in 
the EMAI architecture called the Affective Space.  
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8. Affective Space 
The foot less prompt to meet the morning dew, the heart less bounding at emotion new, and hope, once 
crush’d, less quick to spring again. 
- Matthew Arnold, 1888. 
  
8.1 Introduction 
Due to their discrete and categorising structure, appraisal theories have been the popular 
foundation and theoretical concept on which emotional agent architectures have been built 
(Picard 1998).  The most popular to date has been the OCC model discussed in Section 
2.1.3.  Appraisal theories make assessments on particular aspects of an entity, be it an 
event, object, a piece of music, another person and so on, in order to group it into an 
emotional category.   Using just one appraisal dimension to determine complex emotional 
states, such as pleasantness, is a difficult, if not an impossible task. For example, pride is a 
pleasant emotion, but is it more or less pleasant than surprise? The Theory of Reasoned 
Action and attitude theory in general collectively refers to a number of appraisal 
dimensions. Petty and Cacioppo (1996) tabled a survey conducted by the White House 
Chief of Staff, where the White House staff were asked questions that relate to a number of 
different appraisal dimensions such as effort, quality, confidence and frequency, to gather a 
clearer picture of the subject's attitudes regarding other staff members.  A simple, I like 
this person, or I do not like this person, would not be adequate for evaluating the staff 
member.  Therefore, more specific appraisals need to be gathered.  This is also the case 
with determining an emotional state, for example, distinguishing pride from surprise. 
The number of appraisal dimensions that could be used to categorise emotional states is 
almost limitless and varies depending on the person, object or event being assessed.  An 
emotional state could be evoked from the assessment of smell, sound, sight or on more 
calculated assessments of predictability, effort and legitimacy.  Healey et al. (1998) 
described a wearable computer that selects music to play, based on the assessment of the 
users emotional state calculated from the appraisal of physiological variables that indicate 
the users present mood.  Appraisals will differ in different context.  The objective of this 
chapter is to examine event appraisal. An emotional reaction to a piece of music may be 
assessed with different criteria.  An emotional reaction toward a person based on how they 
look may also be assessed with different criteria. 
Developers of the agents that have used the OCC model as a basis for the generation of 
emotions such as El-Nasrs PETEII (El-Nasr 1998) and Reillys emotional agents (Reilly 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  136 
1996) have developed complex environments where the agents not only make their own 
decisions but are also affected by events occurring within their environment that are 
beyond their control.  Among others, these agents use appraisal dimensions that make 
abstract appraisals such as the liking, disliking, attractive or unattractive. These appraisals 
are not only conjectural but also require emotional judgments themselves.  Having 
calculated an emotional state, these agents then use a set of production rules to determine 
their behaviour.  In the case of PETEEI, which simulates a pet dog, there exists the rule if 
angry and bowl taken away then bark. These types of static production rules do not allow 
for dynamic performances from the agents.  Although adaptive behaviour may not have 
been the basis for these types of agents, it makes the transition of these architectures into 
other domains difficult.  For example, given the aforementioned production rule involving 
the angry dog and the bowl, this implies that the bowl taken away is a bad action and if the 
dog is already angry then its behaviour should be to bark angrily thus signalling to the user 
the dog is displeased.  However, it could be possible through the experiences of such an 
agent that the bowl taken away action becomes a good action and therefore, the production 
rule would no longer apply. 
To overcome this type of problem, the EMAI architecture does not include a set of 
production rules but instead implements an Affective Space that associates emotional 
assessments to all concepts known to the agent.  The agents emotional assessment of a 
concept is dynamic and changes as the agent gains experience through interaction with the 
concept.  This emotional assessment is then coupled with the agents mood in order to 
determine an appropriate behaviour.  To remove the difficulty of using judgments based on 
emotions as appraisal dimensions another psychological theory was sought that eliminated 
such decisions. The six-dimensional appraisal model proposed by Smith and Ellsworth in 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985) was chosen for this task.15 This model proposes six cognitive 
appraisal dimensions by which to differentiate emotional experiences and will be 
introduced in the next section. 
Another problem with the previous emotional agent models is the use of gauge like 
mechanisms for modelling individual emotions (Reilly 1996, El-Nasr 1998, Padgham and 
Taylor 1997, Velasquez 1998).  These gauges must be individually added to the agent, one 
                                                   
15
 Other appraisal theories exist that present the analysis of emotion using a multidimensional (Scherer 1982, 
Roseman 1990).  While the Affective Space is designed such that other appraisal dimensions can be used, 
empirical data for Smith and Ellsworth’s model was readily available. 
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for each emotion, and their own set of production rules and integrative programming 
incorporated into the existing agent.  The Affective Space created from the six-dimensional 
appraisal model overcomes this problem as all emotions are integrated into the Affective 
Space and do not require individual sets of production rules to determine behaviour.  They 
are not represented as gauges but rather as single locations or points within the space. 
The appraisal theory chosen needs to be complex enough to include emotional blending 
and pliable enough to allow the creation of different personalities.  The six-dimensional 
appraisal model utilises the assessment of physical characteristics rather than emotional or 
nonspecific assessment criteria.  This model is not concerned with emotions of others but 
rather an assessment of an event. The model implemented in the EMAI architecture allows 
an EMAI agent to make an emotional decision about the performance of future behaviours. 
Using this emotion-based assessment the agent can change its emotional state on the 
execution of a behaviour. 
8.2 Six Dimensions of Appraisal 
Smith and Ellsworth's experimentation and analysis outlined in (Smith and Ellsworth 
1985), identifies six orthogonal dimensions: pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, 
attentional activity, responsibility and control, across 15 emotions: happiness, sadness, 
anger, boredom, challenge, hope, fear, interest, contempt, disgust, frustration, surprise, 
pride, shame and guilt.  
In the previous chapter, the value of intention was used to make a one-dimensional 
assessment of a situation.  This appraisal dimension merged a rating on a scale from good 
to bad with a rating on a scale from likely to unlikely.  Although, the dimension of 
intention does not appear in the six dimensions mentioned above, the ratings are still used 
and therefore, the premise of intention still exists in the multi-dimensional model.  The 
dimension of pleasantness is synonymous with the good to bad scale and the dimension of 
certainty is synonymous with the likely to unlikely scale.  Figure 8.1 displays two of the 
orthogonal dimensions (pleasantness and control) and where the 15 emotional states 
positioned with respect to them16.  There is no particular reason why these dimensions were 
chosen for display except that the pure emotion points are spread most across the 
                                                   
16
 The shape and colour of the emotional point markers are immaterial in this plot. 
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pleasantness axis.  This illustration will be used in Chapter 9 to demonstrate the EMAI 
architectures computational operations on emotional states. The empirical values for the 
positions of the pure emotions comes from Smith and Ellsworths original study (Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985)17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The values of the pure emotion points (as determined by Smith and Ellsworth (1985)) 
for each of the 15 emotional states in the model are shown in Table 8.1. 
EP P R C A E O 
Happiness -1.46 0.09 -0.46 0.15 -0.33 -0.21 
Sadness 0.87 -0.36 0 -0.21 -0.14 1.51 
Anger 0.85 -0.94 -0.29 0.12 0.53 -0.96 
Boredom 0.34 -0.19 -0.35 -1.27 -1.19 0.12 
Challenge -0.37 0.44 -0.01 0.52 1.19 -0.2 
Hope -0.5 0.15 0.46 0.31 -0.18 0.35 
Fear 0.44 -0.17 0.73 0.03 0.63 0.59 
Interest -1.05 -0.13 -0.07 0.7 -0.07 0.41 
Contempt 0.89 -0.5 -0.12 0.08 -0.07 -0.63 
Disgust 0.38 -0.5 -0.39 -0.96 0.06 -0.19 
Frustration 0.88 -0.37 -0.08 0.6 0.48 0.22 
Surprise -1.35 -0.97 0.73 0.4 -0.66 0.15 
Pride -1.25 0.81 -0.32 0.02 -0.31 -0.46 
Shame 0.73 1.13 0.21 -0.11 0.07 -0.07 
Guilt 0.6 1.13 -0.15 -0.36 0 -0.29 
Table 8.1  Mean Locations of Emotional Points as Compiled in Smith and Ellsworths Study 
                                                   
17
 Note: Though the empirical location of the emotional states shown in Figure 8.1 are the result of Smith and 
Ellsworth's original study, it is possible that other studies could locate these states in different quadrants. For 
example, it is possible in other contexts to locate surprise in the unpleasant region. 
Figure 8.1  Empirical Location of Emotional States with Respect to the Pleasantness and Control 
Dimensions 
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The points are the mean position of the emotional state within the Affective Space as 
collected from 16 participants (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  As each humans individual 
perspective on an emotion and a situation are different, it would be incorrect to conclude 
that emotional state points be equally positioned for all people.  From this it is assumed 
that an Affective Space can be calibrated for an individual, thus producing a personality 
perspective on how each of the six dimensions affects that person and triggers different 
emotional states. 
The term Affective Space has been coined in this dissertation to describe this space. Due 
to the continuous nature of the space with further research it would be possible to pinpoint 
the location of an infinite number of emotions. It could also be done without the need to 
add further variables, gauges or dimensions to the model (as would be the case with 
previously mentioned models). 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) selected the appraisal dimension from a larger group of 
appraisals that has been previously identified in popular appraisal theories.  The appraisal 
dimensions chosen were those, which presented themselves during investigation, as the 
most highly correlated with emotional states within the set of human subjects examined.  
These dimensions will now be defined with respect to their use in the EMAI architecture. 
8.3 Analysis of Appraisal Dimensions 
The six appraisal dimensions are orthogonal, and no single emotion can be identified 
without taking into account each of these six appraisal dimensions. Each of these 
dimensions will now be reviewed. 
Pleasantness.  This dimension relates to an individuals expression of liking or 
disliking towards an event, object or another agent.  This is the scale that is referred to in 
the Theory of Reasoned Action as attitude.  For the purposes of the EMAI architecture, 
this traditional definition of pleasantness is quite vague and meaningless in the assessment 
of an element by an artificial being.  Whether or not the agent finds something pleasing or 
displeasing could be programmed directly into the agent.  However, this would defeat the 
purpose of building an agent capable of adapting its assessment of this dimension.  For 
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example, the agent should be able to find an element pleasing at one moment and 
displeasing at another as a result of a negative experience.   
An EMAI agent assesses and updates the pleasantness dimension as an assessment of a 
task event and its outcome.  If the agent fails to complete a task the pleasantness dimension 
is decreased in value. If the agent experiences success in relation to a task, the pleasantness 
dimension is increased in value. 
Responsibility.  This dimension correlates with an individuals sense of personal 
involvement and amount of blame or credit attributed towards the self when interacting 
with an event, object or another agent.  The two extremes of measure are self-
responsibility and others-responsibility.  In the EMAI architecture, responsibility is a 
measure of the agents relationship and attachment toward an event element. Note the 
agents attachment towards an event element should not be measured in terms of emotional 
attachment. Rather it should be measured in terms of other forms of attachment like how 
long the agent has had the item, how much it cost, what is the agents relationship within 
the event elements, and so on.  For example, the agent will calculate a high responsibility 
for an object where the agent considers it has ownership over it.  More precisely, if the 
agent were in a team situation and within the team there were different ranks (for example, 
team leader, second in charge and third in charge), and the team was performing some task 
and the task failed then the team leader would feel most responsible, the second in charge 
less responsible and so on through the ranks.  
Effort.  The values along this dimension are gauged from an agents exertion with 
respect to an event, object or another agent, either mental or physical.  In the EMAI 
architecture, effort is a function of the depletion of resources used when interacting with an 
object or performing an event divided by the length of time spent interacting. For an EMAI 
agent, at the beginning of performing an event the agent's physical state is recorded.  
During the event, the agent's physical state may be affected by the elements in the event 
space.  At the completion of an event, the change in the agent's physical state is used to 
calculate effort.  For example, if the agent were to perform the task of digging a hole, 
during the execution of the event the agent's physical state may deteriorate because the 
agent may get tired and hungry.  When the agent finished digging the hole, the change in 
tiredness and hunger during the task performance will be directly related to the effort 
involved in the event. 
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Attention.   This dimension is the rating of an individuals regard for an event element 
(that is an event, an object or other agent) with respect to the level of concentration exerted 
towards it during interaction. Each element has an associated value indicating the level of 
attention required to successfully accomplish the task. All EMAI agents are programmed 
with a maximum attention capacity, and each of these agents can perform one or more 
tasks, that utilise its maximum capacity.  In EMAI, attention is measured as the total 
amount of an agents attention that is utilised in performing one or more events 
concurrently.  For example, consider an EMAI agent that is programmed with maximum 
capacity value of 100 units, and the following three events that may be performed 
concurrently by an agent: drive car, eat ice cream and drink coffee.  The drive car event 
may have associated with it an attention value of 70 units, the eat ice cream event may 
utilise 40 units and the drink coffee event may have attached to it a value of 20 units.  Here, 
if this agent has decided to drive car, then it can only perform either eat ice cream or drink 
coffee, but not these two at the same time. 
Control.  This dimension refers to an agents authority to manipulate and direct an 
event, object or another agent. Examining the relationship of the agent toward the entities 
involved in an event, including the assessment of past episodes of these events and their 
outcomes, assesses control in the EMAI architecture. Each EMAI agent is initially 
programmed with its control value over other elements as 0. Over time, as an EMAI agent 
evolves, its control values toward another element (such as an event, an object or another 
agent) changes (either increases, or decreases) according to the outcome of event 
processing.  Almost always there will be one or more elements involved in an event. So 
initially, the EMAI agents control over this event is 0, and the control over each of the 
individual elements involved in this event is also 0.  Based on the outcome of this event 
(that is, success or failure), the control of the agent towards each of the elements involved 
in the event will be either increased by 1 if the event is successful or reduced by 1 
otherwise. The overall control over the event is then the average of the control over each 
individual element in the event. For example, assume that an agent is driving a car on the 
Princes Highway from Sydney to Melbourne. Here, there are four elements involved in this 
event. They are: the car, the Princes Highway, the source city Sydney, and the destination 
city Melbourne. Initially, the control the agent has over these four elements is 0. Now, 
assuming that this event was successful, the agent will increment the control value of each 
of these elements by 1, and calculate the overall control value towards this event to be the 
average control over all the elements in the event. In this case, it will be 1 ((1+1+1+1)/4). 
Further, assume the agent now performs the same event successfully at another time. Now, 
its control over each of the elements will be increased by 1, and the overall control towards 
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the event will be 2. But, if on the third trip, the agent drives the car along Pacific Highway 
from Sydney to Brisbane, the initial control over Sydney and car is 2, respectively, but the 
control over Pacific Highway and Brisbane is 0, respectively. So, the overall control over 
this event will be 1 ((2+2+0+0)/4). If this event was successful, the overall control will be 
2 ((3+3+1+1)/4). 
Certainty.  This dimension refers to an individuals assessment of an event, object or 
person as to the reliability that its outcomes or behaviours can be predicted.  This is 
calculated in an EMAI agent by considering the degree of success or failure the agent has 
had in executing past episodes of similar events. For example, if the agent has carried out 
50 attempts at driving from Sydney to Melbourne on the Princes Highway, and it 
succeeded in 30 of its attempts, and failed the other 20, then the certainty of success on the 
51st attempt will be 0.6 and the certainty of failure will be 0.4. 
To summarise, of all the dimensions the dimension of pleasantness is by far the most 
dominant.   As can be seen in Figure 8.1, emotions lie near both extremes of the 
pleasantness axis. However, as many emotional states such as frustration and contempt 
have similar assessments in the dimension, as was mentioned previously, pleasantness 
alone cannot be used to distinguish between the emotions. 
Measuring the spread of values of the emotional points (shown in Table 8.1) can 
identify the weight of effect that a dimension has on an emotion.  Based on the values 
collected by Smith and Ellsworth (1985), the influence of each dimension listed from most 
to least dominant would be: pleasantness, responsibility, effort, attention, control and 
certainty. 
The Affective Space, Φ, is defined as a six-dimensional space occupied by points that 
ascertain the current emotional state of the agent. The emotion that is closest to this point is 
the most influential emotion in the agent.   The following formalisation of the Affective 
Space appears in (Baillie and Lukose 2001b). Each emotional state is a point, Ω, in that 
space defined by a six point coordinate based on the attitudinal value of the six cognitive 
appraisals toward an event, object or another agent. Ω can be defined as: 
Ω = {P, E, C, A, R, O}                                               8.1 
where P, E, C, A, R and O are the six appraisal dimensions of pleasantness, effort, 
certainty, attention, responsibility and control, respectively. Each of these values is 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  143 
determined by the analyses given earlier in this section.  From these descriptions the 
following equations have been formulated.   
Pleasantness, P, is the average summation of the rating of pleasantness the agent has 
given to an element or event each time the agent has come into contact with it: 
m
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= ∑
=
           8.2 
where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element e and pe is 
the pleasantness rating of e. For example, assume the agent has driven the same car five 
times.  The first time the car performs as expected and the agent is pleased with the car.  In 
this first instance the agent may set the pleasantness rating to 8 on a scale from 1 to 10 
where 1 is unpleasant and 10 is very pleasant. The second time the agent drives the car it 
breaks down.  For this instance the agent rates the pleasantness of the car as 2. For the next 
three contacts with the car the agent rates the pleasantness as 2, 7 and 9.  After these five 
contacts with the car, the agent, using Expression 8.2 assesses the overall pleasantness 
rating of the car to be (8+2+2+7+9)/5 which equates to 5.6.  
Effort, E, is the averaged summation of the effort associated with an element or event 
each time the agent has been in contact with it: 
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where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element e, and f is 
the amount of effort involved with e.  
Certainty, C is calculated by determining the probability of success for the agents 
involvement with an element or event.  Given that S is a function that returns the number 
of times that e has been used by or involved with the agent for a successful event, C can be 
calculated as: 
meSC /)(=                      8.4 
where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element e.  
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Attention, A, is determined by averaging the summation of all the attention ratings the 
agent has assigned to an element or event.  Each time the agent has an involvement with 
the element or event, the agent records how much concentration was exerted during the 
encounter and uses these values to calculate A: 
me
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=
         8.5 
where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element e, and a is 
the amount of attention required by the agent when involved with e. 
Responsibility, R, is calculated using the function r that returns the level of 
responsibility related to an element or event.  The function works by determining the 
nature of the relationship between the agent and e.  For example, it the agent were the 
owner of or in charge of e, r(e) would return a high value.  Responsibility is calculated as 
follows: 
)(erR =         8.6 
In Expression 8.6, the average of the summation of r(e) is not considered because the 
assumption that is adopted in this dissertation is that the responsibility an agent has 
towards an element or event does not change over time.  Although it is not believed this is 
the case in the real world, the issue of responsibility is complex and has many influencing 
factors. As this model is already complex enough, a dynamic responsibility element will 
not be explored. 
The final dimension, Control, O, is calculated by averaging the summation of the 
amount of control the agent has had over an element or event during every encounter the 
agent has had with the element or event: 
        me
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                            8.7 
where m is the number of times the agent has come in contact with the element e, and o is 
the amount of control the agent had over e. 
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The values of these six dimensions form the foundation for describing the emotional 
aspects of an event.  Combined, they form an Affective Space. 
8.4 Assigning an Emotional State 
In the EMAI architecture an emotional state can be assigned to any item be it an event 
element, an event or a plan.  By assessing an item using the six appraisal dimensions a six 
coordinate point can be determined.  This point, when plotted in the Affective Space can 
be compared to the 15 pure emotion points that exist within. 
For any item, i, an Ωi value can be determined that represents the emotional state 
evoked by the item.  The Pi, Ei, Ci, Ai, Ri and Oi values are calculated for an item using the 
appraisal methods explained in Section 8.3.  The representation for Ωi is shown in 
Expression 8.8 and will be further discussed in Chapter 9. 
},,,,,{ ORACEP iiiiiii =Ω                          8.8 
Given Ωi  for an item, the emotional state can be deduced, for the purpose of expression 
in natural language, by determining the distance that Ωi is from each of the 15 pure 
emotion points.  To do this a simple linear distance function is applied.  While more 
complex distance functions could be implemented and examined, for simplicity this will 
not be examined further in this investigation of the EMAI architecture. 
To determine a word that best describes the emotion point of Ωi the distance between 
the items emotional state point and each of the pure emotions (Ω1Ω15) is calculated 
using Expression 8.9. 
)()()()()()( 222222 OORRAACCEEPP jijijijijiji
i
−−−−−−∆ +++++=Ω   8.9 
where 15 values will be calculated for j = 1..15. The pure emotion for the item expressed 
as a written word, Emi, closest to Ωi is then determined by using Expression 8.10. 
))(min(_
15
1
U
=
∆Ω= ji inameemotionEm                  8.10 
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where the function min returns the pure emotion point in closest proximity to Ωi and the 
function emotion_name converts the pure emotion point into a string. 
For example, assume an item with an emotional state point of                             
Ωi =[15, 87, 35, -30,10,-50].  To find the name of the emotion that best describes the 
items emotional state, the first step is to find the distance between this point and the 15 
pure emotion points in the Affective Space using Expression 8.9.  The results are shown in 
Table 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 8.2 that the pure emotion closest to the items emotional state 
is shame.  Therefore, the items emotional state is referred to as shame.  
8.5 Emotion Blending 
Emotion blending is a concept devised by psychologists such as Plutchik (see Section 
2.2.3) where it is stated that there exist several basic emotions and that more complex 
emotions can be created by blending different combinations of the basic emotions.  The 
problem with any emotion synthesis in affective computing will be in determining which 
emotions when blended together produce other emotions.  In affective agent architectures 
such as Em (Reilly 1996) and PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998) emotions are represented by 
individual variables or gauges within the architecture.  The problem occurs when the 
gauges need to be coordinated.  This requires complex programming within the agent to 
Emotion ∆Ω 
happiness 2.08 
sadness 2.22 
anger 2.18 
boredom 2.15 
challenge 1.59 
hope 1.46 
fear 1.70 
interest 2.11 
contempt 1.68 
disgust 1.74 
frustration 1.93 
surprise 2.68 
pride 1.64 
shame 0.80 
guilt 0.84 
Table 8.2 Distance Between Item’s Emotional State and Pure Emotions in Affective Space 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  147 
describe the relationships that exist between the individual variables.  For example, if two 
variables existed where one represented a level of happiness and the other sadness, the 
agent would have to be programmed in a way that made certain the agent was not 
experiencing pure happiness and pure sadness at the same time.   The more emotions 
represented within the architecture, the more individual variables that would exist and the 
more complex the relationships between them. 
The EMAI architecture eliminates the need for defining the complex relationships and 
programming coordination between emotion state variables because of the nature of the 
Affective Space.  The relationships that exist between the pure emotions of the Affective 
Space are simply defined by the distance between them along each of the six appraisal 
dimensions.  Rather than having individual variables that represent the emotions integrated 
into the architecture and using these same variables to record the strength of the emotion of 
the agent, the EMAI architecture separates the two.  The 15 pure emotions are fixed points 
within the Affective Space.  They represent the relationship between the pure emotion and 
the appraisal dimensions but do not record the agents current emotional state (to be 
examined in Chapter 9) or the emotional state of any assessed item (as determined in the 
previous section).  The emotional state of an item or the agent is separate from each pure 
emotion.  Because of this representation, theoretically, an infinite number of pure emotions 
could be added to the architecture with very little effort.  Furthermore, as the emotional 
state point for an item (or the agent) is independent of the pure emotion points, the value 
for the emotional state point can freely change and not affect the pure emotion points.   
Although discrete points within the Affective Space represent the pure emotions, they 
exist within an affective continuum.  Unlike the other affective agent architectures that 
model pure emotions as discrete values with complex rules for blending these values, the 
Affective Space defines blended emotions as the space that exists between the pure 
emotion points.  While the emotional state for an item may fall close to the proximity of a 
pure emotion within the Affective Space, most often it will not fall exactly at the same spot 
as a pure emotion.   
The location of the emotional state point for the item represents a blended emotional 
state.  For example, an emotional state point that has a distance of 2.15 from the point of 
pure happiness and 2.15 from the point of pure surprise will represent a blended emotion 
with equal parts of happiness and surprise.  Such a state would be described as surprised 
happiness.  Table 8.3 displays the results of blending equal parts of two of the 15 pure 
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emotion points with each other.  Where the blended value falls close to another pure 
emotion point the name of this emotion is used to describe the blended state. 
The way in which emotional states are blended together is defined and examined in 
detail in Chapter 9. 
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Table 8.3 Resultant Emotions from Blending Pure Emotions 
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8.6 Emotional State Decay 
The same characteristics of the Affective Space that allow for a natural emotion 
blending process also address the issue of emotional state decay.  Emotional decay is the 
mechanism by which an agent that is experiencing an emotional state will, overtime, begin 
to have the strength of that emotional state reduced.  This ensures the agent does not stay 
in the same emotional mood constantly.  Contemporary affective agent models (PETEEI 
(El-Nasr 1998), Em (Reilly 1996), Silas (Blumberg 1996), Yuppy (Velasquez 1999)) 
address the issue of emotional state decay using decay rate functions.  Because these 
models represent emotions and their associated strengths as individual variables, emotional 
decay must be dealt with manually.  This means coordinating the rate of decay of an 
emotion variable with other emotion variables.  For example, an agent that is experiencing 
happiness, will need to have the value of the happiness variable decreased as the value of 
the variable representing sadness is increased, otherwise the agent will be experiencing 
two opposing emotions at the same time. 
As the Affective Space is a continuous multi-dimensional space and the pure emotions 
are segregated from the affects of an emotional state point mapped into the space, the 
decaying of emotional states is not necessary. A single point in the Affective Space 
represents an emotional state.  If the point is in proximity to a pure emotion, the emotional 
state point is assigned that emotion name.  The closer the emotional state point is to a pure 
emotion, the stronger the emotion being experienced.  The closest that an emotional state 
point can get to the pure emotion is to be positioned at the exact same location in the 
Affective Space as the pure emotion. When the emotional state of the item being assessed 
changes, the position of the emotional state point in the Affective Space also changes. 
Therefore, the emotional state point for the assessed item cannot be experiencing two 
opposing emotional states at the same time.  For example, an item cannot be assessed as 
being in an emotional state of pure happiness if the emotional state point is close to pure 
sadness.  
  The Affective Space, by its very nature, generates naturally decaying emotions 
without any extra programming or coordination effort.  Figure 8.2 illustrates the strength of 
emotion associated with the emotional state point of an item as the emotional state point 
moves along the appraisal dimension axis of pleasantness from the values of pleasant to 
unpleasant.  As can be seen, when the emotional state point for the item is at its most 
pleasant, the strength of the emotion happiness is the greatest.  This is because the point 
for the pure emotion of happiness is closest to the pleasantness axis at the pleasant end.  As 
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the emotional state point moves from the left to the right in the graph in Figure 8.2 the 
strength of the happiness emotion with respect to the items emotional state point reduces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note as Koestler did (see Section 2.2) that a pure emotion is never 
experienced.  Although the EMAI architecture uses the name of the pure emotion point 
closest to an items emotional state point to describe the emotion associated with the item, 
it will still contain amounts of the other 15 emotions.  Wherever an emotional state point is 
placed in the Affective Space, it can never be infinitely far away from any of the pure 
emotions and therefore, they all have an influence on the emotional state point. 
8.7 Summary 
The Affective Space, introduced in this chapter, is a new and unique concept in the 
domain of affective computing.  Due to its multi-dimensional and continuous structure it 
eliminates the need for several time consuming and complex programming tasks that are 
necessary in other affective agent models (PETEII (El-Nasr 1998), Em (Reilly 1996), Silas 
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Figure 8.2 The Strength of Each Pure Emotion with Respect to an Emotional State Point Moving Along the 
Pleasantness Axis through the Affective Space. 
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(Blumberg 1996) and Yuppy (Velasquez 1999)).  These include emotion state assignment, 
emotion blending and emotion state decay. 
The EMAI architecture allows an agent to determine the emotion of an event element, 
event or plan by assessing the appraisal dimensions to determine the items emotional state 
and then comparing this value with the pure emotions that exist within the Affective Space.  
The pure emotion closest in proximity to the assessment items emotional state is said to be 
how the item makes the agent feel. 
As initially discussed in Chapter 2, emotions are a strong factor in determining the 
decision that a human-like agent will make.  This concept is also important in the EMAI 
architecture where an agent can make decisions based on how it feels and how items or 
events will make it feel.  This is the basis for the multi-dimensional appraisal model for 
affective decision making and is discussed in the next chapter. 
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9. Multi-Dimensional Affective Decision Making 
Everyone should carefully observe which way his heart draws him,                  
and then choose that way with all his strength.  
- Hasidic Saying 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the concept of affective decision making using multi-dimensional 
appraisals is examined.  In Chapter 7 a single-dimensional appraisal was used in decision 
making about the ordering of plans in the event space.  The dimension used was intention.  
While the case studies reviewed in Chapter 7 give favourable results for creating human-
like decision making mechanisms for choosing among behaviours the applications for 
creating human-like personalities and learning from complex affective states are limited.  
Choices are essentially rated as liked or disliked.  This one-dimensional scale gives very 
limited scope for distinguishing the effects of complex emotional states on decision 
making.  For example, on the scale of liked to disliked it might be quite simple to say the 
emotion happy exists on one end of the scale and sadness on the other end.  However, 
where would the emotions of surprise and anger fit on the scale?  Anger may be a disliked 
emotion like sadness but the way in which they differ cannot be determined on a one-
dimensional scale.  Furthermore, the one-dimensional appraisal model presented in 
Chapter 7 does not allow the agent to update its beliefs about an event based on anything 
more than whether the event was successful or not.  An event that was executed 
successfully may have also been quite strenuous and therefore, not rated as a liked activity.  
In this case, although the event was successful, the agent may not want to perform it again 
and therefore, the agents intention toward the event needs to fall appropriately.  This 
cannot be achieved with a one-dimensional model (Baillie and Lukose 2002). 
To these ends, this chapter further examines the Affective Space described in Chapter 8 
and illustrates its use in providing a multi-dimensional model of affective decision making.  
9.2 Event Space Appraisal 
The multi-dimensional affective decision making model of the EMAI agent uses an 
emotional prioritising procedure to select behaviours.  This process occurs in the 
Deliberate Area (see Chapter 3) where the agent schedules all events for execution.  
However, before the prioritising can begin, an event must be assigned an emotion.  The 
emotion assigned to the event is calculated by considering the agents emotional responses 
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to each of the elements in the event space. As defined in Chapter 6, an event E is made up 
of a set of actions a, a set of objects o, occurs at a time t, and has context c, as in 
Expression 9.1: 
},,,{ tcoaE =                                                   9.1 
For each element e, in an event E, the emotional state, Ωe is defined as Expression 9.2: 
},,,,,{ ORACEP eeeeeee =Ω                        9.2 
Based on the outcome of event E, the agent will assign a weighting w, to the emotional 
state of each of the elements, e.  As the weighting of an element and resulting emotional 
state with respect to an event are dynamic, the time, t, at which the emotional state is being 
calculated must also be taken into consideration. Therefore, the emotional state resulting 
from an event E, written as Ω tE ,  is calculated as Expression 9.3: 
∑ ΩΩ
=
=
n
e
tetetE w
1
,,,              9.3 
where n is the number of elements associated to event E, and   
and  
Once an event has been completed, each of the elements involved in the event have 
their emotional states updated with respect to the change in the emotional state of the agent 
(or the agents mood) evoked by the outcome of the event, ΩO,t+1.  ΩO,t+1 represents the 
emotional state of the agent after an event has occurred where O  stands for the outcome 
emotion and t+1 is the time at which the event ended.   This value is not the same as the 
emotional state assigned to the event after it has been executed.  This is calculated later in 
this section. 
A change in the emotional state of the agent occurs when the values for each of the 
appraisal dimensions ( P, E, C, A, R, O ) are updated during and after an event.  While each 
of six appraisal values of an individual element involved in the event influence how these 
values are changed for the agents emotional state, the final emotional state cannot be 
∑
=
=
n
e
ew
1
110 ≤≤ we
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determined before the event occurs.  The agent can only speculate.  For example, an event 
the agent believes will make the agent happy may fail during execution, may take longer to 
complete than initially thought or may require extra effort.  These factors would change the 
values of the appraisal dimensions independently of any influence over these values by the 
elements of an event or the event itself.  The resulting emotional state in this example may 
be sad rather than the expected happy.  Therefore, ΩO,t+1 cannot be calculated by 
combining the appraisal dimensions of the elements of an event, but can only be 
determined after the event has been executed.  Only then can an analysis of the appraisal 
dimensions take place. This would include values from the appraisal dimensions of the 
elements in the event and also takes into consideration changes in the agents physical and 
mental states.  The new emotional state of the agent is used to update the values of the 
appraisal dimensions for each of the event elements. The agent attributes a change in its 
emotional state to be the result of the event and therefore, updates the emotional state of 
the event and its elements accordingly. 
The change in the emotional state of an event is calculated using Expression 9.4: 
ΩΩ∆ −= +Ω tEtO ,1,     9.4 
After this has been calculated the emotional states for each element in the event set can 
be updated as Expression 9.5: 
∆ΩΩ Ω++ += w tetete 1,,1,        9.5 
Instead of the element taking on the final emotional state of the event, the previous 
emotional state of the element is taken into account along with the effect the element had 
in the resulting emotional state for the event.  If the events resulting emotional state is the 
same as its initial state and we,t = we,t+1 then the emotional state for the element will not 
change.   
For example, assume an event E with two elements A and B. At the beginning of the 
event, elements A and B both have emotional states of happiness18, that is: 
                                                   
18
 Values have been scaled up by a factor of 100 purely for illustrative purposes. 
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 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
,
,
=
=
Ω
Ω
tB
tA  
and weightings of 0.2 and 0.8 respectively, thus: 
0.8
2.0
 
 
,
,
=
=
w
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tA
 
This would result in the emotional state for the event before execution as: 
21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- -146,[
21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,0.8  21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- -146,[2.0
,,,,,
=
×+×=
+= ΩΩΩ tBtBtAtAtE ww
 
In other words, a happy event.  Assuming that after the event has occurred, the outcome 
results in an emotional state of happiness and A and B are still weighted the same then both 
A and B can be updated using Expression 9.5 as shown below. 
 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
21])- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,- 
21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- 0.8([-146,  21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,(
)(
 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
21])- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,- 
21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- 0.2([-146,  21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,(
)(
,1,1,,1,
,1,1,,1,
=
+=
−+=
=
+=
−+=
ΩΩΩΩ
ΩΩΩΩ
+++
+++
tEtOtBtBtB
tEtOtAtAtA
w
w
 
When the same events emotional state needs to be calculated in the future it will again 
be evaluated, using Expression 9.8, to be happy.  However, if the final emotional state of 
the event changes from its initial state, the emotional states for the elements will change. 
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For example, imagine the same event is to occur again.  This time the elements A and B 
are weighted initially as before (0.2 and 0.8 respectively) but after the event the emotional 
state is sad and the weightings of A and B are now 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.  Figure 9.1 
graphically represents the elements A and B and the event E before execution with a vector 
representing the change in emotional state of the agent (the agents mood) after the 
execution of the event E. 
 
 
 
 
Given the new emotional state of E and the weighting of A and B after the event, the 
new emotional states for A and B can be calculated as: 
]2.82,18,6.6,6.73,6.21,2.6[
3.2]1.6,-27,104,-27.6,-2[139.8,11. 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
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]8.47,9,6,4.64,4.25,8.58[
68.8] 18,- 14.4,- 18.4,- 7.6, [93.2,  21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
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ΩA 
ΩB 
Ω +1,tO = Sadness Ω tE , = Happiness 
Figure 9.1 Emotional State of Event Elements before Event Execution 
Ω tO ,
ΩA ΩB
Ω +1,tO = Sadness Ω tE , =Happiness 
Figure 9.2 Emotional State of Event Elements after Event Execution 
Ω tO ,
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Essentially, this moves the emotional point for each of the elements closer to the final 
emotional state for the event by using the weightings to add a portion of the vector from Et 
to Et+1 onto the emotional states for A and B.  The result is represented graphically in 
Figure 9.2. Once each element of the event has had its emotional state updated, the 
emotional state for the event itself is updated using the new values for A and B and 
Expression 6.15 thus: 
This results in a new emotional state that lies between the elements of A and B as 
shown in Figure 9.3. 
 
 
 
 
Once the agent has calculated the emotional points for each of the events and in turn 
each element involved in an event, the agent can use this emotional point in its affective 
decision-making process. 
9.3 Affective Decision Making  
As described in Chapter 3, the EMAIs decision-making procedure is twofold.  Firstly, 
the agent prioritises its behaviours by ordering events in the Deliberate Area based on the 
number of times an event has been triggered by a goal and thus representing the urgency of 
a event.  Secondly, the agent further orders the events by calculating the resulting 
emotional effect that performing the event will have on the agents emotional state.  
The agents emotional state is stored as a six-dimensional coordinate in the agents 
Emotional State Register (see Section 3.3.4).  This coordinate can be projected into the 
ΩA ΩB
Ω +1,tO = Sadness Ω tE , =Happiness 
Figure 9.3 Emotional State of Event after Event Execution 
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Ω tO,
68.44] 14.4,- 1.56,- 18.4,- 23.12,- -27.24,[
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Affective Space in the same way that an events affective coordinate can be projected into 
the space to determine an emotional state.  The agents emotional state  ΩEMAI is the result 
of weighing the importance of an event wE and summing the m number of resultant 
emotional points for all episodes of all events performed by the agent E and defined by 
Expression 9.6: 
∑ ΩΩ
=
=
m
E
EEEMAI w
1
    9.6 
where 10 ≤≤ wE and ∑
=
=
m
E
Ew
1
1               
  While the emotional state is stored internally as a six-dimensional coordinate, it can 
also be expressed as a word by calculating the distance of the emotional state from each of 
the 15 discrete emotion points as defined in Table 8.1 (see Chapter 8) and selecting the 
name of the discrete emotion to which EMAIs emotional state is closest. 
Given a number of events that have the same priority, the agent will select an event that 
will most likely update the agents emotional state to a more preferred emotional state.  For 
example, if the agent had two events of equal urgency from which to select,  the agent 
would further prioritise these events emotionally.  The agent calculates the emotional point 
for each event and then interpolates how this event, when performed, will update the 
agents emotional state.  If the agent would prefer to have an emotional state closer to 
happy it would select the event that would, when combined with its current emotional 
state, make the agent happy.  Of course, the agent cannot predict exactly how a task will 
influence its emotional state.  For example, a task that is calculated to make the agent 
happy, may fail during execution, the emotional point for this episode would shift and the 
effect on the agent would be different.  It could instead, result in an emotional state of 
angry. 
As it is impossible to visually represent in two dimensions this process in six 
dimensions, for the sake of explanation the emotional space will now be examined as a 
two-dimensional space with the dimensions of pleasantness and control as shown in 
Figure 9.4.  For this demonstration, the agents emotional state has been set close to happy. 
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Due to the discrete nature of the location of the emotional states within the Affective 
Space and as the agents current emotional state (mood) could be located anywhere within 
the space, it is unlikely the agents emotional state will commonly fit the exact location of 
an emotional state point.  For this reason, the distance from the agents emotional state to 
all of the emotional state points is calculated.  The emotional state point to which the 
agents mood is closest is assigned to the agent to be expressed as the agents current 
emotional state.  In Figure 9.4, the agents emotional state is not at the exact location of 
any of the emotional state points, but it is closest to happiness, therefore, the agent is said 
to be in a happy state or mood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 also shows the emotional location of two events (ΩE1 and ΩE2).  If these 
events have been given the same priority for execution, the agent needs to make an 
emotional decision about which event to execute.  One event is closest to the emotion 
challenge and the other is closest to anger.  The agent assesses each of the events by 
calculating how the execution of the event will influence the agents mood using 
Expression 9.7. The equation is the same as 9.6 except the agents mood and events are 
replacing the events and the event elements, respectively.  
∆ΩΩ Ω++ += EMAItEtEMAItEMAI w ,1,,1,                                         9.7 
Figure 9.4  Empirical Location of Emotional States with Respect to the Pleasantness and Control 
Dimensions Displaying Agent’s Mood (ΩEMA ) and Two Events’ States (Ω 1E ,Ω 2E ) 
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where wE,t+1 is the weighted influence that an event has on the agents mood and ∆Ω,EMAI is 
the difference between the agents current mood and the emotional state after event E. 
Returning to the example in Figure 9.4, if the agent is in a happy mood and the agent is 
programmed to prefer its state to be happy, then the agent will select the event that will 
keep itself closest to a happy mood.  In this example, if the emotional points of E1, with a 
weighted effect of 0.6, and E2, with a weighted effect of 0.4, are added to the agents 
current emotional state, the resulting state would be as shown in Figure 9.5 as ΩEMAI1 and 
ΩEMAI2.  By using a linear distance function19, the successful execution of the challenging 
event E1 would result in a mood closer to happiness than E2 would.  In this example the 
agent would select to execute E1 before executing E2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above example, the agent is making a choice based on its emotional perception of 
events as they have occurred in the past.  The agent can never be certain that when it 
executes an event it will be successful or the same values for the six appraisal dimensions 
will remain the same. For example, each time an episode of an event is executed, the six 
appraisal dimensions are reevaluated.  If the values for these dimensions remain the same, 
the emotional state associated with the event will not change.  However, if an event that 
has an emotional state of happiness results in an outcome of sadness then the emotional 
                                                   
19
 For the initial design of this architecture, a linear distance function has been chosen for simplicity.   Further 
investigations into this aspect of the model are needed to determine the best method for calculating 
emotional distances, however, this will not be explored here. 
Figure 9.5  Resultant Agent Moods Generated by Combining the Agent’s Current Mood 
(ΩEMA ) and Two Events’ States (Ω 1E ,Ω 2E ) 
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state of the event is updated to a value somewhere between the emotional states of 
happiness and sadness.  This is shown in the example of Figure 9.4.  This illustrates that 
although the agent can select an event based on how it predicts it will make it feel, once the 
event has been executed, how it actually changes the agents mood could be quite 
different.  This in turn updates the agents emotional perception of the event and its 
elements and is used in future affective decisions.   
9.4 Simulation of a Multi-Dimensional Affective Decision 
Making EMAI Agent 
9.4.1 Objective 
The objective of this simulation study is to evaluate the effectiveness of an EMAI 
Agent that is configured using the multi-dimensional affective decision making model 
described earlier in this chapter. This case study does not examine the complex behaviours 
of a dog nor attempt to explain the real emotions or goals of such an animal. The study is 
anthropomorphic20 in the sense that it evaluates a model for human emotion via a simplistic 
computerised character.  The same method of evaluation is used in Blumberg (1996) and 
El-Nasr (1998).  
The simulation will attempt to demonstrate the affective decision making process based 
on the multi-dimensional model. A detailed evaluation of the EMAI architecture, based on 
this Fido configuration is described in Chapter 10.   
9.4.2 Fidos Knowledge Area 
Ontology 
The Ontology is the very first component configured in an EMAI based agent like Fido. 
The Ontology is composed of the Goal Hierarchy, Type Hierarchy, Relation Hierarchy, 
Event Graphs, and Activity Digraphs. The Goal Hierarchy, Type Hierarchy and Relation 
Hierarchy are depicted in Figure 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8, respectively.  The Goal Hierarchy shown 
in Figure 9.6 illustrates Fidos goals and subgoals.  Beneath the ultimate goal, U, Fido has 
                                                   
20
 An interpretation of what is not human in terms of human or personal characteristics 
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three primary goals: EAT, PLAY and SLEEP.  These goals decompose into a number of 
subgoals, some which are AND-ed and some with are OR-ed.  As the goals are 
decomposed they become more specialised including specialist entities from the Type 
Hierarchy. The illustration in Figure 9.6 takes the Goal Hierarchy to third level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The decomposition of Fidos Goal Hierarchy goes beyond this, however as it is difficult 
to show the extent of the Goal Hierarchy to its most extreme decomposition in a diagram, 
Figure 9.6 Fido’s Goal Hierarchy 
Figure 9.7 Fido’s Type Hierarchy 
Figure 9.8 Fido’s Relation Hierarchy 
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the primitive subgoals are not included in the illustration.  Each of the lowest level 
subgoals shown can be specialised further with concepts from the Type Hierarchy as 
shown in Figure 9.7.  For example, the FIND FOOD goal can be decomposed into the 
subgoals of FIND BONE and FIND CHUM where the FOOD element of the goal is 
specialised using subtypes of the concept type FOOD from the Type Hierarchy.  
Furthermore, the EAT FOOD goal will decompose to the subgoals: EAT BONE and EAT 
CHUM; the FIND TOY goal will decompose to the subgoals: FIND PLANT, FIND 
TOWEL, FIND BALL and FIND SHOE, and so on. 
As there are 35 Event Graphs in this Ontology, they will not be listed here.  However, 
as an illustration, the Event Graph for FIND FOOD and the Activity Digraph for the EAT 
goal are shown below: 
 
The Event Graph for [FIND FOOD] is 
[FIND] – 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD: BONE] 
  (AGNT) -> [AGENT: FIDO] 
(TIM) -> [TIME: #now] 
  (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
 
Precondition: 
  [AGENT: FIDO]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD: BONE] 
Postcondition:  
[AGENT: FIDO]<-(POSS)->[FOOD: BONE] 
Delete List:  
[AGENT: FIDO]<-(AGNT)<-[ACCESS]->(OBJ)->[FOOD: BONE]  
 
The Activity Digraph for [EAT] is 
[FIND FOOD] -> (FBS) -> [EAT FOOD] 
Motivational Drive Generator 
Fidos Motivational Drive Generator consists of the EMAI architectures three drive 
mechanisms (Homeostatic, Cyclical and Default) and includes three Internal State 
Registers: hunger, fatigue and intrigue.  The hunger register depicts the agents need for 
food level, the fatigue register depicts the agents need for sleep and the intrigue register 
depicts the agents need for exercise.  Each register is periodically updated by the Cyclical 
Drive Mechanism at different rates.  For example, Fido will begin to feel hungry before it 
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feels sleepy.  The Homeostatic Drive Mechanism monitors the values of each register.  At 
certain threshold values, the Homeostatic Drive Mechanism sends an appropriate signal to 
the agents Sensory Processor to cause goal activation.  For example, when the hunger 
register reaches a particular high value the drive mechanism will inform the Sensory 
Processor that the agent is hungry and the Sensory Processor will activate a goal of EAT in 
the agents Goal Hierarchy. 
As it is possible for the agent to have no goals active, the Default Drive Mechanism is 
used to ensure the agent is never devoid of behaviour.  For the Fido agent, the Default 
Drive Mechanism monitors the values of the registers and determines when the agent is not 
active. When it finds the agent to be in such a state, the Default Drive Mechanism sends a 
message to the Sensory Processor indicating that a default goal should be triggered.  In the 
case of Fido, the default goal is SNIFF as shown in Figure 9.6. 
When the agent completes a behaviour in response to a triggered goal, the Sensory 
Processor receives external sensory data.  The sensory data is analysed by the Sensory 
Processor and if required passes relevant data onto the Homeostatic Drive Mechanism in 
order to update the values on the Internal State Registers.  For example, when the agent 
finishes the event associated with the EAT goal, the Sensory Processor will receive data 
that represents that the agent has eaten and how much it has eaten.  This data is passed to 
the Homeostatic Drive Mechanism so that it can reduce the agents hunger by reducing the 
value on the hunger register. 
Affective Space 
Fido's Affective Space is configured with 
15 pure emotion points from Smith and 
Ellsworth's experimentation (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985) as outlined earlier in Chapter 
8. The values of the emotion points from 
Smith and Ellsworth's original study have 
been scaled up by a factor of 100 purely for 
illustrative purposes. 
9.4.3 Fidos Interface 
Figure 9.9 The Fido Interface 
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A simple interface is set up for the Fido simulation.  The interface provides the user 
with the means to interact with the Fido agent as well as observe its behaviour, 
motivational urges and emotions.  The interface is shown in Figure 9.9. 
Motivational Urges 
The motivational urges section of the interface consists of three urge gauges.  These can 
be seen at the top of Figure 9.9.  These gauges are visual representations of the agents 
Internal State Registers: hunger, fatigue and intrigue. The registers are controlled by the 
simulation and the user can not adjust the values. 
Environmental Display 
The Environmental Display is the large black window in the center of the interface as 
shown in Figure 9.9.  In this area, an image of Fido is displayed.  The image and simple 
animations of Fido illustrate Fidos behaviours and emotions.  Along with the image of 
Fido, the environmental display also shows which items the user has placed in Fidos 
environment.  These are displayed as small individual icons. 
Simulation Narration 
The textbox under the Environmental Display (in Figure 9.9) contains a narration of the 
simulation.  This keeps a record of Fidos activities, his emotional states and the users 
interaction.  The user can use the scrollbar at the side to review their interactions with 
Fido. 
Tool Bar 
The tool bar consists of a series of buttons that sits below the simulation narrative 
textbox.  The first set of buttons allows the user to put items in and take items out of Fidos 
environment.  When the user adds an item to the environment, a corresponding icon will 
appear in the Environmental Display.  The second part of the tool bar is two buttons that 
control the running of the simulation.  The pause button allows the user to pause the 
simulation at anytime to review the narration and the start button initiates the simulation. 
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Discipline Buttons 
The final items on the Fido interface are the two large buttons that display a sad and a 
happy yellow face.  These buttons can be pressed by the user to inform Fido of whether or 
not he is bad or good.  The buttons can be pressed any number of times.  For example, if 
Fido is chewing the shoe, the user can click on the BAD DOG button several times to 
emphasize to Fido just how bad he is. 
Expressing Emotions 
As the assessment of Fido is carried out by an evaluator (who would assess FIDO's 
emotional behaviour), the interface needs to include a way of expressing Fido's emotional 
state. Figure 9.10 includes a series of gauges that represent the values of the Affective 
Space's six appraisal dimensions and the strength of Fido's emotional state with respect to 
the 15 pure emotions.  This interface clearly shows the agent's state with respect to the six 
appraisal dimensions of its Affective Space and the agent's emotional state.  The emotional 
state is presented as a series of 15 gauges, one for each pure emotion.  The higher the blue 
line on the gauge, the closer the agent's mood is to that pure emotion. 
After initial evaluations with the extended interface, it was found that the evaluators 
were not taking any notice of the gauges and insisted they provided too much information.  
Therefore, they have been hidden for the duration of the simulation presented in Chapter 
10. 
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The evaluators are able to determine the emotional state of Fido through the simulation 
narrative and the agent's animation.  A different animation sequence exists for each of the 
15 pure emotions as shown in Figure 9.11.  As the evaluators are evaluating the emotional 
behaviour of the Fido, they do not need to know about the complex internal workings of 
the architecture.  If Fido is to receive favourable feedback from its outward emotional 
behaviours, the evaluators need to determine if Fido is demonstrating reasonable emotional 
behaviour given the environment and Fido's motivations.  The internal workings of the 
agent need to be disguised.  If the EMAI architecture were used to generate an intelligent 
and believable character in a virtual environment, the external behaviour of the agent 
would have to be reasonable enough to create a suspension of disbelief in an onlooker.  
Making the internal computations visible to a viewer defeats this purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion Fido Animation Frames Emotion Fido Animation Frames 
Happiness 
 
Sadness 
 
Anger 
 
Boredom 
 
Challenge 
 
Hope 
 
Fear Interest 
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9.4.4 Fidos Affective Decision Making Process 
Fidos affective decision making process begins when any of the Internal State 
Registers of the Motivational Drive Generator reach their threshold values.  When the 
drive mechanism senses that an Internal State Register has reached a threshold value, they 
send appropriate signals to the Sensory Processor indicating the state of the agent.  The 
Sensory Processor determines the most suitable goal to activate in the agents Goal 
Hierarchy.  This goal is passed to the Event Space Generator where plans of behaviour are 
devised that will satisfy the agents goal. 
Before making a decision, the agent generates an event space for each choices that it 
can make.  From this event space, an emotional state is evoked based on the assessment in 
the six appraisal dimensions of the elements in the event space by using the action, object, 
time and context of the event.   Given the emotional states generated by each choice, the 
agent selects the event that it perceives will make it the happiest.  Happiness has been 
chosen as the value for the Fido agents Emotional State Bias Register. This of course 
could have been set to make the agent gravitate toward any emotion, preferred cognitive 
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state or any combination of these. However, for simulating a pet dog, it is envisaged that 
happiness would be an appropriate preferred emotional state.  
As the agent may have more than one goal active at any time, each goal is given a 
priority rating that is used by the agent to determine the urgency of the corresponding 
event. The priority rating of a goal is proportional to the value on the Internal State 
Register/s that triggered it (see Section 5.2.4).  When there exists a number of plans 
(represented as Activity Digraphs, refer to Section 4.3.2) for a particular goal, the agent 
uses its emotional decision making abilities to make a choice.  
Here is a typical simulation run of Fido.  Initially, all of Fidos goals are activated, one 
of which is the PLAY goal. The events that Fido determines will satisfy the PLAY goal are 
DIG HOLE, CHEW TOY and PLAY TOY.  The elements involved in each of these events 
are shown below. 
EDIG HOLE={DIG, GROUND} 
ECHEW TOY={CHEW, TOY} 
EPLAY TOY={PLAY, TOY} 
The Event Space Generator specialises these events using subtypes from the Type 
Hierarchy to produce the following events in the event space for the PLAY goal. 
EDIG HOLE={DIG, GROUND} 
ECHEW PLANT={CHEW, PLANT} 
ECHEW TOWEL={CHEW, TOWEL} 
ECHEW BALL={CHEW, BALL} 
ECHEW SHOE={CHEW, SHOE} 
EPLAY PLANT={PLAY, PLANT} 
EPLAY TOWEL={PLAY, TOWEL} 
EPLAY BALL={PLAY, BALL} 
EPLAY SHOE={PLAY, SHOE} 
At the beginning of a simulation, Fido will have no attitudes toward any of these events 
or there elements.  Therefore, the emotional state (Ω) for each will be calculated as shown 
below using the event PLAY BALL as an example.  In this example, it is assumed the 
weightings on objects are 0.8 and the weightings on actions are 0.2. 
 ,0][0,0,0,0,0
 ,0][0,0,0,0,0
,
,
=
=
Ω
Ω
tBALL
tPLAY  
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This would result in the emotional state for the PLAY event (calculated using 
Expression 9.6) before execution as: 
0]0,0,0,0,0,[
,0][0,0,0,0,00.8  0]0,0,0,0,0,[2.0
,,,,,_
=
×+×=
+= ΩΩΩ tBALLtBALLtPLAYtPLAYtBALLPLAY ww
 
The emotion closest to the emotional state of [0,0,0,0,0,0] is hope.  As all of the 
elements in the event space for PLAY have not been interacted with before, they will all 
have emotional states of hope and in turn so will the events of which they are a part.  
Therefore, when the agent comes to make a decision about which event to choose based on 
the one that will make the agent most happy each event is equally as capable of achieving 
this.  Assuming the agents current mood is happiness and the PLAY BALL event is 
weighted as 0.8, by using Expression 9.9 the agent will predict the outcome emotional state 
to be: 
 
( )
 4]- 2,  3,  9,- 7,- [-27,
17] 7,- 12,- 37, 26, [117,   21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
) 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,-,0][0,0,0,0,0(0.8   21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
,,_,_,1,
=
+=
×+=
−+= ΩΩΩΩ + tFIDOtBALLPLAYtBALLPLAYtFIDOtFIDO w
 
The predicted emotional state for Fido, ΩFIDO,t+1, is closest in the Affective Space to the 
emotion of happiness.  Therefore, the agent will predict that the PLAY BALL event will 
keep the agent in a happy state but with not as much strength as before as the predicted 
emotional state point is further away in proximity to the pure happiness point than the 
agents current mood. 
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If the weighting of the other events were also 0.3, the predictions of how they would 
make Fido feel (using the same calculation as above) would also result in Fido remaining 
happy.  However, if for example, the DIG HOLE event had a weighting of 0.9 the 
predicted emotional state would be: 
( )
 15]- 6, 10, 32,- 23,- [-102,
6] 3,- 5,- 14, 10, [44,   21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
) 21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,-,0][0,0,0,0,0(0.3   21]- 9, 15, 46,- 33,- [-146,
,,_,_,1,
=
+=
×+=
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Compared with 15 emotion points in the Affective Space, this value is also in closest 
proximity to the happiness pure emotion, however, it is further away from it than the 
emotional state determined by the PLAY BALL event.  The distance from the predicted 
outcome of PLAY BALL to happiness is 30.16 and the distance from the predicted 
outcome of DIG HOLE to happiness is 109.51.   Therefore, the agent would choose to 
perform the PLAY BALL event before the DIG HOLE event. 
In the situation where a stalemate occurs between competing events (when each 
predicted outcome is the same distance from happiness), it will not matter which event the 
agent selects and hence it uses a FIFO method for selection.  The event that is placed in the 
agents schedule first will be the one executed.   
Assuming that Fido selects the event PLAY BALL, the weighting remains at 0.8 and 
the actual21 resulting emotional state outcome of the event is frustration (for example, the 
ball is thrown and Fido can not find it), the new mood of the agent can be calculated using 
Expression 9.10 thus: 
                                                   
21
 The predicted emotional state outcome of an event is determined before the event is executed.  There can be 
no guarantee or way of calculating what the actual
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Although this point is not at the exact location of the point for pure frustration, 
compared with the other 15 emotion points, the agents new mood is closest to the pure 
frustration point and therefore, the agent is said to be feeling frustration.  After the event 
has occurred and the new agent mood has been determined, the agent updates the 
emotional states of the events and elements involved in the event.  This may or may not 
influence the emotional states of other events depending on overlapping elements.   
Depending on the outcome of the event (success or failure), the agent updates its 
Internal State Variables to reflect the associated behaviour that has taken place.  If the case 
occurs where an Internal State Variable is returned to a normal level inside the thresholds, 
the Homeostatic Drive Mechanism will send data to the Sensory Processor that will 
deactivate the associated goal.  The event space will subsequently be removed from the 
agents schedule. 
The next time a goal is triggered and the agent generates an event space, the updated 
values for the elements in the events (calculated after the agents last behaviour) are used 
in predicting the emotional state of the events. The affective decision making process 
begins again using emotional experiences gained from previous behaviour. 
The multi-dimensional affective decision making process implemented in the Fido 
agent, built upon the EMAI architecture, is evaluated in the next chapter. 
9.5 Summary 
As the one-dimensional model of affective decision making as examined in Chapter 7 
does not provide the necessary depth of representation needed to build a complex agent 
that can make decisions based on multiple appraisal dimensions, the Affective Space 
concept was included in the EMAI architecture and introduced in Chapter 8.   This chapter 
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described how the Affective Space is used for multi-dimensional affective decision making 
and belief revision in an artificial intelligence. 
This multi-dimensional approach to synthesising emotions in artificial beings is a 
powerful concept.  In a world where many decision-making situations have numerous 
outcomes with an equal quality of solution, this type of reasoning is imperative in humans.  
If attempts are to be made to produce artificial intelligences with this human-like 
mentality, the psychological theories of emotion need to be explored and implemented in 
artificial agent architectures and tested for human-like affective decision-making 
capabilities. 
In the case study presented in this chapter, an EMAI agent modelled a computer 
character called Fido and demonstrated the use of the Affective Space adapted from a 
model proposed by Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Fido was programmed to simulate the 
behaviours of a simple pet dog. The behaviours of a pet dog were chosen as most people 
would be able to identify with and have expectations of how a pet dog should behave as 
the behaviours and goals of a pet dog are simple.  The simulation presented in the case 
study examined how the Affective Space can be used to generate different emotional states 
within the agent and used in the affective decision-making process. 
The inclusion of such an Affective Space in the EMAI architecture has removed the 
need for static production rules in determining an emotional state for the agent and to assist 
in decision making.  The agent is able to assign emotional perceptions to events and 
elementary components of events and use these perceptions to make choices based on the 
agents mood and its prediction of how events will influence the agents current mood.  
During execution of events, the agent is also able to update its emotional perception of 
events and their elements as episodes of events succeed and fail.  This leads to a dynamic 
process within the agent that allows for emotional perceptions to change and in turn affect 
future decisions, something lacking in current emotional agent architectures. 
The next chapter presents an evaluation of Fido.  This simulation is presented to a 
number of human participants as an experiment in the evaluation of the EMAI 
architectures ability to generate reasonable emotional states and the use of these emotions 
for intelligent decision making. 
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10. Evaluation of the EMAI Architecture 
You cannot teach an old dog new tricks – W.Camden, Remaines Concerning Britaine, 1614. 
10.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters examined the central focus of the EMAI architecture: the 
Affective Space. This concept is used in an EMAI agent to produce multi-dimensional 
affective decision making capabilities. It allows an agent to make emotional assessments 
about elements and events for the purpose of using these evaluations in reasoning and 
decision making.  
The ability of the EMAI agent to make reasonable decisions and in turn produce 
reasonable behaviours based on emotional assessments is important (Baillie 2002).  Many 
of the previous models of emotional artificial intelligence (PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998), EM 
(Reilly 1996)) were used in the creation of computer based characters and assessed through 
user interaction.  Outward behaviour makes a character appear real and only by assessing 
this can the internal mechanisms be evaluated.  The EMAI architecture was designed with 
this emotional decision making in mind and therefore, the agents capability to use 
emotions as a basis for reasoning, decision-making and behaving is paramount.  The 
concepts of goals (Chapter 5), attitudes (Chapter 6) and an Affective Space (Chapter 8) 
have never before been integrated into an agent for the purpose of building an emotional 
artificial intelligence.  The extent to which the resulting architecture is emotionally 
intelligent is a question of evaluation by those who naturally have emotional intelligence, 
human beings. 
For the purpose of the evaluation, an EMAI agent is used to model a pet dog called 
Fido (see Section 9.4).  This is in keeping with the examples already used throughout this 
dissertation as well as providing the human evaluator with a familiar character with which 
to interact.  Pet dogs have been the characters of choice for other emotional agent 
evaluations (El-Nasr 1998) as a simple simulation of a pet dog can easily be constructed 
from a limited number of goals and events. Most people who evaluate the agents 
performance will have some idea and expectation about how a pet dog should act. 
This chapter describes the experimental procedures used in the evaluation of EMA, the 
results collected from the evaluator questionnaires and a discussion of the results. 
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10.2 Evaluation Technique 
While some studies have examined the most appropriate types of behaviours that 
should exist in domain dependent agents (Cohen et al. 1989, Pollack and Ringuette 1990,  
Hanks et al. 1993), little work has been done on the development of a general methodology 
for the holistic evaluation of agents.  One methodology that has been designed is that of 
Wallace and Laird (1999).  Their methodology evaluates an agents architecture based on 
the number of resources in terms of the amount of knowledge required to achieve a 
specified behaviour and the amount of time required to generate that behaviour.  Such a 
methodology may be appropriate for comparing and analysing complete agent 
architectures. However, it is not appropriate for evaluating the EMAI architecture because 
the EMAI architecture is incomplete and it represents a new architectural mechanism  for 
the generation and use of emotional states in decision-making. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to evaluate the emotional decision making abilities of the agent. 
The methodology for evaluation used by other researches in the affective computing 
domain (see Chapter 2) has been to implement a simple user interface that allows a user to 
interact with the agent either through natural language or point-and-click methods.  
Through interaction with the agent the user is able to evaluate, on a scale of reasonability, 
the emotions produced by the agent and in turn the behaviours exhibited by the agent.  The 
human evaluator is then asked to complete a questionnaire about their experience with the 
agent.  To ensure that each user is given the same chance to experience similar activities 
and interactions with the agent, the method of walk-through exercises (Baeker et al. 1995) 
is implemented.  Each exercise guides the user through an interaction with the agent.   
The primary use of these agent architectures has been in the development of believable 
artificial characters, either human or animal-like.  The aim in creating such artificial beings 
is for use in interactive fiction (computer games and virtual reality).  In this domain, the 
agent should produce performances that create a suspension of disbelief for the user.  To 
create this illusion the agent should be able to simulate emotion, motivation, and 
personality (Pisanich and Prevost 1996).  As the generation of motivation and emotion are 
the primary functions of the EMAI architecture, the same method of evaluation (as above) 
has been used.  
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10.3 Outline of Experimental Procedure 
The evaluation of the EMAI architecture was conducted using 18 volunteer evaluators 
who were asked to contribute between one and one and a half hours of their time for the 
evaluation of the software. The volunteers were recruited through a broadcast email to first 
year computer science students and staff members at the University of Southern 
Queensland. The evaluators included nine members of the public and nine first year 
university students. An introductory verbal explanation and walk-through of the EMAI 
agent interface was presented to each participant.  Evaluators were notified that their 
responses would be used to evaluate the design of the architecture from which the software 
was created and their feedback would be used to further enhance the design. 
The evaluators were given an instruction sheet that outlined the user interface and 
explained the function of each of the buttons, textboxes and gauges that appeared on the 
interface. Once each participant was clear on how the interface functioned, they were 
asked to begin the simulation of the pet dog Fido. The evaluators were given a set of five 
walk-through exercises to perform with the agent. This ensured that each participant had a 
similar interactive experience with Fido. While running the simulation the evaluators were 
asked to fill out the questionnaire to evaluate different aspects of the agent, including how 
the agent set goals, produced emotions and behaved.    The simulation produced a narrative 
as it ran. Stop and Start buttons on the user interface allowed the participant to stop the 
simulation and read back over the narrative before answering any of the questions. The 
instruction sheet and questionnaire are included in Appendix D. 
The procedure mentioned above was repeated for a second model of the agent.  This 
second model, without the participants knowledge, simulated the same pet dog Fido, but 
this time with random goal setting, random emotion generation and random behaviours.  
This provided a baseline for the Fido model that used the EMAI architecture.  If a 
participant had not experienced this type of interaction with a computer character before, 
their initial response to the EMAI model could have been positive to the extent that it 
biased their judgment and responses on the questionnaire.  By including a Fido character 
with random emotions and behaviours it provided a calibration point for the data collected 
from the survey about the EMAI model. Due to the random models randomised 
behaviours, it was expected that some of the time the agent would act in a manner that the 
evaluators think is appropriate and other times it would not.  Half of the evaluators began 
their evaluations with the EMAI model.  This was followed by an evaluation of the random 
model.  The other half of evaluators began their evaluations with the random model and 
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continued afterwards with the EMAI model.  The evaluators were not aware which model 
was which.  Evaluators completed the entire evaluation questionnaire with one agent 
model before beginning again with the other. 
Evaluators were assured of their anonymity and to this end, no personal details were 
collected. 
10.4 Results 
The evaluation of the EMAI architecture was performed over a number of weeks as 
people volunteered to participate in the experiment.  On completion of the questionnaires, 
the evaluations were collected and data was entered for analysis.  In all, 18 evaluations 
were returned.  
Evaluators completed a number of walk-through exercises. To prompt evaluators to 
think about their experience with the EMAI agent and the random model throughout these 
exercises, at the end of each exercise, the evaluators were asked to complete several 
questions relating to the exercise.  Following this the evaluators were asked a series of 
questions to obtain an overview of their experience with the EMAI agent and the random 
model.   
The results are given as a collection of two types of evaluator responses.  For some 
questions the evaluators gave simple yes/no answers.  The computed χ2 statistic and P-
value accompany these results. For other questions the evaluators were asked to rate 
certain characteristics of the agent on a seven-point scale from 1 to 7. Unless otherwise 
stated, throughout the following results 1 represents unreasonable and 7 represents 
reasonable.  Included with these rated answers are the statistics for a matched pairs t test 
and associated P-values. 
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10.4.1 Exercise 1 
Exercise 1 asked the evaluators to perform the following list of instructions with Fido: 
⇒ Run Fido. 
⇒ Before beginning run the mouse over each part of the screen. Hint boxes will pop 
up that informs you what each part/button is for. 
⇒ Click on the Start Button to Begin.  Notice that Fido initially has low motivation 
for all of the motivational urge gauges (at the top). As the values on the 
motivational urge gauges go up, Fido will begin to do things. 
⇒ For this exercise just watch what Fido does without interacting with him.  
⇒ When Fidos hungry gauge reaches the extreme right, wait until FIDO IS 
HUNGRY has printed in the narrative box 3 times and press the pause button. 
⇒ Use your experience in watching Fido and the narration in the text box to answer 
the questions about exercise 1 on the questionnaire. 
⇒ Close Fido 
The purpose of this exercise was to give the user time to adjust to the Fido softwares 
interface, the simulation of Fido and to become comfortable reading Fidos emotional and 
physical states as well as his default behaviours without user interaction.   
The results for this question where rated from 1 being erratic to 7 being calculated.  The 
question and results are shown in Table 10.1 along with the 95% confidence interval for 
the data.   
The next question was asked in order to focus the evaluators attention on the 
motivational urge gauges.  In the EMAI model of Fido these gauges represented the 
Motivational Drive Generator (see Chapter 3) of the agent.  The values of the gauges 
(hunger, fatigue and stimulation) where dynamic and changed with time and the 
behaviours of the agent.  At certain threshold levels the gauges would trigger appropriate 
goals in the agents Goal Hierarchy.  In the random model the gauge values changed 
randomly and did not affect the agents goals.  The question asked was: 
Did you feel that Fidos behaviour was driven by the values on the motivational urge 
gauges (the three gauges at the top of the window)? 
EMAI Random Question 
Mean Interval Mean Interval 
 
t P 
How did the progression of Fido’s behaviour 
appear to you? 
5.33 0.023 3.11 0.027 3.87 <0.001 
Table 10.1 Behaviour Progression Evaluations 
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The answers for this question were given as either Yes or No. The results showed that 94% 
of the evaluators were aware that the motivational urges were affecting the behaviour of 
the EMAI agent.  For the random agent, only 44% of the evaluators thought the 
motivational gauges where affecting the behaviour.   
The next two questions asked the evaluator about Fidos changing emotions and 
behaviours.  These questions were asked to prompt the evaluator to take notice of and 
reflect on the emotions that were being produced by the models and the resulting 
behaviours.  
The results given in Table 10.2 show that the evaluators thought the EMAI models 
behaviour with respect to changing emotions and changing behaviours was reasonable.  
For the random model the evaluators did not entirely rate Fidos emotions and behaviours 
as unreasonable but did not rate them as highly as the EMAI agent.  The random models 
changing emotions were regarded as slightly more reasonable than the resulting 
behaviours. 
Exercise 1 was designed to give the evaluators a voyeuristic view of the Fido 
simulations in action.  During this exercise, evaluators were not able to interact with the 
Fido models: the following exercise introduced user interaction. 
6.05 0.012 4.22 0.020 4.34 <0.000
5 
6.00 0.012 3.39 0.021 5.61 <0.000
5 
Table 10.2 Changing Emotional State and Behaviours Evaluation 
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10.4.2 Exercise 2 
Exercise 2 asked the evaluators to perform the following list of instructions with Fido: 
⇒ Run Fido. 
⇒ For this exercise use the BAD DOG and GOOD DOG buttons ONLY. 
⇒ By using the GOOD DOG button to praise Fido when he performs a good action 
and the BAD DOG button to reprimand Fido when he is bad try and teach Fido to 
prefer playing with the ground (rolling about) rather than other activities.  
Continue this until the hungry gauge reaches the extreme right, wait unit FIDO 
IS HUNGRY has printed twice.  Press the pause button. 
⇒ Use your experience in watching Fido and the narration in the text box to answer 
the questions about exercise 2 on the questionnaire.  DO NOT CLOSE FIDO 
WHEN FINISHED. 
⇒ After answering the exercise 2 questions, continue to Exercise 3 with the same 
Fido program open. 
This exercise built upon Exercise 1 by allowing the evaluator to experience Fidos 
default behaviours. However this time the evaluators were able to interact with Fido and 
discipline him. The evaluators were allowed to select either the GOOD DOG or BAD 
DOG buttons to praise or discipline Fido respectively.  These buttons allowed the user to 
give positive or negative reinforcement to the behaviours being performed by Fido.  The 
EMAI Fido model associated a pleasant emotional state with the GOOD DOG button 
and an unpleasant emotional state with the BAD DOG button.  When either button was 
pressed, EMAI Fido would update the emotional states for each of the elements for the 
current event.  The random Fido simulation applied random emotional states when either 
of the buttons was pressed.   
The first two questions related to ease of training and whether or not the evaluators 
thought Fido learned anything during the simulation.  The goal was to determine if the 
evaluators thought they could influence Fidos behaviour.  The questions were: 
Did you find Fido easy to train? 
Do you think that Fido learned anything during the training? 
94% of the evaluators thought the EMAI model was easy to train opposed to the 11% 
who believed the random model was trainable.  Not such a convincing difference in results 
was given toward the agents learning, with 88% of evaluators believing the EMAI model 
learned and 33% believing the random model learned.  Even though only 11% of 
evaluators thought the random Fido was difficult to train, a third thought the agent was 
learning throughout the interaction. 
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The next question asked if the evaluators thought Fidos emotional states where related 
to the way in which they used the GOOD DOG and BAD DOG buttons.  The question 
and results are shown in Table 10.3.  This data shows that the evaluators thought the EMAI 
model reacted quite reasonably to the way in which they applied the GOOD DOG and 
BAD DOG buttons and the random model reacted quite unreasonably. 
A second part to the previous question asked each evaluator to briefly explain their 
training techniques and how they thought Fido responded. 
Answers for this question were very similar across evaluators.  In summary, they 
explained that when Fido performed an act they thought was bad, they would click on the 
BAD DOG button and when Fido was good, they clicked on the GOOD DOG button.  
One participant wrote:  
When he chewed something or raised his leg I click on the BAD DOG button, 
when he slept or rolled on the ground I clicked on the GOOD DOG button. 
The next exercise involved further user interaction with Fido and asked the evaluators 
to monitor the agents behaviours and motivational states.  This exercise was continued 
from Exercise 2 where the Fido models retained the knowledge obtained during     
Exercise 2. 
techniques? 
6.05 0.012 3.44 0.027 4.00 <0.0005 
Table 10.3 Emotional State During Training 
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10.4.3 Exercise 3 
Exercise 3 asked the evaluators to perform the following list of instructions with 
simulated Fido: 
⇒ Continuing from the last exercise, press the start button to start the simulation 
going. 
⇒ Click on the Food Button to give Fido some food. 
⇒ Once Fido has finished eating the food, take notice of his emotional state and his 
next behaviour. 
⇒ When Fido is hungry again, click on the Food Button again. Continue this until 
you have served up about 5 lots of dog food.  NOTE: You cannot add more dog 
food until he has begun eating the lot before. 
⇒ Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 3. 
⇒ Close Fido 
The objective of this exercise was to give evaluators experience in monitoring Fidos 
motivational urges, how the values of these urges affected its behaviour and whether or not 
Fido retained previously learned knowledge from Exercise 2. 
The first two questions were asked to gauge the amount of attention that each evaluator 
gave to Fidos motivational state and how they thought this state affected its behaviour. 
The third question asked the evaluators to rate the eating behaviours as related to the 
motivational urges. The questions and results are shown in Table 10.4.  This data shows 
the evaluators noticed that most of the time the EMAI model ate after it expressed hunger 
and that in most of these instances its next behaviour after expressing hunger was eating.  
However, the evaluators thought the random model ate after it expressed hunger around 
half of the time but very rarely did it eat directly after expressing hunger. 
Did Fido eat only after he expressed he 
was hungry? 
6.00 0.026 3.78 0.025 3.42 <0.0025 
When Fido was hungry and there was 
food available did Fido eat the food 
before doing something else? 
6.05 0.028 2.00 0.019 7.70 <0.0005 
How would you rate this type of 
behaviour? 
6.00 0.013 3.22 0.026 5.61 <0.0005 
Table 10.4 Motivational Urge Affects on Behaviour 
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To further analyse Fidos eating behaviour the evaluators were asked the following 
question: 
During the times when he was hungry, did Fido seem to retain knowledge of his 
previous training? 
It is clear from this data that the evaluators considered the EMAI model to retain 
knowledge far more than the random model as 83% of the evaluators believed the EMAI 
model did, against 11% for the random model. In reality, the EMAI model retained all of 
its knowledge and the random model retained none. 
The evaluators rated the EMAI models behaviour to be more reasonable than the 
random models behaviour even though the random models behaviour was not rated as 
being entirely unreasonable. 
The next exercise allowed the participant further interaction with the agent by allowing 
the users to add items to the agents environments and attempt to train the behaviour of the 
agent with respect to the items. 
10.4.4 Exercise 4 
Exercise 4 asked the evaluators to perform the following list of instructions with Fido: 
⇒ Run Fido. 
⇒ Add the ball and towel to the environment. 
⇒ Teach Fido  that playing with the ball is GOOD and playing with the towel is 
BAD. 
⇒ Do not forget to give Fido dog food when he appears hungry!! 
⇒ When you think that Fido has been trained, attempt to reverse the Fidos training.  
See if you can make him think that the towel is GOOD and the ball is BAD. 
⇒ When you think you have done this take the towel away.  Observe Fidos 
behaviour. 
⇒ After a while, add the towel back into the environment. 
⇒ Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 4. 
⇒ Close Fido 
The objective of this exercise was to give the user an opportunity to add new items into 
Fidos environment and to allow the user to train Fido with the use of the objects.  The 
simulation allowed several items to be added to the environment by clicking on appropriate 
buttons in the tool bar.  When items were added to the environment Fido would attempt 
different actions with the items.  For example, when the BALL was added to the 
environment, Fido could choose to PLAY with the BALL or CHEW the BALL.   
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For this exercise the evaluators were asked to add a BALL and a TOWEL into the 
environment and to train Fidos actions toward the objects using the GOOD DOG and 
BAD DOG buttons. Initially the user had to train Fido to prefer playing with the 
BALL and dislike the TOWEL and then the user had to attempt to reverse the agents 
attitude towards each object.   
Both agents were programmed with the same set of goals.  However, the EMAI 
models goals were triggered by the agents motivational gauges and the random models 
goals where triggered at random time intervals during the simulation.  The EMAI model 
would select its behaviours based on the events that would make the agent the happiest and 
satisfy the current set of goals.  The random model randomly selected events whether or 
not they satisfied the goals and whether or not they made the agent happy. 
The evaluators were asked several questions about the training of Fido.  The results are 
shown in Table 10.5.  The evaluators rated the EMAI model as quite easy to train and the 
random model as almost impossible to train. The results also show the evaluators thought 
that EMAI model produced reasonable emotional states while the random model produced 
closer to unreasonable emotional states. 
The next question asked the evaluators to reflect on whether or not they thought the 
agents prioritised their behaviours. 
Overall, do you think that Fido prioritises his behaviours? 
A unanimous result of Yes (100%) was obtained for the EMAI model, while only 13% 
of the evaluators thought the random model prioritised its behaviours. 
The last exercise in the evaluation gave the evaluators even more degrees of freedom 
with respect to user interaction with Fido.  Exercise 5 allowed the evaluators to create their 
own training regime. 
6.25 0.015 1.78 0.014 9.57 <0.0005 
6.50 0.009 2.61 0.020 10.05 <0.0005 
Table 10.5 Fido’s Training  
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10.4.5 Exercise 5 
Exercise 5 asked the evaluators to perform the following list of instructions with Fido: 
⇒ Run Fido. 
⇒ For this exercise it is your task to train Fido to like an item of your choice for 
playing with.  Add all of Fidos items to the environment including food items 
and try to teach Fido to prefer playing with and eating certain objects.  Get Fido 
to have several favourite items, so if you take one away he plays with the other. 
⇒ Observe Fidos behaviour. 
⇒ Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 5. 
⇒ Close Fido 
This final exercise allowed each participant to have some free reign over their 
interaction with Fido. The participant was permitted to use the interactions from past 
exercises to formulate their own training exercise with Fido.  Again the evaluators were 
asked questions relating to ease of training and emotional states. 
The results are shown in Table 10.6. Evaluators thought the EMAI model was relatively 
easy to train and the random model was near impossible to train. The results show that the 
EMAI model was far more capable of producing reasonable emotional states with respect 
to training as compared with the random model. 
The next question took a slightly different perspective and asked the evaluators to 
assess the agents ability to develop attitudes toward objects in its environment.  The 
question asked was: 
Do you think that Fido was able to devise a list of favourite and least favourite items? 
94% of the evaluators agreed the EMAI model was capable of forming liking and 
disliking attitudes toward the objects in its environment compared to only 16% who 
thought the random model was capable of forming attitudes. 
6.00 0.016 1.78 0.016 12.84 <0.0005 
6.28 0.011 2.22 0.021 10.14 <0.0005 
Table 10.6 Ease of Training Fido in Multiple Tasks 
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Besides being able to produce reasonable emotional states, it is important to the 
successful evaluation of the EMAI model that the evaluators were able to observe the 
emotional states affecting the agents behaviour and learning.  To this end the evaluators 
were asked: 
Do you think that Fido learned from his emotional states? 
The results were unanimous.  All evaluators agreed the EMAI model displayed the 
ability to learn from its emotional states and the random model did not. 
On completion of the exercises and the associated set of questions, the evaluators were 
asked to reflect on their experience with each model and to give an overview evaluation of 
the agents.  This evaluation focused on four key areas; intelligence, learning, behaviour 
and emotions. 
10.4.6 An Overview of  the Evaluation of Fido 
The overview evaluation of the Fido models was given to evaluators on the completion 
of the exercises.  The data obtained from this questionnaire was necessary for the 
evaluation of effectiveness of the EMAI architecture to use emotional mechanisms for 
intelligence, behaviour and learning.  The first item addressed was the agents intelligence. 
Intelligence 
For this part of the evaluation, evaluators were given a definition of intelligence within 
the scope of the EMAI architecture.  They were told  there are many and varied definitions 
of intelligence, but for the purpose of this experiment, intelligence was being evaluated 
from a limited number of perspectives.  The first perspective examined was goal 
orientation:  the evaluators were informed that human behaviour is considered as goal 
orientated.  They were told that this means that humans set goals and try to satisfy them 
and often there are several actions that can achieve the same goal. The evaluators were 
asked nine questions relating to the agents intelligence. The answers for each of the 
questions are in Table 10.7. 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  187 
 From these results it can be seen that the EMAI model performed well in all aspects of 
goal setting intelligence and outperformed the random model. The evaluators also 
considered the EMAI agent to have a far better ability to formulate, and in turn use 
attitudes for decision making. All evaluators thought the EMAI agent had the ability to 
form emotions and to use them for decision-making. The random model showed the 
evaluators mostly doubted that the random agent could do the same.   
Another evaluation on intelligence was performed on the agents capabilities for 
adaptation.  Again the EMAI model performed favourably with 94% of evaluators 
believing the agent had the ability to use its intelligence to adapt to the environment 
compared with 22% for the random model could do the same. 
As a final evaluation of Fidos intelligence the evaluators were asked to rate the agents 
intelligence. The EMAI agents intelligence was rated to be significantly (t=7.12, 
P<0.0005) more reasonable (with a mean of 6.00) than the random agents intelligence 
(with a mean of 2.28). 
Question EMA
Yes 
Random 
Yes 
 
2 P 
78% 11% 16.20 <0.0005 
WANTs? 
44% 78% 4.21 <0.05 
Do you think that Fido can formulate ways in which to 
satisfy his goals? 
83% 11% 18.84 <0.0005 
Do you think that Fido tries other plans of action when one 
fails? 
89% 33% 7.20 <0.01 
Do you think that Fido shows the ability to form attitudes? 89% 7% 25.08 <0.0005 
Do you think that Fido uses his attitudes to make 
decisions? 
89% 11% 21.78 <0.0005 
Do you think that Fido shows the ability to form emotions? 100% 28% 20.35 <0.0005 
Do you think that Fido’s emotions influence his 
behaviour? 
100% 60% 7.89 <0.005 
Another definition of intelligence is the ability to adapt to 
certain environmental changes.  Do you think that Fido 
has this form of intelligence? 
94% 22% 13.31 <0.0005 
Table 10.7 Intelligence Overview 
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Learning 
The learning section of the questionnaire focused on the agents ability to revise its 
beliefs about its environment, behaviours, objects and emotions.  Learning for the Fido 
simulation was equated with Fidos ability to be obedient.  It was assumed that if Fido 
appeared to be doing what the participant wanted the agent to do based on the way in 
which the participant had trained Fido, then the participant would consider the agent as 
obedient.  The first question and results are shown in Table 10.8. 
The results displayed show that the EMAI agent was considered obedient whereas the 
random agent was considered disobedient.  The evaluators were then asked to rate the 
agents learning skills as they related to different aspects of the simulation.  The four 
questions asked and the results are shown in Table 10.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
A significant number of evaluators thought the EMAI agent possessed the ability to 
learn about its environment, its behaviour, objects in its environment and it emotional 
states.  A significant number of evaluators agreed that it was not the same case with the 
random model. 
How would you rate Fido (with respect to 
his obedience)? 
6.22 0.011 1.89 0.014 14.33 <0.0005 
Table 10.8 Fido’s Obedience Rating 
72% 0% 20.35 <0.0005 
95% 17% 22.05 <0.0005 
Do you think Fido learns about good and bad objects? 100% 11% 28.80 <0.0005 
Do you think Fido learns about his behaviours from his 
emotional reactions? 
78% 5% 19.31 <0.0005 
Table 10.9 Fido’s Learning Abilities 
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Behaviour 
In this section, the evaluators were simply asked to rate the holistic behaviour of the 
models in terms of reasonability and predictability.  The results are given in Table 10.10 as 
the mean values where 1 was unreasonable and unpredictable and 7 was reasonable and 
predictable. 
Emotions 
This section of the questionnaire asked the evaluators about the emotional states and 
responses exhibited by the agents.    The first question was: 
Do you think that Fidos emotional states were reasonable? 
The results obtained indicate that 94% of the evaluators thought the emotional states 
expressed by the EMAI model where reasonable compared with only 11% for the random 
model.  Furthermore, the mean degree of predictability for the EMAI model was rated 
higher than the random model for the question shown in Table 10.11. 
 
 
 
Personality 
In this section, the evaluators were asked to express their attitudes toward the 
personality of the characters created by each of the models.  Data was collected about 
predictability, intelligence, emotional stability and goal orientation. The answers were 
recorded where 1 was unpredictable, unintelligent, emotionally unstable and erratic and 7 
6.22 0.012 2.28 0.014 11.35 <0.0005 
6.12 0.013 2.11 0.025 5.86 <0.0005 
Table 10.10 Predictability and Reasonableness of Model 
5.83 0.023 2.11 0.023 5.95 <0.0005 
Table 10.11 Predictability of Emotional Responses 
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was predictable, intelligent, emotionally stable and goal orientated respectively.  The 
average results of the data collected from the evaluators are shown in Table 10.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results show that the EMAI model was rated significantly higher than the random 
model for all of the four personality traits measured. 
Expectation 
The evaluators were asked four questions relating to how they believed the models 
should behave and whether or not the agents lived up to their expectations of a 
programmed computer character.  The first three questions and the results are shown in 
Table 10.13.  The answers were recorded with 1 being none of the time and 7 being all 
of the time.  These results show the evaluators thought the EMAI model met their 
expectations of a computerised character more often than the random model.  The results 
also show the evaluators thought the emotional model implemented in the EMAI model 
produced emotional states that seemed far more reasonable than the random model.  
6.00 0.012 2.17 0.023 7.67 <0.0005 
5.94 0.015 2.33 0.024 8.00 <0.0005 
5.83 0.017 1.94 0.018 8.03 <0.0005 
5.44 0.023 1.56 0.012 10.28 <0.0005 
Table 10.12 Fido’s Personality Ratings 
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The last question asked: 
Did you find that at any time during the simulation that you experienced an emotional 
attachment to Fido? 
This question sought an indication of whether or not the computer character was 
successful in achieving a sense of suspension of disbelief with the evaluators. 69% of 
evaluators found they experienced an emotional attachment toward the EMAI model 
against 22% for the random model.  While the EMAI model was rated much more 
favourably in comparison to the random model, the results for the EMAI model were lower 
than expected. 
This section concluded the overview evaluation of the agents.  At this stage, evaluators 
were given the opportunity to freely comment on the models and to give any suggestions 
for improvement to the emotional and behavioural mechanisms of the agents.  Several of 
the most common improvements suggested the EMAI model be made a little less 
predictable. For example, 
He's too responsive. As soon as you say good dog he'll continue to do whatever 
it is. This may go on for a while. He needs to be able to do other things as well. 
and 
I guess this Fido learned too well, perhaps a little bit more naughtiness earlier 
on. 
5.83 0.015 3.56 0.025 4.26 <0.0005 
6.06 0.015 2.39 0.017 8.57 <0.0005 
2.16 0.019 4.61 0.029 4.22 <0.0005 
Table 10.13 User Expectations of Fido 
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and 
Hes a bit too predictable. Fido should be a little bit more erratic to make him 
more exciting. 
Further comments, while constructive (and even humourous) will not be discussed at 
this point, but will be invaluable for improving future versions of the EMAI agent. 
As the initial questionnaires were filled out in entirety for each agent at different times, 
the evaluators could only give an indirect comparison of the second agent with the first 
agent on the second questionnaire.  For one final evaluation of the Fido models, on 
completion of the exercises with both agents, the evaluators were given a set of debriefing 
questions.  This gave the evaluators an opportunity to directly compare both models. 
10.4.7 Debriefing Questions 
The debriefing questions repeated questions that were asked in the previous sections of 
the evaluation questionnaire.  However, at the time the evaluators completed these 
questions, they had already had the opportunity to interact with both models.  These final 
questions serve as the evaluators direct comparison of the models. 
Table 10.14 displays the results gathered about the first four questions.  The results are 
given as percentages of evaluators who selected one model over the other in each of the 
categories shown.  For questions 1, 2 and 3 all evaluators agreed the EMAI model 
possessed better goal setting, learning and intelligence skills and for question four, while 
not a unanimous vote, the EMAI agent was rated much higher than the random agent. 
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The final part of the evaluation asked each participant to directly compare the agent 
models traits of learning skills, behaviour, emotional states and goal setting. The mean 
results are displayed in Table 10.15. 
The results in Table 10.15 show the EMAI model was rated as far more reasonable than 
the random model. 
10.5 Discussion 
The evaluation of the EMAI and random models was useful in determining how 
successful the EMAI architecture and the mechanisms designed to emulate emotions were 
in simulating an intelligent computer character. 
The objective of this experiment was to determine if the behaviours and emotional 
states produced by the EMAI agent were sufficient to create a sense of suspension of 
disbelief in a human subject who was interacting with the agent.  To do this an agent needs 
to produce results that could measure up to a turing test and convince the user into thinking 
they were interacting with a real person or animal.  The Fido model that implements the 
Trait EMA Random 
 
t 
 
P 
Learning Skills 6.61 2.44 10.93 <0.0005 
Behaviour 6.56 2.39 12.41 <0.0005 
Emotional States 6.06 2.56 6.51 <0.0005 
Goal Setting 5.78 2.00 11.48 <0.0005 
Which model possessed the best goal setting skills? 100% 0% 
Which model learned from your feedback the most? 100% 0% 
Which model seemed more intelligent? 100% 0% 
Which model seemed more emotionally intelligent? 94% 6% 
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EMAI architecture is far from being able to live up to the expectations of a turing 
examination as the interface is very simplistic and makes it obvious to the user that they 
are interacting with a machine.  However, the first step toward using the EMAI 
architecture to create realistic artificial life is to determine if the concepts that are 
integrated for the use of producing intelligence are reasonable.  To this end the EMAI 
architecture was evaluated on the basis of reasonability for all aspects of the agents 
behaviour.  To calibrate the data gathered, the same evaluators were asked to also interact 
with a random agent.  The data from the random agent acts as a comparison base to help 
eliminate any favourable participant responses that could have been due to the novelty and 
fun of the Fido software.   By including a randomly behaving Fido model, the evaluators 
were forced to examine the behaviour of the models in detail rather than evaluating the 
animations and user interface. As the random model produced random emotional 
behaviours, there was always a chance the random Fido would act in a way the user was 
expecting by coincidence.   
The evaluation questions focused on gathering data about four key areas of the EMAI 
architecture: motivation and goal setting, learning, behaviour and emotions.  
10.5.1 Motivation and Goal Setting 
The experiment simulated motivation using three Internal State Registers that were 
represented by gauges located at the top of the user interface.  These gauges represented 
the agents hunger, fatigue and intrigue.  When the Internal State Registers of the EMAI 
model reached certain threshold values, goals were triggered in the agent that when 
satisfied would reduce or increase the values of the registers. For example, as the hunger 
register reduced to a threshold value approximately halfway along the gauge, the agent 
would become hungry and goals that related to eating would be triggered. When an eating 
goal was satisfied the value on the hunger gauge would change, thus indicating the agent 
was no longer hungry.  In the random model, the values on the gauges did not affect the 
agents goals as goals were triggered at random intervals independently of the gauges.   
The differences between the models were identified by the evaluators with 94% of 
evaluators agreeing the gauges did influence the EMAI models goals against 44% who 
believed the gauges influenced the random models behaviours.  While the goals produced 
in the EMAI model were deliberate and the results show that the architecture favourably 
achieves this, due to the very nature of the random model there was always the possibility 
the agent would by coincidence have the appropriate goal triggered when the gauges were 
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close to threshold values.  Therefore, the 44%, of the evaluators who thought the random 
model was motivationally driven was expected.  In fact to produce an even lower result, 
the random model would have to be programmed to deliberately trigger inappropriate 
goals at gauge threshold values. 
Evaluators remarked of the EMAI models motivational mechanisms with comments 
such as: 
When he needs exercise, he goes digging the ground. 
and 
When he was extremely hungry (as shown on the motivational gauge), I fed him 
and the hungry urge changed. 
These showed that the evaluators were aware of Fidos changing urge values and the 
associated behaviours that were motivated by them. In contrast, evaluators noticed that the 
random models behaviour was not related to the values on the motivational gauges with 
comments such as: 
Even though he was hungry, he still wanted to play. 
and 
Even as the motivational gauges changed the dog still appeared to be active 
and continued with repetitive actions. 
The objectives of motivational mechanisms in the EMAI architecture are to act as 
triggers for goal setting and thus related behaviours.  To gauge the agents ability to 
perform this process to a standard that would be rated as reasonable to an onlooker, several 
other questions were asked.  These questions were presented in Section 10.4.6 and are 
repeated with the results, for convenience in Table 10.16 below. 
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The first question asked the evaluators whether they thought the models were able to set 
goals.  The results highly favoured the EMAI model. This showed the evaluators were 
aware of the EMAI agents goal processing abilities.  The random actions of the other 
agent proved significantly less convincing.  The second question focused on the 
motivational gauge values and asked the evaluators if they thought the models ever 
performed actions that were not in line with the agents urges (as shown on the gauges).  
The results for the EMAI model were not outstandingly different between evaluators. 
Although almost half of the evaluators though the EMAI agent performed actions that were 
not related to its motivations, the result is not as notable as was hoped.  This suggests that 
either the evaluators were not clearly aware of the EMAI agents wants, the programmed 
behaviours associated with motivations did not meet the evaluators expectations or the 
architecture does not perform as expected. As the EMAI agent was programmed to eat 
when it was hungry, sleep when it was tired and play when it was excited, the latter is 
initially rejected. The hypothesis is that this evaluation is the result of a poorly designed 
interface or badly chosen motivation/behaviour pairs. Another factor that may have also 
influenced the evaluators is that of the agents emotional state.  Although this question 
aimed at matching motivational mechanisms with appropriate behaviours, the evaluators 
may have also assessed motivation with respect to the agents emotional state.  Although a 
motivation was matched with an appropriate behaviour, the presence of a seemingly 
inappropriate emotional state may have influenced the assessment.  The random model did 
behave as expected producing a poor result.  The behaviours of the random agent were in 
no way associated with the levels on the motivational gauges.  
The next question asked if the agents were able to devise methods that would satisfy 
their goals.  The results suggest the evaluators were aware of the EMAI agents goals and 
Do you think that Fido set’s goals? 78% 11% 16.20 <0.0005 
Did Fido ever perform actions that were not related 
to his WANTs? 
44% 78% 4.21 <0.05 
Do you think that Fido can formulate ways in which 
to satisfy his goals? 
83% 11% 18.84 <0.0005 
Do you think that Fido tries other plans of action 
when one fails? 
89% 33% 7.20 <0.01 
Table 10.16 Goal Setting Intelligence Ratings 
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noticed the agents attempts to satisfy them. The random model was rated much less 
favourably. 
Finally, a question was asked to discover if the evaluators thought the models were 
capable of failure-recovery as failure-recovery is a quality of goal orientated systems.  The 
results were favourable with a significant number of the evaluators believing the EMAI 
agent could recover and try other plans of action after one plan had failed in contrast with a 
smaller number of evaluators who thought the random model could do the same. 
The lower outcome obtained for the question on relating behaviour to the EMAI agents 
wants could be due to the wording used.  This question is the only one that mentions wants 
rather than referring to them as goals.  The result obtained for the third question support 
this view.  In order for the evaluator to have noticed the agent formulating ways to achieve 
its goals, the evaluator would have had to witness the agents behaviour.  The outward 
behaviour of the agent was the only way in which an evaluator could have understood the 
actions the agent was attempting to satisfy its goals.  Furthermore, the goals of the agent 
were directly related to the agents motivational state represented on the motivational 
gauges.  Essentially, these two questions were asking for very similar evaluations to take 
place.  The conclusion is therefore that the evaluators did not associate goals and the plans 
to satisfy them with wants and related actions. 
In all, the results gathered about motivation and goal setting significantly favoured the 
EMAI model. 
10.5.2 Learning 
The focus of the learning element of the EMAI architecture lies in the mechanisms that 
allow an agent to have valenced reactions toward elements in its environment.  In the 
experiment, the EMAI Fido model learned through user interaction where the evaluator 
could praise the agent when it was performing a preferred action and scold the agent when 
it was not.  When the agent received praise, it associated the positive emotions with the 
current event.   When it received negative feedback from the evaluator, it associated 
negative emotions with the event. 
In future decision making the agent used its knowledge about the emotions attached to 
events and the elements of the events, such as the action or any involved objects, to select 
an event to perform.  As discussed in Chapter 9, the EMAI agent initially prioritised its 
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choice of behaviours based on urgency (symbolised by the levels of the Internal State 
Registers) and then arranged the behaviours on emotional preference.  The emotional 
preference of behaviours is calculated by determining how the behaviour would influence 
the agents mood if it were performed.   This process was not present in the random model.  
The random model did not retain any information received from user interaction nor use 
any knowledge of previous behaviours to make future decisions. 
The evaluators were asked to assess both the EMAI and random models outward 
behaviour with respect to learning by allowing the evaluators to work through several 
training exercises with the agents.  The evaluators were asked to attempt to train the agents 
to prefer playing with and eating certain objects.  The results obtained were encouraging. 
Evaluators explained their training techniques in a similar way.  The following 
comment from one of the evaluators is typical of most comments received.  It shows the 
BAD DOG button was used to discipline the agent while the GOOD DOG button was 
used to praise the agent. 
When Fido ate grass, pushed "Bad Dog" Only did this once. When Fido rolls 
on ground, pushed "Good Dog" He kept rolling on the ground. 
Initially, the evaluators were asked if they found Fido easy to train and whether they 
thought that Fido learned anything from the training.  Most evaluators thought the EMAI 
model was easy to train compared to a few who thought the random model was easy to 
train.  Again most of the evaluators thought the EMAI model learned from the training and 
significantly less thought the random model did.  These results were expected as the EMAI 
agent associated the emotional state of happy with a press of the GOOD DOG button.  
When the evaluator pressed the GOOD DOG button, the EMAI agent associated a happy 
emotional state with its current behaviour and any associated event elements.   This would 
bring the emotional state value of the event, from which the behaviour derived, closer to 
happy.  In turn, when the event was next placed in the agents schedule it would have a 
higher emotional priority for being selected for execution.  Therefore, the more praise the 
EMAI agent received for a behaviour, the higher the likelihood that it would be selected 
again.  This process illustrates affective decision making in the EMAI agent.  
The EMAI architectures mechanism for learning lies with an extension of the Theory 
of Reasoned Action (see Chapter 6) which provides the agent with the ability to make 
multi-dimensional affective decisions.  This ability allows the agent to develop attitudes 
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about the elements in its environment though interaction with them.  Attitudes are based on 
the outcome of events and the use of objects.   A favourable outcome develops positive 
attitudes and an unfavorable outcome develops negative attitudes.  The results show that 
the evaluators had a sense of this process occurring in the EMAI agent and thought that it 
produced reasonable behaviour.  The opposite is true for the random agent. 
Finally, the evaluators were asked to rate the overall intelligence of each model.  The 
mean result obtained for the EMAI model clearly shows the evaluators believed the EMAI 
agent produced more reasonable intelligent behaviours than the random model.  This 
conclusion was also evident in the evaluators comments. 
Evaluators commented on the EMAI models obedience aspect of its intelligence as:  
He was extremely intelligent.  If I told him it was good to do something then he 
did it and continued doing it. 
and 
He does what you tell him is good to do and he does not do what you tell him is 
bad. 
Evaluators commented on the random models intelligence as: 
Random behaviour, unrelated to motivation or environment. 
and 
He did not appear to remember anything I tried to teach him. He was extremely 
erratic, doing whatever he wanted to do. 
These results confirmed that the Theory of Reasoned Action, implemented in the EMAI 
agent to give the agent the ability to form attitudes, was effective as a learning mechanism. 
10.5.3 Emotions 
The essential element in the EMAI architecture is the inclusion of the Affective Space 
and the Theory of Reasoned Action that allows the agent to form emotions about its 
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behaviours and objects with which it comes in contact.  It can then use these emotions to 
make decisions about future events based on the emotional reactions the agent has about 
these events and how performing these events would influence the agents mood. 
Throughout the evaluation the evaluators were asked to answer questions about the 
reasonableness of the agents emotional states and how they thought these emotions were 
affecting the agents behaviour.  Some initial questions asked the evaluators to rate the 
agents emotional states with respect to agents current behaviour and the evaluators 
interaction.  The EMAI model rated favourably on both these aspects.  With respect to the 
agents emotional states and current behaviours, the mean responses obtained for the 
EMAI model show the emotion producing mechanisms present in the EMAI architecture 
are working to produce a computer character that is capable of producing quite reasonable 
emotional states from an onlookers point of view.  The random model, while not rated as 
totally unreasonable, was expected to produce mediocre results.  Due to the nature of the 
randomness of the emotions produced there was always a possibility the agent, by 
coincidence, would meet the evaluators expectations. 
10.5.4 Behaviour 
The emotional mechanism is closely tied to the outward behaviours of the agents.  
Evaluators had to rely on the outward behaviour of the agent to evaluate the agents 
emotion forming abilities.  Of course, this is always the case with computer character 
interaction as the user is not aware of the internal mechanisms driving the character.  
Although motivation, learning and emotions were evaluated separately from behaviour, the 
results obtained for the agents capacities were essentially the evaluators evaluation of the 
agents behaviour.  For this reason, several questions about the agents behaviours were 
also asked. 
Although evaluators were asked questions relating to intelligence, motivation, goals and 
emotions, the evaluation of these categories relied on how the evaluators viewed the 
outward behaviour of the agents.  In the debriefing the evaluators were asked to rate the 
agents behaviours on two scales, one for reasonableness and one for predictability. The 
evaluators thought the EMAI model produced behaviours that were significantly more 
reasonable and predictable than the random model. It is ideal that the EMAI model was 
rated highly for both reasonableness and predictability as the architecture was designed 
with these characteristics in mind. However, while these results seem in favour of the 
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EMAI model, the evaluators also needed to be asked if they thought the models met their 
expectations of computer generated characters.  The EMAI model may be able to produce 
reasonable and predictable behaviours but if these characteristics are not expected in a 
computer generated character then the architecture may need to be modified when used for 
this purpose. 
Evaluators were given the opportunity in the evaluation to comment freely on their 
expectations of the models.  Typical comments received about the EMAI model included: 
He responded well to positive and negative reinforcement, acting in a logical 
fashion with enough randomness of behaviour to discover and evolve new ways 
of interacting with his world. 
and 
Sometimes he can be a bit predictable but overall yes. He is motivated by his 
goals and urges and will try different approaches if he does not get them. 
and 
From my point of view a computerised character should be more predictable 
than a real one.  So I am very satisfied with Fidos performance. 
Feedback received about the evaluators expectations in relation to the random models 
behaviours were quite different.  Some of the  comments were: 
Having had some experience with AI and Alife before, I know they can be 
contrary, but you can generally sense some structure evolving. This Fido has 
none. 
and 
Total unpredictable! 
and 
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Given the programming of Fidos character to be neurotic, then yes I could see 
he could meet expectations. 
The previous results coupled with the comments from the evaluators are strongly in 
favour of the EMAI model.  Reasonableness and predictability are favourable 
characteristics to have in a computer generated character.  The EMAI model has displayed 
the ability to successfully fulfill these characteristics.  
10.5.5 Direct Comparison of the Models 
Having completed the questionnaires for both models separately, the evaluators were 
given an opportunity to directly compare both agents.  This comparison was performed on 
four characteristics of the agents learning skills, behaviour, emotional states and goal 
setting.  Each category was rated by the evaluators on the same scale of reasonableness 
used throughout the evaluation.  The EMAI model performed significantly better in 
comparison with the results obtained for the random model. 
10.6 Summary 
The results show that the evaluators rated the EMAI model much more favourably than 
the random model.  It was hoped these types of results would be obtained as the behaviours 
and emotional states of the EMAI model were calculated through the mechanisms 
integrated into the agents architecture for the very purpose of building a computerised 
character that could meet a users expectations.  The random model was used against 
which to benchmark the EMAI model.  If the EMAI model could not meet the evaluators 
expectations significantly more often than the random model then the affective 
mechanisms integrated into the EMAI agent could be construed as useless for this purpose.   
Not only do the results of the evaluation favour the EMAI model but they also reinforce 
the success of the new concepts integrated into the agents architecture.  These concepts, 
discussed in-depth throughout this dissertation, include the Ontology, the Motivational 
Drive Generator, the Event Space Generator, the Intention Generator and the Affective 
Space.  Each of these new ideas for generating intelligence using emotional theories in 
artificial beings received exceptional feedback throughout the evaluation.  The results 
reinforce the concepts integrated into the agent architecture and encourage further 
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evaluations of more sophisticated computer generated characters with more complex goal 
hierarchies and user interaction interfaces. 
This chapter concludes the content of the dissertation and discussion of the research 
herein and the contributions to the field of affective computing and artificial intelligence.  
The following chapter summarises the content of this dissertation, details the contributions 
of this work to the domains of affective computing and AI and discusses the future 
direction of this research. 
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11.  Conclusions and Further Directions 
Does the road wind up-hill all the way? Yes to the very end. – Christina Rossetti 1830-1894 
11.1 A Piece of the Puzzle 
Emotions are a difficult concept to define let alone integrate into the domain of artificial 
intelligence.  Emotions have been studied in fields such as philosophy, physiology, 
neurology and psychology. All have their own and often distinct ideas and models 
explaining how emotions are generated and affect behaviour.  Investigators in the field of 
artificial intelligence have only begun their examinations into this domain.  Researchers 
are examining the influence that emotion has on intelligence and investigating ways in 
which the phenomena can be used to enhance artificial beings.  
A small group of researchers has focused their efforts on the integration of appraisal 
theory models of emotions (see Chapter 2) with agent technologies to produce artificial 
beings primarily for the entertainment industry.  This includes producing believable agents 
for the field of interactive drama (Maes 1995) and computer games (Stern 1999) that are 
capable of producing performances from scripts and simulating an illusion of life 
implementing emotional exaggerations and personalities.  Other areas where emotions are 
beginning to advance artificial intelligence are in the domains of intelligent tutoring 
systems (Kort et al. 2001), wearable computers (Healey 2000) and user interfaces (Klein et 
al. 1997, Picard 2000).  While these systems may not require the computer to produce 
emotions or emotional behaviours, models of emotions have been useful in allowing the 
systems to reason about the emotional states of their students and thus enhancing the 
interaction and learning experience. 
As the integration of emotional mechanisms into artificial intelligences is a research 
area in its infancy, little work has been performed experimenting with different emotional 
models.  Appraisal theories have been selected for their discrete categorising nature as they 
are ideal for integration into many agent architectures that are capable of generating 
appraisals that fit the models.  However, much of the work has focused on a small group of 
appraisal theories and in particular the OCC model (see Chapter 2).  While this research 
has been successful in producing believable emotional agents, the model is restrictive in its 
categorical nature. Contemporary research in agent models (BDI (Rao and Georgeff 1995), 
SOAR (Tambe 1997)) does not implement emotional intelligence in decision-making, re-
planning, or goal prioritisation.  Some new models are emerging that do consider emotions 
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(PETEEI (El-Nasr 1998), Tok (Reilly 1996), The Affective Reasoner (Elliot 1992)), 
however, they generally consider the generation of emotional states and not the 
consequences on the agents beliefs and goals.  Listed here are the limitations of affective 
agent models that precede EMAI and how the EMAI architecture overcomes these 
limitations: 
1. Models that do integrate emotions require considerable reprogramming when new 
emotional categories are added.  The EMAI model overcomes this by replacing the 
traditional individual gauge method of emotional representation with a continuous 
Affective Space.  This is demonstrated in Chapters 8 and 9. 
2. There is no feedback from the generated emotional state to enable the agent to 
adapt to its environment. An EMAI agent uses emotional states to discover how 
events make it feel and further uses this information in decision making tasks.  This 
is presented in Chapters 5 through 9. 
3. There is a lack of deep knowledge representation and manipulation capabilities.  
The integration of conceptual graphs into the EMAI architectures Ontology allows 
for a depth of knowledge representation that gives an EMAI agent the ability to 
construct complex representations of events at varying generalised and specialised 
levels and to associate emotional states with these.  The EMAIs Ontology was 
described in Chapter 4. 
4. Contemporary research attributes emotional state to holistic events. The EMAI 
architecture attributes emotional states at the atomic level of all the entities 
associated with an event.  This was shown in Chapter 9. 
5. Emotional decay in previous models has been dealt with by using constant decay 
rate functions that act over time. This is contrary to the EMAI model that uses a 
continuous Affective Space that allows opposing emotions to counteract each other.  
This was illustrated in Chapter 8. 
6. Current agent models do not address the issue of dynamic goal interpretation (via 
dynamic planning). This differs from EMAI agents (like Fido) that could plan and 
re-plan, based on changing goals that are associated with changing emotional states.  
This contribution is demonstrated in Chapters 5 through 9. 
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7. Current agent models lack the ability to maintain a dynamically changing 
experience against an event or element. In contrast, the EMAI architecture is able 
to revise its experiences toward during an event or toward and element at every 
encounter, and its experiences are continuously revised based on the outcome of the 
encounters.  This is also illustrated in Chapters 5 through 9. 
8. Contemporary agent models do not apply emotional bias in decision making. EMAI 
agents (like Fido) use a biasing emotional state in its multi-dimensional affective 
decision making technique to determine its most preferred choice.  The biasing 
mechanism is demonstrated in Chapter 9. 
9. No formal models of emotional intelligence have been described to formalise 
emergence of emotion in an agent model.  The EMAI model achieves this through 
the formalisation of event and element appraisal, emotional state generation, 
emotional state updating and multi-dimensional affective decision making.  The 
formalisations appear in Chapters 5 through 9. 
10. Current agent models represent individual emotional states as separate variables 
thus making it a complex task to add new emotional states or combine existing 
ones. The use of the continuous multi-dimensional Affective Space in the EMAI 
architecture presents emotional states as related points within the same space. This 
allows for the easy addition of new emotional states to the space as well as the 
blending of multiple emotional states to produce a single resulting emotional state.  
The Affective Space is formally introduced in Chapter 8 and further demonstrated 
in Chapter 9. 
11. Until now the Theory of Reasoned Action had been applied in the psychological 
domain and not fully formalised for computational use. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
formulae (discussed in Chapter 6) have been extended in this dissertation to 
calculate the attitudes an agent has towards events and event spaces.  Furthermore, 
the ideas of formalisation presented in the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein 
and Ajzen 1975) have been expanded to express the computational nature of Smith 
and Ellsworths (1985) appraisal dimensions used in EMAI to generate emotions 
and perform affective decision making.  These ideas are discussed and presented in 
Chapters 5 through 9. 
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The contributions the EMAI model makes to the domains of affective computing and 
AI are made possible via the new and unique mechanisms integrated into the architecture. 
11.2 Emotionally Motivated Artificial Intelligence (EMAI) 
 The EMAI architecture consists of three functional areas; the Knowledge Area, the 
Constructive Area and the Deliberate Area (explained in Chapter 3). The Knowledge Area 
of the architecture refers to the agents Ontology, the Motivational Drive Generator, the 
Emotional State and Bias Registers, the Sensory Processor and the Affective Space.  
Within this area resides the knowledge the agent needs in order to function.  This includes 
the agents knowledge structured in the Ontology (examined in Chapter 4) as the Goal 
Hierarchy, the Type Hierarchy, the Relation Hierarchy and a set of canonical conceptual 
graphs.  
Discussion on the  Motivational Drive Generator (examined in Chapter 5) demonstrated 
how the Internal State Registers were used to represent the agents lower emotional states 
such as hunger and tiredness.  The registers are monitored and updated by three drive 
mechanisms (Homeostatic, Cyclical and Default).  The drive mechanisms are used to 
trigger associated goals from the agents Goal Hierarchy by way of the Sensory Processor.  
These goals represent the wants of the agent and the agent strives to satisfy these goals by 
constructing a series of event spaces in the Constructive Area.  
The Constructive Area receives abstract goals from the Knowledge Area. These goals 
are processed by the Event Space Generator into plans (represented by Activity Digraphs) 
the agent knows if successfully executed, will satisfy the goals that were triggered earlier 
from the Goal Hierarchy.  The events that constitute the event space (explained in Chapter 
6) are constructed from four elemental concept types: actions, objects, time and context.  
These elements are derived from the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975) and used to describe all aspects of behaviour. Once constructed, the event space is 
passed to the Deliberate Area for ordering, prioritising and scheduling processing. 
The Deliberate Area accepts input in the form of an event space from the Constructive 
Area.  The purpose of the Deliberate Area is to order, prioritise and schedule events.  The 
events in the agents schedule become the outward behaviour of the agent.  The Deliberate 
Area creates an ordered schedule of events for the agent to perform. The schedule is 
dynamic and is continually updated and reordered as new event spaces arrive from the 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  208 
Constructive Area.  This operation is performed in the Deliberate Area by the Intention 
Generator. 
The Intention Generator uses the agents Affective Space to assign emotive values to 
the elements of an event.  These values are then used to prioritise the agents behaviours 
from most-liked to least-liked.  Initially the process of making an affective decision based 
on a single appraisal dimension (intention) derived from the Theory of Reasoned Action, 
was examined in Chapter 7.   
In Chapter 8, the discussion returned to the Knowledge Areas Affective Space.  As this 
concept forms the heart and soul of the EMAI architecture, the methods implemented for 
implementing the Affective Space were formalised.  The multi-dimensional nature of the 
Affective Space was also examined along with its inherent nature to deal simply with 
complex issues such as emotion decay and blending. 
In Chapter 9, the process of single-dimension affective decision making was expanded 
into the realm of multi-dimensional decision making using the Affective Space.  
Formalisations for generating emotional states, updating emotional states and predicting 
future emotional states were given. 
As the EMAI architecture was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of using concepts 
of emotion and emotional evaluation of actions, objects and other elements to generate 
intelligence in an artificial agent, the capabilities of these mechanisms to produce 
reasonable and believable intelligence in a computer-generated character was evaluated in 
Chapter 10. 
The evaluation of the EMAI architecture determined if the model was sufficiently 
capable of using the set of highly integrated mechanisms for generating motivation, goal 
setting, emotional intelligence and event prioritisation and scheduling.  The results gave 
positive feedback about the EMAI architecture's ability to produce reasonable emotional 
states and associated behaviours.  The data also confirmed the agent's ability to set and 
execute goals using motivational mechanisms related to the agent's physical and mental 
states.  
The emotional concepts implemented in the EMAI architecture are twofold. The 
functioning of the Motivational Drive Generator represents the lower level or survival 
emotions (discussed in Chapter 2) and the higher order emotions are represented and 
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formulated using the Affective Space. The Internal State Registers in association with the 
Homeostatic, Cyclical and Default Drive Mechanisms and the Sensory Processor trigger 
goals in the agent's Goal Hierarchy. Following this, an EMAI agent will endeavour to 
satisfy these goals by devising a list of appropriate events. The agent selects events to 
execute by prioritising them in order of the emotional states the event would evoke if 
executed. 
This functionality has eliminated the need to fix production rules in the agent's 
knowledge base. Instead, the agent's choice of behaviour is influenced by its motivational 
and emotional states.  The results obtained from the evaluation experiment show this type 
of behaviour is reasonable in an artificial agent, in particular one used for creating 
computer characters. 
11.3 Research Contributions 
The objective behind this dissertation has been to develop a new architecture for an 
emotionally motivated artificial intelligence.  The approach taken has been to move away 
from the traditional individual variable approach (see Section 1.4) that limits the way in 
which emotions are represented and processed. The EMAI architecture presented in this 
dissertation makes a small but significant advance away from this single-dimensional 
methodology with an innovative mechanism used in agent construction, called the 
Affective Space. The Affective Space continues to uses appraisal theories, but eliminates 
fixed formatted production rules and creates a dynamic multi-dimensional emotional state 
space used for the generation and processing of emotions.  The research presented here has 
led to a number of contributions to the field of Artificial Intelligence and Affective 
Computing.  
Contribution 1: The first contribution has been to develop an agent with the ability to 
appraise behavioural choices based on emotional assessment.  Given a specific goal to 
achieve and a number of suitable action options from which to choose, the agent can select 
an option that feels the best. Appraisal theories explain how a person could feel after an 
event. An EMAI agent determines how an event is considered, emotionally before the 
behaviour induced by the event takes place.  This is generated from experience and beliefs 
obtained through the agent's interaction with its environment, other agents (including 
humans) and its internal states. 
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Contribution 2: Secondly, an EMAI agent has the ability to revise its beliefs based on 
experience using the emotional states to assess elements of an event and use these 
evaluations in the assessment of future behaviours. The EMAI architecture extends the 
single-dimensional appraisal of intention from the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein 
and Ajzen 1975) to generate a multi-dimensional affective appraisal model that evaluates 
responses toward events.  The values gathered are then used to extrapolate future 
emotional states. 
Contribution 3: Behaviour selection in an EMAI agent is primarily based on an 
emotional state. The agent, based on its current emotional state and emotional bias, can 
generate a number of behavioural choices stemming from motivational mechanisms.  
These emotional states are used by the agent in a debriefing of its choice, the integration of 
new knowledge into the belief system and its use in the future assessment of events. 
Contribution 4: Another concept the EMAI agent introduces is that of a continuous 
multi-dimensional emotional space.  Previous models of emotional agents use a method 
that employs a number of levels or meters that represent discrete emotions.  These levels 
can rise or fall depending on the agents state.  The EMAI model engages a continuous 
Affective Space that consists of (initially) 15 emotional states, but is capable of 
representing infinite emotional states.  This suggests the agent can never experience no 
emotion and can support complex or mixed emotional states. Furthermore, mixed 
emotional states that are generated cannot be formed by an unlikely combination of 
emotional states due to their positioning in the Affective Space.  
Contribution 5: Another inherent characteristic of the continuous emotional state is the 
natural emotional decay that occurs.  As the agent receives input that changes its emotional 
state and it moves toward another emotional state it will also be moving away from current 
emotional states.  For example, if the agent is angry, as it receives happier input it will 
become more happy and less angry.  Emotional decay in previous models has been 
implemented by using constant decay rate functions that act over time.  These require 
considerable maintenance and coordination.  In the EMAI architecture, decay of an 
emotional state occurs as the result of the mood, represented by a point in the Affective 
Space, changing.  As the appraisal dimensions stored in the Knowledge Area that represent 
the agents mood are updated, the location of the mood point in the Affective Space 
changes.  Therefore, as the mood point moves away from one emotional state point 
towards another, it naturally causes the strength of the previous emotional state to decay.   
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Contribution 6: A further value that affects the operation of the Affective Space and 
adds extra functionality to the model that has not been seen in previous models of 
emotional agents is that of mood or current emotional state.  While other models do 
consider the issue of a mood or current emotional state they do not use this for emotional 
biasing in decision making. Depending on the agents mood it can select from tasks that 
will alter its mood to a more desired state.  What this means for the agent is that it will not 
always select the same task to put it in the desired mood.  For example if the agents 
preferred mood is happy it may select a different task to alter its mood from sad to happy 
than it might from angry to happy.  
Contribution 7: An EMAI agent also possesses a deep knowledge representation 
through its use of conceptual graphs and its interrelated knowledge of goals and known 
concepts.  Using this knowledge, the agent can extrapolate emotional states about new 
situations that are related through its Ontology. Although an agent may not have had an 
emotional experience involving a particular concept, it can estimate its emotional response 
using related concepts.  For example, the agent may have experienced an angry incident 
with a particular teacher.  If the agent had to calculate its emotional response toward 
another teacher, it could use the past angry response to extrapolate an emotion. Introduced 
in the EMAIs knowledge representation were several new abstractions that were used to 
enhance the use of conceptual graphs for the purpose of constructing the EMAI 
architecture. These included the Goal Hierarchy, Event Graphs and Activity Digraphs.  
Contribution 8: The way in which goals and concepts are represented in the agents 
knowledge base also allows it to attribute emotional states to the concepts/elements that 
make up an event.  Contemporary research attributes emotional state to a holistic view of 
events rather than assigning emotional reactions to the atomic components of an event, 
namely the action, object, time and context.  The way in which an EMAI agent assigns 
these emotions to the elements is further used to extrapolate and predict the emotional 
states of events that the agent has not encountered before but contains elements from other 
events that it has experienced. 
Contribution 9: The manner in which goals are structured in the EMAI architecture's 
Ontology also allows an EMAI agent to address the issue of dynamic goal interpretation 
via dynamic planning. EMAI agents can plan and re-plan the activities for satisfying their 
goals based on changing goals, environmental states and element appraisals that are 
associated with changing emotional states.   As the emotional state of the agent changes, so 
does its goals.  Furthermore, as the agent gathers experiences with elements in its 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  212 
environment and makes emotional assessments of these items, the agents plans for 
satisfying its goals also change. 
Contribution 10: In the same way that an EMAI agent can maintain a set of dynamic 
goals, an EMAI agent also maintains a dynamically changing experience against the 
elements of events that it has experienced.  An EMAI agent is able to revise its experience 
toward the event elements at every encounter and can revise these assessments on a 
continuing basis determined by the outcome of the last encounter. 
Contribution 11: Another restriction of previous emotional agent architectures that the 
EMAI architecture has overcome is the need to calculate emotional states through a series 
of constant production rules. For example, in the PETEEI pet-dog model, one rule is if the 
agent is angry and bowl is taken away then bark.  In the PETEEI model the event, bowl is 
taken away followed by a bark implies the agent is angry or in a bad mood.  Firstly, there 
is no mechanism to make this event a positive event resulting in positive emotions, it is 
programmed into the agent to have a negative effect on the agent. An EMAI agent allows 
its appraisal of events to change over time and with experiencing episodes of the event. 
Secondly, if the event bowl is taken away was to become a good event the production rule 
would no longer make sense.  An EMAI agent does not use production rules, but instead 
maps the event's appraisals into the Affective Space in order to determine how it will affect 
the current state of the agent. In this way the agent's emotions are dynamic and it can use 
these changing affective appraisals to adapt to its environment. 
Contribution 12: Another contribution made in this dissertation is the extension of the 
formalisation of the Theory of Reasoned Action.  As the theory was developed for use in 
the psychological domain, the expressions that explain the relationship between beliefs, 
assessments and intention were too vague for implementation into a computation agent.   
Therefore, the expressions used in the theory were expanded and modified to best suit the 
EMAI architecture and used for single-dimensional affective decision making.  
Furthermore, the formalisation used in this dissertation for the Theory of Reasoned Action 
was further augmented and used to describe the nature of the six appraisal dimensions of 
Smith and Ellsworths (1985) appraisal model and used to develop the EMAI agents 
multi-dimensional affective decision making qualities. 
Contribution 13: Finally, this dissertation contains the first attempt at a formalisation 
of a model of emotional intelligence that has been developed to describe the emergence of 
emotion in an artificial agent model.  This model, as described in Chapters 8 and 9, was 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  213 
evaluated by a number of volunteers interacting with an experimental computerised 
character built using the EMAI architecture.  While conclusive evidence does not exist to 
support this formalisation as being the true and correct way to implement an emotional 
decision making mechanism in an artificial agent, the preliminary results were supportive 
and encouraging. 
11.4 Future Directions  
During the course of the research presented in this dissertation, many issues and ideas 
for further work have arisen.  This section examines three directions the research in this 
dissertation could take to improve on the EMAI architecture and concludes by discussing 
some further application areas. 
11.4.1 Deeper Knowledge Representation of Event Element Relationships and Attitudes 
As discussed in Chapter 5, values for attitude calculated using the Theory of Reasoned 
Action mean very little in isolation.  For example, the attitude value for buying a new red 
Honda sports car may be 6, but when compared to nothing it is meaningless.  Therefore, 
attitudes are calculated for related events such as buying a new blue Ford ute or buying a 
secondhand white Mercedes Benz and compared with the former event to put it in 
perspective. 
However, the aforementioned events and their associated attitudes are calculated for the 
same action, in this example, buying a car.   The Theory of Reasoned Action does not 
describe how the attitudes toward individual event elements, pertaining to one action, 
might relate to the same elements involved in a different action. For example, is the 
attitude towards the red Honda sports car in the event for buying a car the same, as it 
would be in the event for driving a car?   
While the EMAI architecture allows for weightings to be applied to individual elements 
that make up an event it does not allow for the depth of relationships that exist between the 
individual elements.  In Chapter 7 the Theory of Reasoned Action was used to calculate 
the attitude toward performing an event.  In brief, the agents attitude toward performing 
an event is determined by the agents set of beliefs about the event elements and how the 
agent assesses each of these beliefs. Although the attitude calculation equation is used in 
the Theory of Reasoned Action to holistically assess an intention, according to Petty and 
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Cacioppo (Petty and Cacioppo 1996), it can also be used to assess attitudes towards 
elements involved in events such as people, objects and issues.  However, it does not 
describe how the attitudes toward individual elements from one event might be combined 
with elements from other events to calculated new attitudes. 
The EMAI architecture extends the Theory of Reasoned Action and applies it to finding 
assessment values for six appraisal dimensions.  These values are used to determine the 
agents current emotional state.  While this has been evaluated as adequate for the task of 
representing the goals of a pet dog and combining event space elements to produce 
reasonable emotional states, it is unclear how more complex event spaces and associated 
elements would be handled. 
This possible shortcoming of the EMAI architecture and limitation of the Theory of 
Reasoned Action introduces an objective for further research.  It seems that in an event, the 
action and object of that action have the most influence over the attitude toward the event 
and thus the associated emotional state evoked by the event.  Consider the pet dog 
example.  Assume the pet dog has two objects in its environment: BALL and TOWEL, and 
the agent also has two actions to choose from, namely, CHEW and PLAY.  These elements 
can be combined to create four event spaces, thus: 
E1 = {[CHEW],[BALL]} 
E2 = {[CHEW],[TOWEL]} 
E3 = {[PLAY],[BALL]} 
E4 = {[PLAY],[TOWEL]} 
Assuming the agent, through experience, believes the action CHEW is bad and thus 
evokes a negative emotional state and the action PLAY is good and results in a positive 
emotional state, the agent will select the action PLAY over the action CHEW.  If the agent 
believes the BALL evokes positive emotions and the TOWEL evokes negative emotions, 
the agent will choose, in this example, the event E3 that represents playing with the ball.   
In this case, the events action is disassociated from the object.  Each object is combined 
with each action to produce an event space. 
Now consider the actions for another agent; KISS and PLAY TENNIS and the objects 
BILL and TED.  Combined these elements create the following four event spaces. 
E1 = {[KISS],[BILL]} 
E2 = {[KISS],[TED]} 
E3 = {[PLAY TENNIS],[BILL]} 
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E4 = {[PLAY TENNIS],[TED]} 
In this case if the agent believed the event E1 that represents kissing Bill evoked positive 
emotions and the event E4 (playing tennis with Ted) also evoked positive emotions, it 
would calculate that both the events, E2 and E3 (kissing Ted and playing tennis with Bill) 
would also evoke positive emotions.  However, this may not be the case, Ted may be a 
terrible kisser and Bill an awful tennis player.  Therefore, attitude associations that might 
work in the EMAI architecture for the goals and events of a simple pet dog would not work 
in the same way for more complex and disassociated events.   
Here lies the need for a more complex event space definition within the agents 
Ontology. Restrictions need to be placed on event element combinations.  This could be 
achieved by creating a deeper knowledge representation of an event using the existing 
conceptual graph concepts.  Restrictions could be placed on events that allow and disallow 
particular combinations of elements.  For example, a restriction on which object (in this 
case, agent) can be combined with the action KISS may be that the object should be a good 
kisser.  If the object does not meet the necessary criteria then the element combination is 
not allowed. 
This type of knowledge representation is possible within the current constructs of the 
EMAI architecture but as yet has not been thoroughly explored.  It may also be the case 
that these restrictions on event element combinations are still not adequate for producing 
reasonable emotional states in agents with complex goals, beliefs and events.  An 
investigation would need to develop a formal relationship between actions, objects, time 
and context in event spaces. This research path needs to be explored further to determine if 
the current EMAI architecture is capable of achieving these reasonable emotional states for 
complex event spaces or if further enhancements need to be made. 
Within the issue of deeper knowledge representation also lies the issue of scalability. 
While the objective of this dissertation was to discover the plausibility of modeling 
emotion in AI, scalability was not addressed.  However, it is an important issue to consider 
and will be briefly discussed here.   
As the knowledge base grows and the type and relation hierarchies become more 
complex, the topics of load handling and fault tolerance arise.  Although combinatorial 
explosion is the main issue of scalability with respect to the knowledge base and the 
generation of events and plans, it allows the agent to fully explore its environment.  As 
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suggested in the Case Study 4 in section 7.8, Alberts decision making process 
demonstrates that humans do not need to consider all of the possibilities in their 
environment to make a decision.  However, when an initial set of possibilities is 
considered unusable, another set is contemplated.  As the EMAI architecture handles 
combinatorial explosion in a similar manner, the issue of scalability has not arisen.  
However, as scalability of small scale AI systems is a concern, further experimentation 
should be performed to discover the limitations of the EMAI architecture. 
11.4.2 Domain Specific Event Appraisals and Emotional Theories 
Another area that is worthy of research is that of the appraisal dimensions selected for 
constructing the Affective Space.  The dimensions chosen for EMAIs initial Affective 
Space belonged to an existing appraisal model by Smith and Ellsworth (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985).  As the objective of the research herein was not to evaluate the appraisal 
dimensions but to evaluate the use of such a model in an intelligent agent architecture, 
different appraisal dimensions were not evaluated. It has become evident during this 
research that while the appraisal dimensions used for EMAI's Affective Space have been 
successful in representing emotional states with respect to events, there are many other 
dimensions that could be equally as effective. Furthermore, stimuli other than events can 
evoke emotional states and in these cases, an entirely different set of appraisal dimensions 
may be more appropriate.  
The model produced by Smith and Ellsworth (1985) provides an excellent starting point 
for the creation of the Affective Space as they had developed the model by assessing a 
number of appraisal dimensions and identifying the discrete location of emotions along 
these dimensions through non-invasive human experimentation.  The Smith and Ellsworth 
model demonstrates a strong relationship between a subjects interpretation of an event and 
the emotional reaction to it.  They identified six orthogonal appraisal dimensions that show 
how their selected 15 emotional states are unique. 
Besides the six appraisal dimensions that were included in the Smith and Ellsworth 
model used for the definition of EMAIs Affective Space (pleasantness, effort, certainty, 
attention, responsibility and control) psychologists have suggested many others.  These 
include legitimacy (Roseman, Jose et al. 1990), compatibility, novelty and perceived 
obstacle (Scherer 1982) and danger or threat (Smith and Lazarus 1990).   
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Because the Smith and Ellsworth model was developed through experimental 
procedures and evaluated as a successful theory for relating their chosen appraisal 
dimensions with 15 separate emotional states, it formed an excellent basis for the Affective 
Space of the EMAI architecture.  As the objective of this dissertation was to develop an 
emotionally intelligence artificial intelligence, and not expand the psychological theory of 
emotion, further research into other appropriate appraisal dimensions and other emotional 
states was not explored.  This is not to suggest that this type of research would not be 
beneficial to the advancement of affective computing.  In fact, the appraisals in the EMAI 
architecture are restricted to the emotional states evoked from events.  However, emotional 
states can be evoked from a number of other cognitive appraisals. 
Music, for example, can evoke a variety of emotional states in the listener (Juslin and 
Madison 1999).  Tempo, timing, articulation, key, tone and instrument choice all influence 
the emotions experienced by the listener. 
Colour, is another concept that can elicit an emotional response from the viewer 
(Jacobson and Bender 1996).   Emotions experienced as the result of viewing a specific 
colour differ culturally. For example, black is associated with funerals and mourning in the 
western world and white and purple are associated with funerals and mourning in the 
eastern world.  However, the research clearly shows that differing colours can evoke 
different emotional states. 
This suggests that emotional experiences are not restricted to the cognitive appraisals of 
Smith and Ellsworths model.  Exactly what appraisal dimensions are appropriate in 
assessing concepts other than events is ill-defined in current literature.  Initially a full 
analyses of the domain where the affective application is developed needs to be undertaken 
before further identification of more appropriate appraisal dimensions is made. 
  It could be the case that in some domains cognitive appraisal models of emotion 
theory are inadequate for the full realisation of a reasonable emotionally intelligent 
artificial being.  For example, besides the theories of emotion presented in Chapter 2 that 
give the western world philosophy on the subject, there are also a number of eastern views 
on emotion.  The traditional Chinese medicine of acupuncture defined 12 main Qi channels 
that run through the body (Rogers 2000).  These channels related to major organ and 
intestinal parts of the body such as the stomach, lungs and large intestine.  The lungs are 
said to relate to the emotion of sadness, the stomach corresponds to pensiveness and the 
heart happiness. 
THE SYNTHESIS OF EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES       
  218 
In the Chinese martial art of Tai Chi, emotions are related to the universal five 
elements; wood, fire, earth, water and metal.  Each element corresponds to both a negative 
and positive emotional state.  For wood, the positive emotion is humour and the negative 
emotion is anger. 
Exactly how these views on emotional theories could be integrated into AI is unclear 
but also worth further investigation.  It may be that some western philosophies are suited to 
a particular set of application areas and eastern philosophies to others. 
11.4.3 Computerised Character Building 
Having completed an evaluation of the EMAI architecture in the form of a simple pet 
dog and a comparison of its performance against a randomly programmed model, an issue 
has arisen that questions the depth of architecture needed to create a suspension of 
disbelief.  During the evaluation, the random modelled pet dog performed in a manner that 
was acceptable to the evaluator.  While the EMAI model did outperform the random 
model, the depth of the EMAI architecture may have implemented more mechanisms than 
necessary in order to fool the user. 
Stern in (Hirsh 1998) identifies some key characteristics for the successful creation of a 
computerised character.  He suggests they need to 
• act like humans  to use natural language, reason and discuss events; 
• have knowledge about their world and memories of personal history; and 
• exhibit emotions and personalities that fuel their motivations and desires. 
Stern also explains one important key point in the development of a life-like computerised 
character.  All they need to do is make the user believe they are real.  The characters do not 
have to be internally alive, just perceived as such.  This approach is called user-perception-
based development. 
The EMAI architecture has not been designed in an attempt to create an agent that is 
operating as if programmed to be alive.  The concept of the Affective Space has been 
based upon an existing psychological model of emotion in an attempt to create a more 
efficient, adaptable and believable agent.  The experiment performed in Chapter 10, 
illustrates the successfulness with which the EMAI architecture was used to model a pet 
dog called Fido.   
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The most complex part of creating a computer character with the EMAI architecture is 
in the programming of the Ontology.  This is a labourious task of gathering domain 
specific information, goals and associated plans to fill the agents knowledge base.  As a 
further research project it would be critical to define a generic Ontology that could have 
plug in type modules that would be of use to application developers who were interested in 
integrating the EMAI agents into their software.   
This research could lead to the development of a computer character generation engine. 
Similar to a games engine, this would allow novice programmers and applications 
developers easy access to building computerised gaming characters with the EMAI 
architecture without having a depth of knowledge that spans conceptual graph theory, 
cognitive appraisal theories of emotion and goal setting and planning.  Rather an ideal 
front-end could be written that makes the internal workings of an EMAI agent invisible to 
the developer.  This way creative designers could put more energy into the development of 
the personality and background of the character rather than be concerned with artificial 
intelligence concepts. 
This type of application would require extensive research into the psychology of 
human-computer interaction, what the user believes they are perceiving when interacting 
with a computer generated character and the tools needed by games developers and 
interactive fiction writers. 
11.4.4 Other Application Areas 
A number of application areas for affective computing have been developed in recent 
years.  The majority of these areas focus on the computers ability to predict the emotional 
state of the user.  Several projects undertaken by the MIT Media Laboratory focus on 
wearable computers and affective tutoring systems that rely on their ability to determine 
the users emotional state from a series of physiological changes.  The research into the 
EMAI agent has taken a different perspective.  Rather than predicting the emotions of the 
user, the computer itself is generating emotions that affect its own behaviour.  This type of 
behaviour would be beneficial in the creation of an intelligent tutoring system that not only 
predicts the users emotional state but also could adapt to it and provide an emotional and 
personalised interface that could appear sympathetic to the user.  
Another obvious application area for the EMAI architecture is in the development of 
computer game and interactive fiction characters.  This was discussed in Section 11.4.3.  
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Over the years computer games players have seen a significant advancement in the quality 
of the sound, visual effects and virtual reality environments that have been created by 
computer games programmers.  Stern, a leading computer games developer, in (Stern 
1999) comments that, what computer gamers are really seeking is affective AI and in 
particular the creation of believable artificial life or A-life.  He comments that by 
combining a direct interactive interface with highly expressive and personality rich 
characters the users are easily able to suspend their disbelief and form emotional 
relationships with the characters.  The EMAI architecture achieves a partial step in the 
direction to achieving this in computer characters by modelling an emotion rich decision-
making mechanism that gives a computer character a perceived personality and the ability 
to use emotions to adapt to its environment. 
E-commerce systems are increasingly recognising the importance of giving additional 
value to users by providing personalised transactional experiences (Meech and Marsh 
2000). Two specific factors that are apparent in the impact of personalised transactions in 
e-commerce are those of trust and personality and how these may be integrated into web 
based interfaces. Shoppers in face to face transactions with another human being usually 
encounter these traits.  The principle behind a life-like intelligent agent to act as a host at a 
website is the same as for the creation of computer games characters.  The aim is to create 
a suspension of disbelief for the user.  The qualities necessary for this are personality, 
emotions, social relationships and the illusion of life (Mateas 1997).  With the ability to 
create an artificial personality with emotions, the EMAI architecture could be used to 
develop a personalised face for an e-commerce business by providing a face for the 
company and a personal shopping guide.  
A further application of the EMAI architecture that couples with the e-commerce 
interface is a field called persuasive computing.  This field deals with the use of computers 
in marketing and advertising.  It involves the use of computer systems intentionally 
designed to change a person's attitudes or behaviour in a predetermined way (Fogg 1999). 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) has been used to study and 
calculate human attitudes regarding particular subjects and topics.  This theory has further 
been used in the analysis of persuasion techniques through advertising and marketing 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1996).  As the EMAI architecture has been built on the concepts of 
the Theory of Reasoned Action it makes it an ideal candidate for use in this field of 
application and research. 
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As can be seen from the aforementioned application areas, the EMAI architecture is 
ideal for integration into applications that require an intelligent system and an interface 
with personality and emotional capabilities.  The deep knowledge representation of the 
agents Ontology allows it to be programmed to meet the needs of any domain. Its 
emotional abilities allow it to create a personalised and non-threatening interface for 
computer systems and web interfaces and its attitude development mechanisms allow it to 
not only to meet the current needs of the user but to also be able to perceive future needs. 
11.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation has examined the concept of emotions from many viewpoints 
including the philosophical, the neurological and the psychological.  Of all the opposing 
and complementary theories of emotion one point is always made; emotions influence 
behaviour.    Although emotions were originally thought to impede rational thinking, new 
schools of thought have arisen that consider emotions a vital part of rational intelligent 
behaviour and necessary not only for survival, but also intellectual success.  In recent years 
emphasis has been placed on the concept of emotional intelligence.  This has lead many 
researchers in the area of artificial intelligence to examine the contribution that theories on 
emotion could have in the development of intelligent agents.  Thus the domain of affective 
computing was borne. 
The contributions in this dissertation endeavour to further enhance the domain of 
affective computing by providing a different perspective on the way in which emotions are 
modelled in an artificial agent.  The continuous Affective Space in the EMAI agent is used 
to replace the static gauges that are used to represent emotions in EMAI architectures 
predecessors.  Initial evaluations of the EMAI architectures ability to simulate a simple 
computer character have been promising and provided valuable and positive feedback.  
This data will be useful in determining future enhancements and further experimentation. 
What the future holds for the field of affective computing is unclear.  As it is very much 
in its infancy, researchers need to continue to examine and assess the elementary concepts 
of emotion generation.  No one theory stands out from the rest as being the ideal.  The 
complexities of human emotions may be too extreme to include them holistically within an 
artificial intelligence at this time.  Only those segments of emotional behaviour that are 
advantageous to the goals of an artificial being should be considered.  Further 
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categorisation of emotional behaviours is necessary to identify domains where particular 
aspects of emotions are of advantage.   
As more and more effort is put into small projects that contribute to the understanding 
of emotions, the field of affective computing comes one step closer to a model for general, 
emotional, artificial intelligence.  
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Appendix A 
The OCC Cognitive Structure of Emotions  
A number of theories exist that have been developed in order to specify how many and 
which appraisal criteria are minimally needed for differentiating emotional states.  The 
Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC) model presents 22 emotional states (happy-for, gloating, 
resentment, pity, joy, distress, pride, shame, admiration, reproach, love, hate, hope, fear, 
satisfaction, fears-confirmed, relief, disappointment, gratification, gratitude, remorse and 
anger) with respect to valenced reactions to events, agents and objects.  The model 
categorises emotions based on the consequences of events, the actions of agents and 
aspects of objects.  Within these categories, the model further distinguishes emotional 
states by determining whom the event affected or who performed the action.   Figure C.1, 
taken from (Ortony et al. 1988), illustrates the categorisation of the 22 emotions. 
Although the OCC model was never intended to be used for generating synthetic 
emotional states in artificial beings the authors did believe that it was important that 
machines be able to reason about emotions with respect to natural language processing, 
distributed problem solving and planning. Despite the authors original intentions for the 
model during the 1990s, it became the default model of choice for synthesising emotions in 
artificial intelligences.  Partial implementations can be seen in the architectures of Tok 
(Bates 1992) and The Affective Reasoner (Elliot 1992). 
Furthermore, the OCC model only addresses the cognitive generation of emotions.  It 
does not consider learning from emotional states, blending of emotional states or emotional 
reasoning or decision making.  For this reason, artificial intelligence researchers are using 
this model as a starting point for building affective computers. 
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e for others 
 happy-for        gloating 
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Figure A.1 The OCC Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Ortony, et al. 1988) 
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Appendix B 
Emotional State Categorisation in The Affective 
Reasoner Architecture 
Group Specification Name and Emotion Type 
Well-Being appraisal of a situation as an 
event 
joy: pleased about an event 
distress: displeased about an event 
Fortune-of-Others presumed value of a 
situation as an event 
affecting another 
happy-for: pleased about an event 
desirable for another 
gloating: pleased about an event 
undesirable for another 
resentment: displeased about an 
event desirable for another 
jealousy: resentment over a desired 
mutually exclusive goal 
envy: resentment over a desired 
non-exclusive goal 
sorry-for: displeased about an 
event undesirable for another 
Prospect-based appraisal of a situation as a 
prospective event 
hope: pleased about a prospective 
desirable event 
fear: displeased about a 
prospective undesirable event 
Confirmation appraisal of a situation as 
confirming or disconfirming 
an expectation 
satisfaction: pleased about a 
confirmed desirable event 
relief: pleased about a 
disconfirmed undesirable event 
fears-confirmed: displeased about 
a confirmed undesirable event 
disappointment: displeased about 
a disconfirmed desirable event 
Attribution appraisal of a situation as an 
accountable act of some 
agent 
pride: approving of ones own act 
admiration: approving of anothers 
act 
shame: disapproving of ones own 
act 
reproach: disapproving of 
anothers act 
Attraction appraisal of a situation as 
containing an attractive or 
unattractive object 
liking: finding an object appealing 
disliking: finding an object 
unappealing 
Well-being/Attribution compound emotions gratitude: admiration + joy 
anger: reproach + distress 
gratification: pride + joy 
remorse: shame + distress 
Attraction/Attribution compound emotion 
extensions 
love: admiration + liking 
hate: reproach + disliking 
Table B.1 Emotional State Categorisation in The Affective Reasoner 
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Appendix C 
Conceptual Graph Theory 
C.1) Introduction 
Conceptual Graphs (CG) are based on the existential graphs of Charles Sanders Peirce 
(Sowa 2001) and the semantic networks of artificial intelligence.  They are formally 
defined by an abstract syntax with the purpose of expressing meaning in a model that is 
logical, human readable and computationally trackable (Sowa 1984).  A CG has no 
meaning in isolation.   It is part of a larger knowledge representation called a semantic 
network.  A semantic network is a collection of all the relationships that concepts have 
with respect to one another, to procedures and motor mechanisms.   
According to Sowa (Sowa 1984), a conceptual graph is created through the process of 
perception.  Perception occurs in an individual when sensory input is received.  This could 
be in the form of a visual, audible or other sensory stimulus.   Through experience, a 
person builds up a stock of what are called percepts in long-term memory.  Each of these 
percepts are a persons mental representation of previously received sensory inputs.  For 
example, a person may have mental representations of objects such as dog, cat and apple 
and actions such as sit, eat or sleep.  The conceptual graph itself resembles a completed 
jigsaw puzzle that has been constructed by joining smaller pieces together, each piece 
representing a single percept. On receiving sensory input, long-term memory is searched 
for percepts matching all or part of the input.  These percepts are then assembled into a 
working model that best describes the input. When a person sees a cat sitting on a mat, 
percepts are gathered for cat, sit and mat.   These percepts are then combined to form a 
complete image of the sensory input.  A conceptual graph represents the logical 
associations and organisations of the percepts within the model created by the sensory 
input.    
The process of perception is an individualistic process.  For example, if two people 
were to hear that the cat sat on the mat, each person might develop a different image in 
their minds eye based on their individual stock of percepts.  One person may imagine a 
white cat sitting on a deep plush pile mat and the other person may imagine a black cat 
sitting on a doormat.  The image in the minds eye is analogous with the completed jigsaw 
puzzle where pieces representing the percepts cat, mat and sit have been connected and a 
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conceptual graph could be created to diagramatically represent this image.   What the 
image means to the individual cannot be expressed as a conceptual graph.  Conceptual 
graphs must derive meaning in the semantic network through their links to context, 
linguistic rules, procedures, definitions, episodes and emotions.  However, as this appendix 
is dedicated to the syntax of conceptual graph theory, the numerous links to the semantic 
network will not be discussed here. 
A conceptual graph is constructed using a series of concept nodes, that represent the 
percepts, and conceptual relation nodes that specify the role that each percept plays in 
connecting the concept nodes. 
Conceptual Graphs have the general form as shown in Figure C.1. This can be written 
using a linear notation in the form, 
[CONCEPT1] -> (REL) -> [CONCEPT2] 
This may be read as a relation of a concept1 is a concept2.  The arrows in the 
conceptual graph indicate the direction of the reading.  A reversal of the arrows in Figure 1 
would result in the reading a relation of a concept2 is a concept1.  The following is an 
example of a simple conceptual graph: 
 
[CAT] -> (PART)->[TAIL] 
This graph reads a part of a cat is a tail.  Expressed like this the description sounds 
ungrammatical and in reading more complex conceptual graphs in this manner, it is.  
However, this is a useful aid in interpreting any conceptual graph.  Once the user is 
familiar with conceptual graph structures, they could express the above CG, as a tail is a 
part of a cat. 
Concept nodes represent elements such as entities, attributes, states and events while 
conceptual relation nodes connect the concepts.  A concept has two parts, a concept type 
and a referent.  The concept type is a label that associates the concept with a real world 
perception.  Examples of a concept type are entity, action, and time. A concept type does 
not refer to any specific instance of an entity, attribute, state or event but instead acts as a 
Figure C.1 A Simple Conceptual Graph Form 
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predicate for which the semantic network to which the CG belongs, has a definition.  It is 
the purpose of the referent to identify a particular instance of the concept type.  The 
concept type t and referent r are displayed in linear form between square parenthesis with 
the concept type on the left and the referent on the right, thus: 
[t: r] 
Figure 2 integrates a number of concept types for example [ENTITY].  In this instance 
the referent has been left blank to indicate an existential quantifier meaning the actual 
referent is a physical entity that exists somewhere in the semantic network.  To define a 
particular instance of an exact entity type a referent could be included thus: 
[ENTITY: John] 
This would mean that John exists as an instance of an entity in the semantic network. 
While a CG may be used to represent a general description of an event, it can be linked 
to episodes indicating when such an event took place and also emotional associations 
during that episode that indirectly confer emotional overtones on the types of concepts 
involved.  As this dissertation concentrates primarily on the emotional assessment of 
events the following example focuses on the definition of an event using CG notation.  In 
keeping with Ajzen and Fishbeins definition of a behavioural event (Petty and Cacioppo 
1996) (see Chapter 6), an event can be represented as a CG as shown in Figure C.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphical or character-based notation can be used to depict a conceptual graph that 
represents knowledge with its series of concept nodes and conceptual relation nodes (Sowa 
1984, 2001).  In what is called the display form of Figure C.2, rectangles represent 
Figure C.2 A Conceptual Graph Representation of an Event 
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concepts and conceptual relations are drawn as circles or ovals.  The way in which the 
conceptual relations exist between the concepts is drawn as an arrow.  In linear form, the 
boxes are abbreviated as square brackets and the circles as rounded parentheses.   
The textual representation of a conceptual graph in linear form is less cumbersome and 
more easily parsed and dealt with from an analysis point of view and will be used from this 
point forward.  Figure C.2 can be written as: 
[ACTION] – 
(OBJ) -> [ENTITY] 
(AGNT) -> [ENTITY] 
(TEMP) -> [TIME] 
(CONT) -> [CONTEXT] 
The hyphen on the first line indicates that the relations attached to [ACTION] are 
continued on subsequent lines.  A longer version could have been written as follows (the 
English-like translations appear in brackets after the graphs): 
[ACTION] –> (OBJ) -> [ENTITY]  (an entity is the object of an action) 
[ACTION] –> (AGNT) -> [ENTITY] (an entity is the agent of an action) 
[ACTION] –> (TEMP) -> [TIME] (a time is the temporal value of an action) 
[ACTION] –> (CONT) -> [CONTEXT] (a context is the context of the action) 
This can also be more simply expressed in a condensed English-like sentence and read, 
an entity is the object of an action on an entity at some time and in some context.  
Therefore, the sentence a cat entity is the agent of the action sitting whose object is a mat 
entity, whose temporal value was the time Tuesday and whose context was in the rain 
could be expressed as: 
[SAT] – 
(OBJ) -> [MAT] 
(AGNT) -> [CAT] 
(TEMP) -> [TUESDAY] 
(CONT) -> [RAIN] 
It could also be condense further into a more sensible English-like sentence as the cat 
was sitting on the mat on Tuesday in the rain. 
Notice that the labels for the conceptual relations are kept relatively short and usually 
abbreviated (three or four characters) to keep the notation brief.  For future reference, 
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Table C.1 displays the conceptual relations to be used in this appendix along with their 
abbreviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Like the concept type, the conceptual relation has two parts, the relation type and a 
nonnegative integer called its valence. The conceptual relation acts as a connector between 
concept types and specifies the role that exists between them.  The relation type is a label 
that explains the nature of the relationship and the valence is the number of arcs that 
belong to the conceptual relation.  Most of the common relations are dyadic (with two 
arcs) such as: 
[ACTION] -> (OBJ) -> [ENTITY] 
However,  a conceptual relation may have any number of arcs for example, 
[ACTION] -> (PAST) 
depicts an action concept occurring in the past with (PAST) as a monadic conceptual 
relation and  
[PERSON: Joe] <- (BETW) – 
<- [HOUSE] 
                <- [CAR] 
describing a person called Joe being between a car and a house where the conceptual 
relation (BETW) is triadic as the concept [PERSON: Joe] is one and the same thus giving 
the (BETW) conceptual relation three arcs. 
In summary and as formally defined by the NCITS.T2 Committee on Information 
Interchange and Interpretation in the Conceptual Graph Standard of March 21, 2001 (Sowa 
2001),  
Conceptual Relation Abbreviation 
object OBJ 
agent AGNT 
own OWN 
context CONT 
location LOC 
temporal TEMP 
past PAST 
instrument INST 
manner MANR 
between BETW 
Table C.1 Conceptual Relation Abbreviations 
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A conceptual graph g is a bipartite graph, which consists of two kinds of 
nodes called concepts and conceptual relations.  
• Every arc a of g is a pair (r, c) consisting of a conceptual relation r and a 
concept c in g. The arc a is said to belong to r; it is said link r to c; but it 
does not belong to c.  
• A conceptual graph g may have concepts that are not linked to any 
conceptual relation; but every arc that belongs to any conceptual relation r 
in g must link r to exactly one concept c in g.  
• Three kinds of conceptual graphs have distinguished names:  
1. The blank is an empty conceptual graph with no concepts, 
conceptual relations, or arcs.  
2. A singleton is a conceptual graph that consists of a single concept, 
but no conceptual relations or arcs.  
3. A star is a conceptual graph that consists of a single conceptual 
relation r, every arc that belongs to r, and every concept c that is 
linked by some arc (r, c) that belongs to r.  
Both the concept and conceptual relation nodes are labeled with English words.  These 
are percepts that are understood by the semantic network where the conceptual graphs have 
been created and also aid in the conversion of the graphical notation into English 
sentences.  These labels are organised within the semantic network as hierarchies known as 
type hierarchies and relationship hierarchies.  Both hierarchies are partially-ordered sets of 
labels that support the inheritance of properties from supertypes to subtypes.  Supertypes 
within the hierarchy are more abstract and subtypes are more primitive.  The concepts in 
the CG of Figure C.2 are quite abstract.  Examples of these hierarchies are illustrated in 
Figure C.3 and C.4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.3 shows a simple Type Hierarchy.  The type denoted by T, at the very top of 
the hierarchy, is the most abstract type and is known as the universal type.  All other types 
Figure C.3 An Example Type Hierarchy 
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in the hierarchy are subtypes of the universal type.  As can been seen, moving down 
through the hierarchy leads to subtypes that have the properties of their parents. At the 
very bottom of the hierarchy is the type abstract denoted by ⊥. 
 
 
 
 
The hierarchy in Figure C.4, which shows a Relation Hierarchy, is structured in the 
same manner as the Type Hierarchy.  There is a universal relation that acts as the common 
supertype to all other relations.  In this example, the relation CONT (context) is a parent to 
the relations LOC (location) and TEMP (temporal).  These relations could be used to 
describe the location of an entity or when a particular action occurred.   
Concept types from the Type Hierarchy can be combined with conceptual relations in 
the Relation Hierarchy to form countless conceptual graphs.  However, not all 
combinations of concept nodes and conceptual relation nodes will make sense.  For 
example, in (Sowa 1984), Sowa gives the following example: 
[SLEEP] -> (AGNT) -> [IDEA] -> (COLR) -> [GREEN] 
which may be read Some act of sleeping has an agent, which is an idea, which has a 
colour, green.  To eliminate such nonsensical conceptual graphs, Katz and Fodor (Katz 
and Fodor 1963) created a set of semantics that impose constraints on the combinations of 
concept and conceptual relation nodes that are allowed.  These constraints allow for the 
creation of meaningful graphs that represent possible situations in the world.  These graphs 
are called canonical. 
C.2) Canonical Graph Formation 
There are three processes by which a canonical conceptual graph may be formed. These 
are: 
Figure C.4 An Example Relation Hierarchy 
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1. When a new real world situation is encountered and a graph is formed by means of 
perception, the graph formed by the new combination of concept nodes and 
conceptual relation nodes is deemed canonical. 
2. Graphs that are introduced into the semantic network by a knowledge engineer are 
referred to in conceptual graph terms to resemble insight and are considered 
canonical. 
3. New conceptual graphs can be formed through a series of operations called 
formation rules.  Although there are a number of formation rules that can be 
applied to conceptual graphs there are only four considered to produce canonical 
graphs.  These are copy, restrict, join and simplify. 
 
As the first two processes listed above could be achieved in a variety of ways, they are 
not discussed here.  However, the formation rules of item three are part and parcel of 
conceptual graph theory and therefore, warrant definition at this point. 
As its name suggests, the copy rule creates a copy of a conceptual graph.  If the 
knowledge base of an application includes a conceptual graph g1, then by copying g1 
another conceptual graph called g2 can be produced that is an exact replica of g1.  As g1 
existed in the knowledge base as a canonical graph, then g2 must also be a canonical graph.  
It may seem pointless to have two conceptual graphs that are exactly the same in the 
knowledge base, however, if a conceptual graph is manipulated by another formation rule, 
then it becomes different and the original is lost.  Therefore, it is pertinent to make a copy 
of a conceptual graph before applying other formation rules on it, if the original conceptual 
graph will be needed later. 
The restrict rule can perform changes to concept types or referents or the concept nodes 
of a conceptual graph.  The restrict rule allows the concept type to be constrained to 
another type that exists in the Type Hierarchy as a subtype of the concept type.  For 
example, given the Type Hierarchy of Figure C.3 and the conceptual graph, 
[ACTION] -> (AGNT) -> [ENTITY] 
the concept [ACTION] could be restricted to the concept [EAT] forming the new 
canonical conceptual graph, 
[EAT] -> (AGNT) -> [ENTITY] 
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Furthermore, the concept [ENTITY] could be restricted to the concept [ANIMAL] or even 
further to the concept [DOG] to create the graph: 
[EAT] -> (AGNT) -> [DOG] 
To prevent the concept [ENTITY] being restricted to a concept such as [ROCK] that 
would make a nonsensical graph such as: 
[EAT] -> (AGNT) -> [ROCK] 
a base set of canonical graphs can be included within a conceptual graph processor to 
place selectional restrictions on the concept types of restrict operations that can be 
performed.  In the above example, given the canonical graph [EAT]->(AGNT)-
>[ANIMAL],the concept [ENTITY] could never be restricted to a concept type that was 
not [ANIMAL] or a subtype thereof. 
The restrict rule can also perform restrictions on a concept type by adding a referent 
when none exists.  For example, the above graph could be restricted to a particular instance 
of the concept type [DOG] and create the graph: 
[EAT] -> (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
The join rule takes two canonical conceptual graphs and joins them at the intersection 
of concept nodes.  This operation is formed by identifying an identical concept in two 
graphs, deleting this concept from one of the graphs and then linking all arcs from the 
deleted concept to its identical concept in the other graph.  For example, consider the 
following two graphs: 
[EAT] -> (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
and 
[EAT] -> (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
By using the join rule and specifying the concept [EAT], the following new conceptual 
graph can be formed: 
[EAT] – 
(OBJ) -> [BONE] 
(AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
This graph can be read a dog called Deefa eating a bone.  
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The final canonical formation rule is simplify.  This rule acts on a conceptual graph to 
remove duplicate concept nodes if there are any present. This operation is usually 
performed after graphs have been joined to remove any redundant nodes.  
For example, the graph: 
[EAT] – 
(OBJ) -> [BONE] 
(AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
 
is joined by the concept [EAT] to the graph: 
[EAT] – 
 (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
 (TEMP) -> [TUESDAY] 
 (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
to form the graph: 
[EAT] – 
 (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
 (TEMP) -> [TUESDAY] 
 (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
 (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
 (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
 
As the resultant graph, contains a redundant link to the concept [DOG: Deefa] from 
the concept [EAT] via the conceptual relation (AGNT), the above graph can be simplified 
to remove the redundant link and produce the graph: 
[EAT] – 
  (AGNT) -> [DOG: Deefa] 
  (TEMP) -> [TUESDAY] 
  (LOC) -> [BACKYARD] 
  (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
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C.3) Generalisation and Specialisation 
The canonical formation rules of join and restrict, described in the previous section, are 
also known as specialisation rules.  This is due to the nature of the resultant conceptual 
graphs.  Specialisation occurs when concepts in a graph become less generic by 
converging the concept type to one of its subtypes in the Type Hierarchy or when a 
specific referent is designated. 
The operations that reverse the effects of specialisation are called generalisations.  After 
a graph has been generalised the concept type labels become more generic taking on type 
labels of their supertypes from the Type Hierarchy.  It should be noted that generalisation 
does not necessarily preserve the canon.  For example the graph: 
[DOG] <- (AGNT) <- [EAT] -> (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
could be generalised on both the [DOG] and [BONE] concepts resulting in the graph: 
[ENTITY] <- (AGNT) <- [EAT] -> (OBJ) -> [ENTITY] 
This graph implies that some entity eats another entity and while this may be true in some 
circumstances, it is not the case for all combinations of [ENTITY] subtypes that could be 
specialised into this graph from the Type Hierarchy.  For example, the graph: 
[BONE] <- (AGNT) <- [EAT] -> (OBJ) -> [DOG] 
or some bone is eating a dog, is a nonsensical specialisation.  Therefore, by generalising 
the first graph that defined the constraints that only a dog can eat a bone, the knowledge 
base has lost its canonical nature.  However, operations that result in generalisations of 
graphs are necessary from time to time because they form the basis for logic within the 
knowledge base and are necessary for adding new insights (see Section 2 of this appendix). 
C.4)  Type and Relation Expansion and Contraction 
Type and Relation expansion in conceptual graph theory is somewhat similar to 
variable substitution and expansion that takes place in mathematical expressions.  Given a 
definition for a type in the Type Hierarchy or a relation in the Relation Hierarchy, these 
conceptual graphs can be substituted into existing conceptual graphs where the type or 
relation appears.  This will expand the conceptual graph and is called type or relation 
expansion depending on the concept being replaced.  The opposite operation that replaces 
sections of conceptual graphs with one type or relation concept is called contraction. 
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Consider the following type and relation definitions: 
type KISS(x) is 
 [TOUCH: *x] – 
  (AGNT) -> [PERSON] -> (PART) -> [LIPS] 
  (MANR) -> [TENDER] 
If a graph existed thus: 
[KISS] – 
(AGNT) -> [PERSON: HARRY]  
(OBJ) -> [PERSON: MARY] 
it could be expanded by replacing the concept type KISS with the type definition for 
KISS above.  The resulting graph would look like this: 
[TOUCH] – 
  (AGNT) -> [PERSON: HARRY] -> (PART) -> [LIPS] 
  (MANR) -> [TENDER] 
  (OBJ) -> [PERSON: MARY] 
Type contraction would return the above graph back to its former state.  Relation 
contraction and expansion works in exactly the same way. 
C.5)   Other Graph Operations 
Before concluding this appendix, two other operations that are used in manipulating 
conceptual graphs should be mentioned.  These are the rules of projection and maximal 
join. 
The projection rule allows one conceptual graph to be projected onto another 
conceptual graph resulting in a graph that consists of concept nodes and conceptual 
relation nodes that are present and directly connected in each graph.  Basically, it is finding 
a graph that is a common subgraph of the two given graphs where specialisations are held.  
For example, given the graphs: 
[ACTION] -> (AGNT) -> [ENTITY] 
and 
[DOG: Deefa] <- (AGNT) <- [EAT] -> (OBJ) -> [BONE] 
by projecting the first graph onto the second graph, the following graph results: 
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[DOG: Deefa] <- (AGNT) <- [EAT] 
Maximal join operates in a similar manner to the join rule, except that the graphs are 
joined on all maximally common projections.  For example, given the graphs: 
[EAT] –  
(AGNT) -> [DOG] 
  (MANR) -> [FAST] 
and 
[EAT] –  
(AGNT) -> [DOG] 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
the resultant maximally joined graph would be: 
[EAT] –  
(AGNT) -> [DOG] 
  (OBJ) -> [FOOD] 
(MANR) -> [FAST] 
where the graphs have been joined on both the [EAT] concept and the [DOG] concept in 
the same operation. 
C.6)   Conclusion 
There have been many books, tutorials and conference papers written on conceptual graph 
theory.  The nature of conceptual graphs is as broad as it is deep.  This appendix has 
provided a brief introduction to the topic and included necessary syntactical and 
operational information necessary to the comprehension of the use of conceptual graphs 
throughout this dissertation. 
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Appendix D  
Evaluation Questionnaire 
Simulation of Fido. 
Background:  EMAI (Emotionally Motivated Artificial Intelligence) is the software 
agent that has been designed by Penny Baillie as the result of her research into emotional 
intelligence for her PhD.  EMAI can be used to simulate any type of computer character.  
For this experience, EMAI is simulating a simple computerised pet called Fido.   Fido is a 
simulation of a pet dog with simplistic behaviours.  The simulation has not been designed 
to evaluate how well EMAI simulates a pet dog, but rather to gather your evaluation about 
the emotional intelligence produced by the agent.  A pet dog was chosen as the computer 
character as most people are familiar with and have expectations about the behaviour of 
pet dogs. 
Interacting with Fido 
If you received the fido.zip file via email you will need to unzip the contents into a new 
directory.  A directory called EMAI on your desktop will do.  EMAI (Emotionally 
Motivated Artificial Intelligence) is the model that has been developed during the research 
for Pennys Ph.D.  For this experiment/evaluation EMAI is being used to model a pet dog 
called Fido. 
There are two executable files for you to evaluate; fidogreen.exe and fidoblue.exe.  
Each program implements a different type of model for producing emotions and 
behaviours in the pet dog Fido.   The evaluation that you are about to undertake will assist 
in the further development of the EMAI software.  For this reason your answers about each 
model need to be as honest as possible. 
What you wo not be evaluating 
Not having the resources, skills, staff and money of multimillion-dollar software 
companies, the EMAI software has a primitive interface, no sound and no sophisticated 
computer graphics so you will not be evaluating the software for these things. 
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The actual behaviours of a pet dog are quite complex.  Although EMAI is simulating a 
pet dog, you will not be evaluating the accuracy or depth of the pets range of actions. 
What you will be evaluating 
The purpose of this evaluation is to obtain your opinion about the emotional 
intelligence of the pet dog.  Things that this will include are goal setting, motivation, 
attitude development, learning and emotional states. 
How to Proceed 
Peoples experiences with Fido can be many and varied.  In order to gather data about 
similar experience with Fido the following exercises have been created for you to follow.   
Read an exercise, run the EMAI software and perform the exercises with Fido then 
answer the questions.  You will need to perform this routine twice; once with Fidogreen 
and once with Fidoblue.  When finished with the exercises close the program.  On closing 
you will find that a text file has been generated in the same directory as the programs, they 
will be called fidogreen.txt and fidoblue.txt. You can use these to review your simulation 
if you need to.  These files will be overwritten each time you run the program. 
When you are finished return your questionnaires to Penny. Exercises begin on page 
three. 
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EMAs User Interface 
This document explains the interface for EMAs simulation of Fido, a computer character pet 
dog. 
Motivational Urges 
The motivational urges section of the interface 
consists of three urge gauges.  These gauges represent 1) 
how hungry Fido is; 2) how sleepy Fido is, and 
3) how much exercise Fido wants.  These are 
controlled by the simulation and the user cannot 
adjust the values. 
 
Environmental Display 
black window where an image of Fido is 
displayed.  The image and simple animations of Fido 
illustrate Fido’s behaviours and emotions.  Along with 
the image of Fido, the environmental display also shows 
which items you have placed in Fido’s environment.  
These are displayed as small individual icons. 
 
Simulation Narration 
Tool Bar 
to put items in and take items out of Fido’s environment.  When the user adds an item to the 
environment a corresponding icon will appear in the environmental display.  The second 
part of the tool bar are two buttons that control the running of the simulation.  The pause 
button allows the user to pause the simulation at anytime to review the narration and the 
start button starts the simulation running again. 
 
Discipline Buttons 
The final items on the EMAI interface are the large buttons with the sad and smiley faces .  
These buttons can be pressed by the user to tell Fido whether or not he is bad or good.  The buttons 
can be pressed any number of times.  For example if Fido is chewing the shoe, the user can click on 
the BAD DOG button several times to emphasize to Fido just how
Running the Simulation 
X button in the top right hand 
corner. On closing the program the narrative from the simulation run will be written to a file called 
“fidogreen.txt” or “fidoblue.txt” in the same directory as the EMAI software. 
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Exercises 
Introduction - IMPORTANT 
To perform these exercises select one of the Fido simulations, either Fidogreen or 
Fidoblue. Perform ALL exercises and complete the questionnaire for ONE FIDO ONLY 
before repeating the exercises and questionnaire for the other Fido. 
Each questionnaire should take you about 45mins to complete.  If you do not have time 
to complete the questionnaires for both Fidos, try to finish one in a sitting then come back 
later and complete the other questionnaire. Please try and complete these questionnaires as 
quickly as possible.  You will need to print out 2 copies of the questionnaire to complete if 
you do not already have a paper copy.   
Exercise 1: Default Behaviour. 
a) Run Fido. 
b) Before beginning run the mouse over each part of the screen. Hint boxes will pop up 
that informs you what each part/button is for. 
c) Click on the Start Button to Begin.  Notice that Fido initially has low motivation for all 
of the motivational urge gauges (at the top). As the values on the motivational urge 
gauges go up, Fido will begin to do things. 
d) For this exercise just watch what Fido does without interacting with him.  
e) When Fidos hungry gauge reaches the extreme right, wait until FIDO IS HUNGRY 
has printed in the narrative box 3 times and press the pause button. 
f) Use your experience in watching Fido and the narration in the text box to answer the 
questions about exercise 1 on the questionnaire. 
g) Close Fido 
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Exercise 2: Simple Learning. 
a) Run Fido. 
b) For this exercise use the BAD DOG and GOOD DOG buttons ONLY. 
c) By using the GOOD DOG button to praise Fido when he performs a good action and 
the BAD DOG button to reprimand Fido when he is bad try and teach Fido to prefer 
playing with the ground (rolling about) rather than other activities.  Continue this until 
the hungry gauge reaches the extreme right, wait unit FIDO IS HUNGRY has 
printed twice.  Press the pause button. 
d) Use your experience in watching Fido and the narration in the text box to answer the 
questions about exercise 2 on the questionnaire.  DO NOT CLOSE FIDO WHEN 
FINISHED. 
e) After answering the exercise 2 questions, continue to Exercise 3 with the same Fido 
program open. 
Exercise 3: Satisfying Motivational Urges 
a) Continuing from the last exercise, press the start button to start the simulation going. 
b) Click on the Food Button to give Fido some food. 
c) Once Fido has finished eating the food, take notice of his emotional state and his next 
behaviour. 
d) When Fido is hungry again, click on the Food Button again. Continue this until you 
have served up about 5 lots of dog food.  NOTE: You cannot add more dog food until 
he has begun eating the lot before. 
e) Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 3. 
f) Close Fido 
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Exercise 4: Complex Learning   
a) Run Fido. 
b) Add the ball and towel to the environment. 
c) Teach Fido to that playing with the ball is GOOD and playing with the towel is BAD. 
d) Do not forget to give Fido dog food when he appears hungry!! 
e) When you think that Fido has been trained, attempt to reverse the Fidos training.  See 
if you can make him think that the towel is GOOD and the ball is BAD. 
f) When you think you have done this take the towel away.  Observe Fidos behaviour. 
g) After a while, add the towel back into the environment. 
h) Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 4. 
i) Close Fido 
Exercise 5: Complex Behaviour  
a) Run Fido. 
b) For this exercise it is your task to train Fido to like an item of your choice for playing 
with.  Add all of Fidos items to the environment including food items and try to teach 
Fido to prefer playing with and eating certain objects.  Get Fido to have several 
favourite items, so if you take one away he plays with the other. 
c) Observe Fidos behaviour. 
d) Click on pause and answer the questions for exercise 5. 
e) Close Fido 
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Overall Impression of Fido 
Complete the remainder of the Questionnaire.  If you need to review your interaction 
with Fido, there will be a .txt file in the same directory as the program that has your last 
interaction recorded. (fidogreen.txt or fidoblue.txt), or you can run the Fido program again. 
Repeat Exercises and Questionnaire NOW for the other Fido Simulation. 
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Questionnaire 
These evaluations were made about which Fido?     ❑ Green      ❑Blue  
How to fill out this questionnaire: 
You will need to fill out TWO copies of this questionnaire. One for Fidogreen and one 
for Fidoblue. 
The answers to most questions will provide you with a rating scale like this: 
Place an X in the appropriate box in the range to indicate your answer. e.g. for all of the 
time put: 
for none of the time put: 
for half of the time put: 
For other answers, tick the yes or no box where indicated, or for an explanation, print a 
couple of brief sentences. 
none of the time | | | | | | | | all of the time
none of the time | | | | | | | X| all of the time
none of the time |X | | | | | | | all of the time
none of the time | | | | X| | | | all of the time
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Exercise 1 
a) How did the progression of Fidos behaviours appear to you? 
Did you feel that Fidos behaviour was driven by the values on the motivational urge 
gauges (the three gauges at the top of the window)?  
❑ Yes      ❑No 
Explain with an example: 
b) How would you rate Fidos changing emotional state taking into consideration his 
behaviour? 
c) How would you rate Fidos changing behaviours taking into consideration his 
emotional state? 
Exercise 2 
a) Did you find Fido easy to train? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
b) Do you think that Fido learned anything during the training? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
c) How would you rate Fidos emotional state with respect to your  training techniques? 
d) Briefly explain your training techniques and Fidos emotional and behavioural 
responses. 
Exercise 3 
erratic |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| calculated 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
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a) Did Fido eat only after he expressed he was hungry?  
b) When Fido was hungry and there was food available did Fido eat the food before 
doing something else? 
c) During the times when he was hungry, did Fido seem to retain knowledge of his 
previous training?  
❑ Yes      ❑No 
d) How would you rate this type of behaviour? 
Exercise 4 
a) How easy do you think that Fido is to train? 
b) Overall, do you think that Fido prioritises his behaviours?    ❑ Yes      ❑No 
c) How would you rate Fidos emotional states during the training? 
Exercise 5 
a) How easy do you think that Fido is to train in multiple tasks? 
never |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| always 
never |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| always 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
impossible |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| very easy 
impossible |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| very easy 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
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b) Do you think that Fido was able to devise a list of favourite and unfavourite items? 
❑ Yes      ❑No 
c) How would you rate Fidos emotional states during this exercise? 
d) Do you think that Fido learned from his emotional states? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
Explain: 
An Overview of your Evaluation of Fido 
Use your experience with Fido during the exercises to answer these questions. 
Intelligence 
There are many and varied definitions of intelligence.  For the purpose of this 
experiment, intelligence is being evaluated from several perspectives. 
a. Human behaviour is considered as goal orientated.  This means that we set goals 
and then try to satisfy them.  Often there are several actions that can be taken to 
achieve the same goal.  If one attempt fails, we can fall back on another plan of 
action to satisfy our goals.  Goal setting also means that if we do not WANT to do 
something then we wo not. 
Do you think that Fido sets goals?  ❑ Yes      ❑No 
Did Fido ever perform actions that were not related to his WANTs? ❑ Yes      
❑No 
Do you think that Fido can formulate ways in which to satisfy his goals?  
❑ Yes      ❑No 
Do you think that Fido tries other plans of action when one fails? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
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b. Attitude has been defined as a persons predisposition toward objects, actions and 
other elements. These predisposition are referred to as liking or disliking. Do you 
think that Fido shows the ability to form attitudes? 
❑ Yes      ❑No 
c. Do you think that Fido uses his attitudes to make decisions? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
 
 
d. Emotional Intelligence has been described as a persons ability to reason and make 
decisions based on emotional experiences and intuition.   
Do you think that Fido shows the ability to form emotions? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
If yes,  Do you think that Fidos emotions influence his behaviour? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
Explain: 
e. Another definition of intelligence is the ability to adapt to certain environmental 
changes.  Do you think that Fido has this form of intelligence? 
❑ Yes      ❑No 
f. Overall how would you rate Fidos intelligence?  
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable
 
 Explain: 
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Learning 
a. How would you rate Fido?  
b. Do you think Fido learns about his environment to plan for his actions?  
❑ Yes      ❑No 
 
c. Do you think Fido learns about good and bad actions? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
d. Do you think Fido learns about good and bad objects? ❑ Yes      ❑No 
e. Do you think Fido learns about his behaviours from his emotional reactions?  
❑ Yes      ❑No 
f. Overall how would your rate Fidos learning using the criteria listed above? 
Explain your answer. 
 
Behaviour 
a. Overall, how would you rate the Fidos behaviour? 
 
unpredictable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| predictable 
very disobedient |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| very obedient 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
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Emotions 
a. Do you think that Fidos emotional states were reasonable?  ❑ Yes      ❑No 
 Explain: 
b. To what degree were you able to predict Fidos emotional response to your 
actions? 
Personality 
Explain in your own words what you think about Fidos personality.  Rate your answer 
in terms of how the character conveyed this personality to you. 
Briefly describe your feelings toward Fido: 
Expectation 
The following questions relate to your expectations of the Fido simulation. 
a. Do you think that the actions that Fido performs throughout the simulation meet 
your expectations of a computerised character? 
unpredictable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| predictable 
none of the time |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| all of the time 
unpredictable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| predictable 
stupid |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| intelligent 
emotionally unstable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| emotionally stable 
erratic |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| goal orientated 
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Explain: 
b. Do you think the emotions produced by Fido seem reasonable? 
Explain with an example: 
c. During your interaction with Fido did you find that Fido produced actions that you 
thought were outrageous or out of the ordinary?  
Give an example: 
d. Did you find that at any time during the simulation that you experienced an 
emotional attachment to Fido? 
❑ Yes      ❑No 
Explain: 
Improvement 
Suggest one improvement for the emotional and behavioural model used to simulate 
Fido and explain why it is needed. 
 
Comments 
Any other comments? 
none of the time |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| all of the time 
none of the time |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| all of the time 
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Debriefing Questions 
Answer these questions AFTER you have completed all the exercises with BOTH 
Fidos. 
In your opinion, 
1. Which model possessed the best goal setting skills? □ Green      □ Blue 
2. Which model learned from your feedback the most?  □ Green      □ Blue 
3. Which model seemed more intelligent?   □ Green      □ Blue 
Explain why? 
4. How would you define the term emotionally intelligent? 
5. Which model seemed more emotionally intelligent? □ Green      □ Blue 
6. Overall what did you think of Fido Green? 
7. Overall what did you think of Fido Blue? 
8. Have you ever interacted with a program like Fido before?     □ Yes      □ No 
9. If yes, what program?  How does Fido compare to this? 
10. Your final ratings of the Fidos compared to what you expect from a computerised 
pet dog. 
 Fido Green Fido Blue 
Learning Skills unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
Behaviour unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
Emotional States unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
Goal Setting unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
unreasonable |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| reasonable 
 
Disclaimer: 
I understand that in undertaking this survey I will remain totally anonymous.  No 
personal details or my name will be published with this data.  I also understand that I may 
discontinue this evaluation at anytime before or during the experiment.  Data resulting 
from this survey will be collated with other surveys and statistically analysed and used in 
research papers and Penny Baillie’s PhD.  Any explanations that I give for certain answers 
could also be published however, I would still remain anonymous.   
Signed_________________________________________                   
Date:____/______/_______ 
Please return (just the questionnaire) by June 29th, 2001 to:   
Penny Baillie, Department of Mathematics and Computing, University of Southern Qld. Toowoomba, Qld., 
4350 Email: penny.baillie@usq.edu.au      Fax:  4631 1775 
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